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PRACTICE MAKES PERFECT: JUDICIAL
DISCRETION AND THE 1993 AMENDMENTS
TO RULE 11
Maureen N. Armour"

I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article discusses the 1993 amendments to Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure' and judicial discretion. The 1993
amendments signal the beginning of a new era in the courts' sanctions
practice, but one in which judicial discretion inevitably plays a significant
role. The Article examines the seemingly inevitable conflict between the
courts' sanctions practice, based largely on subjective judgments and a
fact intensive analysis, and their institutional commitment to produce a
decision based in law.2 This issue is examined from the perspective of
the judge. What does it mean to her when the rule states that she has the

discretion to sanction?
The Article explores methods to limit the Rule's reliance on the
courts' highly individualized approach to sanctions on a case by case
basis in order to limit variability, and have more predictability and
consistency in the case law.3 This goal is accomplished by proposing a

* Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University School of Law. M.S.W.,

University of California, 1975; J.D., Southern Methodist University, 1981.
1. See infra Appendix (including all versions of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and a brief history).
2. As pointed out in recent commentary regarding the 1993 amendments: "By providing
greater discretion to district court judges, the new rule will promote inequitable decisions. Since each
judge brings his or her own experiences and perspectives to the bench, uniform interpretations of
Rule 11, and corresponding predictability of results for litigants, are virtually impossible." Howard
A. Cutler, A Practitioner'sGuide to the 1993 Amendment to FederalRule of Civil Procedure 11,
67 TEMP. L. REv. 265, 267 (1994) (footnote omitted).
3. A large body of commentary looks at whether or not Rule 11 provides adequate guidance
to courts considering sanctions. The rule has spawned a body of confusing, conflicting case law that
does not always provide lawyers with a clear sense of what is and what is not acceptable advocacy.
See Edward D. Cavanagh, Developing StandardsUnder Amended Rule 11 of the FederalRules of
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Rule 11, like so many other judicial reforms, has been a lightning
rod for "arguments about the meaning of courts as institutions."'
Although the Rule is no longer intended to reach de minimis or minor
violations,6 the overriding institutional policies that should govern the

Civil Procedure,14 HOFSTRA L. REv. 499, 502 (1986); Melissa L. Nelken, Has the ChancellorShot
Himself in the Foot? Lookingfor a Middle Ground on Rule 11 Sanctions, 41 HASTINGS LJ. 383,
392-93 (1990) [hereinafter Nelken, Chancellor's Foot]; Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under
Amended FederalRule 11-Some "Chilling"Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and
Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1345-47 (1986) [hereinafter Nelken, Chilling]; Carl Tobias, The
1993 Revision of FederalRule 11, 70 IND. L.J. 171, 196 (1994) [hereinafter Tobias, 1993 Revision]
("Numerous courts encountered difficulty defining the term [frivolous], articulating consistent standards for identifying it, and providing clear guidance to counsel and litigants, partly because the legal
contentions that attorneys and parties present in individual cases differ significantly."); Carl Tobias,
Civil Rights Plaintiffs and the ProposedRevision of Rule 11, 77 IOwA L. REV. 1775, 1793 (1992)
[hereinafter Tobias, Civil Rights Plaintiffs] (.'[N]onfrivolous' is [a] term ... likely to foster
conflicting judicial construction and enforcement... "); Carl Tobias, PublicLaw Litigation and the
FederalRules of Civil Procedure,74 CORNELL L. REv. 270, 303 (1989) [hereinafter Tobias, Public
Law Litigation] ("Numerous courts' application of amended Rule 11 has jeopardized litigation
seeking to vindicate new legal theories, less popular and test cases as well as suits which plaintiffs
cannot easily plead and prove without data that defendants possess."); Georgene M. Vairo, The New
Rule 11: Past as Prologue?,28 LOy. L.A. L. REv. 39, 41, 62 (1994) [hereinafter Vairo, Prologue];
Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A CriticalAnalysis, 118 F.RtD. 189, 217 (1988) [hereinafter Vairo,
CriticalAnalysis] ("As many critics of amended Rule 11 feared, Rule I1 is being used aggressively
against plaintiffs in 'disfavored' lawsuits. While many of the cases in which sanctions have been
imposed appear to be frivolous, there are many very close cases.) (footnote omitted); Georgene
Vairo, Rule 11: Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 475, 476 (1991)
[hereinafter Vairo, Where We Are].
4. This dimension of judicial decisionmaking is routinely discussed in the commentary
without a clear resolution: To what extent is a decision constrained by law and to what extent does
it inevitably reflect the court's subjective or personal perspective? See Patricia A. Cain, Good and
Bad Bias: A Comment on Feminist Theory and Judging, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1945, 1946 (1988);
Gilbert S. Merritt, Judges on Judging: The Decision Making Process in FederalCourts of Appeals,
51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1385, 1386 (1990). See generally David E. Van Zandt, An Alternative Theory of
PracticalReason in JudicialDecisions, 65 TUL. L. REv. 775 (1991) (analyzing the concepts of common sense and practical reason in judicial decisionmaking). This is the primary issue addressed in
the literature on discretion and indeterminacy. It is also the issue addressed by the pragmatists, the
feminists, and the critical race theorists. Ultimately, it is the issue that underlies the debate regarding
the uniform and fair enforcement of Rule 11.
5. Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Preferencesfor Settlement, and the
Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471, 1527 (1994);
cf John B. Gates, Theory, Methods, and the New Institutionalism in Judicial Research, in THE
AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL ASsESSMENT 469 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991)
(engaging in an empirical, as opposed to normative, assessment of the American courts system).
6. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993) ("Rule 11 motions should not
be made or threatened for minor, inconsequential violations of the standards prescribed by subdivision (b).'); see also Tobias, 1993 Revision, supra note 3, at 180.
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courts' sanctions practice remain open to debate.7 As one commentator
aptly states, resolution of the Rule 11 debate "implicates the fundamental
tenets of the federal system of civil procedure."8 Should the courts'
discretion to sanction under Rule 11 be exercised aggressively, shifting
away from institutional policies that have traditionally erred "on the side
of, or [have] give[n] the benefit of the doubt to, the party"9 seeking
access to the courts? Or should the courts exercise their discretion to
sanction with restraint,"0 only intervening in cases in which it is clear
that there has been a serious abuse of judicial process leading to a
detrimental impact on the court?" The debate over the normative
preferences to be given priority in a court's Rule 11 sanctions practice

has reached a stalemate with no immediate resolution in sight. 2

7. See generally Tobias, 1993 Revision, supra note 3 (suggesting methods for the effective
implementation of the 1993 amendments to Rule 11); Vairo, Where We Are, supranote 3 (presenting
an empirical framework for the analysis of important issues raised by Rule 1I).
8. Vairo, Where We Are, supra note 3, at 486.
9. Martin B. Louis, InterceptingandDiscouragingDoubifulLitigation:A GoldenAnniversary
View of Pleading, Summary Judgment, and Rule 11 Sanctions Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,67 N.C. L. REV. 1023, 1052 (1989).
10. The call for restraint in Rule 11 sanctions has been widely advocated. See Timothy R.
Phelps, Note, Rule 11 Sanctions: TowardJudicialRestraint,26 WASHBURN L.J. 337,380-81 (1987)
(the broad grant of discretion under Rule 11 should encourage judicial self-restraint); Nancy H.
Wilder, Note, The 1983 Amendments to Rule 11: Answering the Critics' Concern with JudicialSelfRestraint, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 798, 816-18 (1986). But see Richard A. Posner, The Meaning
of Judicial Self-Restraint, 59 IND. LJ. 1, 9-10 (1983) (discussing the problem of grounding
principled decisionmaking in the norm ofjudicial self-restraint because it fails to tell the jurist what
principles to pick and why).
11. Both Professors Tobias and Vairo argue that sanctions in a close case or a case which is
less than clear amount to an unduly aggressive sanctions policy no longer mandated by the rule. See
Tobias, 1993 Revision, supra note 3, at 173-74; Vairo, Prologue,supra note 3, at 69-78. Even Judge
Schwarzer, an advocate of expanding attorneys' duties under the rule adheres to this notion: "The
Rule places a heavy burden on judges, one many judges would just as soon pass up. Judges have
an obligation to ... use the Rule with care and restraint. Judges, like lawyers, can stop and think
before imposing sanctions, minimizing mistakes ... " William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11: Entering
a New Era,28 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 7, 37 (1994).
12. See generally Schwarzer, supranote 11 (noting the difficulty with applying Rule 11 and
the great burden placed upon judges having to exercise their discretion); Vairo, Prologue,supra note
3 (discussing the myriad criticisms of Rule 11 prior to the 1993 amendments and the virtues of
various reform proposals aimed at remedying such problems). The issues raised in these articles
mirror prior commentary. See Louis, supra note 9, at 1052-62 (looking at Rule 11 as a successful
part of the courts' efforts to reform the litigation interception system of the federal rules); Vairo,
Where We Are, supra note 3, at 476 (discussing the divergence in opinion regarding the purposes
of Rule I1, stemming from inconsistency in the case law prior to 1993 amendment); cf.Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Sanctions, Symmetry, and Safe Harbors: Limiting Misapplication of Rule 11 by
HarmonizingIt with Pre-Verdict DismissalDevices, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 257, 261 (1991) (arguing
for treatment of the Rule as part of the pre-trial interception system, including sharing its policy
goals and normative assumptions); Beverly Dyer, Note, A Genuine Ground in Summary Judgment
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It is not the goal of this Article to resolve this debate. 13 Instead it
takes a much more limited look at the courts' sanctions practice and the
paradigm 14 of judicial discretion that has shaped that practice in an
effort to address the question of the proper scope and exercise of judicial
discretion under Rule 11. Numerous articles about Rule 11 have
addressed the problem of judicial discretion and Rule 11, but none from
the perspective offered here.'" This Article looks at the courts' exercise
of judicial discretion under Rule 11 from the perspective of the
decisionmaker. 16 In doing so, it looks at the sense that judges have of
their freedom to act and of their own discretion. 7 How then do judges
making sanctions decisions satisfy themselves and potential critics that
their exercise of judicial discretion is legitimate?" What standards

for Rule 11, 99 YALE L.J. 411, 430 (1989) (noting that courts did not apply "clear standards" in
applying Rule I1 in the aftermath of the 1983 amendments).
13. As aptly put by one commentator, "[t]he purpose, nature, and shape of courts ... are up
for grabs." Resnik, supra note 5, at 1531; see Thomas D. Lambros, The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: A New Adversarial Model for a New Era, 50 U. PiTT. L. REv. 789, 806 (1989)
(discussing the adjudicative and managerial role of the courts and the need for judges to utilize
creativity in fulfilling this role); cf Lawrence Baum, Courts and Policy Innovation, in THE
AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT, supranote 5, at 413 (looking at the adjudicative role
of the courts within the larger social context); Wayne V. McIntosh, Courts and Socioeconomic
Change, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT, supranote 5, at 281,281 (assessing
the "relationship between courts and the society in which they operate," and the different functions
they perform).
14. The term paradigm is a central organizing principle in the sociology of knowledge. See
PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALrrY 10 (First
Irvington 1980) (1966); THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 43 (2d
ed. 1970); WERNER STARK, THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1958). Paradigms denote the coherent
frameworks within which disparate facts are ordered and related to larger belief systems or
ideologies, and which guide action and communication. Paradigms provide a way to look at the
normative parameters of "objective reality." They provide a way to link our understanding of that
reality to socially ordered and conditioned facts.
15. See supra note 2.
16. AHARON BARAK, JUDICIAL DISCRETION 135-36 (Yadin Kaufmann trans., Yale Univ. 1989)
(1987).
An appropriate exercise of judicial discretion must be done out of an awareness of the
different foundations that comprise judicial discretion. An appropriate exercise ofjudicial
discretion is an objective exercise of judicial discretion.... A proper objective exercise
of judicial discretion must be done out of subjective awareness that judicial discretion is
being activated. This approach places a heavy burden upon the judge.
Id.
17. See Keith Hawkins, The Use of Legal Discretion: Perspectivesfrom Law and Social
Science, in THE USES OF DISCRETION 11, 15 (Keith Hawkins ed., 1992) (distinguishing between
discretion as a quality of rules, discretion as a quality of behavior, and discretion as the sense that
people have of their freedom to act).
18. Taking the lead offered by Professor Charles Yablon, this Article starts with the premise
that sanction decisions are made initially by the courts and we should look at what they perceive
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should the courts use and what standards do they use to make sure that
the result is not only fair and just, but perceived as such?1 9
Judicial discretion, for the purposes of this Article, defines the
court's decisionmaking activities that are not viewed by the court as
completely rule-bound or doctrinally constrained, which includes virtually
all of them if the commentary is to be believed. 0 For the purposes of
this Article, judicial discretion is treated, not as a problem, but as a fact
of judicial life. From the perspective of the decisionmaker, it is possible
21
to identify two distinct dimensions of the courts' judicial discretion.
Both dimensions affect how the decisionmaker understands and attempts
to answer the following question: How does a court ensure that the
discretionary decisions it renders are viewed as a legitimate exercise of
its judicial power?
One dimension is internal and looks at the nature or structure of the
courts' discretion in an effort to identify the decisional elements, judicial
skills, activities, and normative assumptions involved in rendering a
decision.' One such decisionmaking paradigm is the "legal" paradigm.

themselves to be doing if we are going to understand judicial discretion. See Charles M. Yablon,
Justifling the Judge's Hunch: An Essay on Discretion, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 231, 258-67 (1990).
Professor Yablon used his empirical analysis to enrich the theoretical understanding of discretion.
The goal of this Article is to use theoretical insights regarding discretion to enrich the judicial
practice.
19. The traditional "legal paradigm" as a method for justifying or legitimating judicial
decisions posits the existence of explicit rules and principles to which the court adheres. The
paradigm assumes that the "fit' between the rules and the facts ensures the resulting decision is
based on law and viewed as a legitimate exercise of judicial power. The paradigm is sometimes
criticized as a method of justification because it fails to acknowledge what the decision in fact
entails. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73
CORNELL L. REv. 422 (1988) (reviewing the role of precedent in judicial decisionmaking); Duncan
Kennedy, Freedom and Constraintin Adjudication:A CriticalPhenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC.
518 (1986) (discussing the conflict faced by judges between decisionmaking based upon precedent
and that based upon a subjective belief as to what is the proper or just outcome); Joel Levin, The
Concept of the Judicial Decision, 33 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 208 (1983) (discussing the reasoning
and logic of judicial decisions in constructing a conception of the common law as a guide in legal
decisionmaking).
20. It is not the purpose here to engage in or resolve more theoretical debates about the nature
ofjudicial discretion and whether its existence is consistent with a legal system based on "law." The
fact of discretion is a given and the question is how should it be constrained or explained? See, e.g.,
George A. Martinez, LegalIndeterminacy,JudicialDiscretionand the Mexican-American Litigation
Experience: 1930-1980, 27 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 555, 614-17 (1994) (pointing out that numerous
theoretical developments ranging from feminist jurisprudence to critical race theory all reflect
attempts by commentators to conceptualize and address the impact on the legal process of the judge
as a decisionmaker).
21. See infra notes 152-98 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 166-98 and accompanying text.
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The other paradigm defines the courts' discretion, that is, their
decisionmaking authority, in terms of their unique skills, experiences, and
institutional expertise.2 3 For purposes of this Article, this latter paradigm
of discretion is denoted the "skill" paradigm. 24 Courts using the "legal"
paradigm in rendering a decision focus primarily on the decisional
activities and skills involved in the application of law to fact.25 This
paradigm defines a "good" or legitimate decision as one in which the
court adequately developed the relevant facts, accurately represented the

23. The paradigm of judicial discretion as skill is seen in both the managerial and procedural
contexts. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, ManagerialJudging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U.
CHI. L. REv. 306, 309 (1986) (discussing the ideology of "managerialism," the belief that "ad hoc
procedural activism" can make the system work); Martin B. Louis, Discretion or Law: Appellate
Review of Determinationsthat Rule 11 Has Been Violated or that Nonmutual Issue Preclusion Will
Be Imposed Offensively, 68 N.C. L. REV. 733, 733 (1990) (noting the distinction between
inconsequential procedural issues and those that affect the outcome or merits of the case, with the
former reviewed for "abuse of discretion" and the latter reviewed de novo for their adherence to the
legal paradigm). See generally Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 374 (1982)
(noting that the courts' managerial practice involves informal interaction, the receipt of diverse
information, and wide variability in the decisional outcomes). The idea of deference to the courts
as decisionmakers, reflecting their unique institutional competence, is seen in substantive arenas as
well. Cf Alan D. Hornstein, Book Review, 44 MD. L. REv. 216, 221 (1985) (reviewing RICHARD
NEELY, WHY COURTS DON'T WORK (1982)) (discussing the expansion of judicial authority beyond
the limits of judicial competence and the problems posed by individual case adjudications that
produce far-reaching consequences). Courts are more willing to strictly enforce Rule 11 in procedural
areas that do not directly impact the merits. See, e.g., Henderson v. Department of Pub. Safety &
Corrections, 901 F.2d 1288, 1296-97 (5th Cir. 1990) (sanctioning motions for change in venue and
in limine).
24. The conceptualization of judicial discretion as "skill" has been noted by numerous
commentators. See supranote 23. However, Professor Charles Yablon has addressed the issue most
recently and thoroughly in an effort to define the normative assumptions of the paradigm. See
Yablon, supra note 18, at 260-68.
25. See BARAK, supra note 16, at 113-51. Discretion in the context of the legal paradigm is
often conceptualized as the gap or play in the normative structure of the law. See George C. Christie,
An Essay on Discretion, 1986 DUKE L.J. 747, 748 (defining discretion as the ability to pick
alternative outcomes and noting that it is "quintessentially associated with variability of result");
Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHi. L. REv. 14, 22 (1967) (criticizing legal
positivism by pointing out the importance of standards that operate differently from rules in guiding
judicial decisionmaking); Henry J. Friendly, IndiscretionAbout Discretion,31 EMORY L.J. 747, 754
(1982) (asserting that discretion describes decisions that will not be reversed even if the appellate
court disagrees because these are not decisions of law); Kent Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial
Decision: The Elusive Questfor the Fetters that Bind Judges, 75 COLuM. L. REv. 359, 364 (1975).
(discussing the "open texture" of the law that exists after a "judge has thoroughly considered all
relevant legal norms"). The question is whether courts are free to "legislate" in order to fill in this
gap or are they "legally bound to reach one conclusion?" Id. at 365. Cf Nicola Lacey, The
Jurisprudenceof Discretion:Escapingthe Legal Paradigm,in THE USES OF DISCRETION, supranote
17, at 361 (arguing that discretion cannot simply be understood as the gap or play in the normative
structure of the law or rules, but is instead the point of intersection between the legal paradigm and
the world).
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law, and then correctly applied the law to the facts.2 6 How then does a
court justify its exercise of judicial discretion using the paradigm of
discretion as "skill"? Or, stated from an institutional perspective, how are

courts to be held accountable for their exercise of decisionmaking
authority under the paradigm of discretion as "skill"? This is the question
this Article ultimately seeks to answer with regard to the courts' Rule 11

sanctions decisions.
The internal or structural dimension of judicial discretion as
decisionmaking is often discussed separate and apart from the second
dimension, the context of the decisionmaking. When one talks about the
context of a decision one is not simply talking about the "legal issue" as
narrowly presented to the court for resolution. Context is used here to
include both the "issue" and the institutional perspective brought to bear
on the decisionmaking.27 At the risk of oversimplification, this Article
looks primarily at the courts' evolving managerial and adjudicative roles
and functions and the decisions that are treated as falling within those
decisionmaking arenas in defining this contextual dimension." This

26. This is not an effort to resolve all questions regarding what courts are in fact really about
when they are attempting to adhere to the "legal paradigm" as a decisional model. However when
asked to make or justify a decision, the trial courts and courts of appeals routinely refer to this model
of decisionmaking. If the elements of the paradigm have been met, the decision is legitimate. This
Article is not concerned with whether in fact there is a single correct decision. The discrepancy
between the normative assumption of the paradigm that there is a single right or correct answer, and
the reality that even doctrinally driven decisions contemplate some variability in decisional outcomes
has been addressed elsewhere. See, e.g., Lea Brihnayer, Wobble, or the Death of Error,59 S. CAL.
L. REV. 363 (1986); Robert S. Thompson, Legitimate and Illegitimate DecisionalInconsistency: A
Comment on Brilmayer's Wobble, or the Death of Error, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 423 (1986). The focus
here is on the paradigm as a way courts understand what they are about when they render a decision.
27. See EEOC v. Anderson's Restaurant, Inc., No. 90-2119, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 5458, at
*7 (4th Cir. Mar. 24, 1992) (reported without published opinion at 958 F.2d 367) (holding that the
trial court is uniquely competent to address the amount of a fee award); Rivarde v. Missouri, 930
F.2d 641, 642 (8th Cir. 1991) ("The district court dismissed appellants' complaint based on a rule
of procedure, not a rule of law, and it is well settled that the district court has broad discretion in
matters ofjudicial procedure."); Lepkowski v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 804 F.2d 1310, 1321
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (questioning whether dismissal of a case pursuant to the court's local rules was "so
severe as to venture beyond the limits of judicial discretion"); infra notes 359-66 and accompanying
text.
28. The contextual elements of discretion are obviously more complex than the two on which
this Article focuses. For example, one contextual element that inevitably impacts a trial court's
decisonmaking is the judge's perception of the appellate court's role upon appeal. Cf. Christie, supra
note 25, at 752 ("Only where there is accountability can we meaningfully speak of discretion in
choice. Accountability, not the existence of standards, is the identifying feature of contexts in which
discretion is 'at home."). Here the adjudicative dimension refers to any decisions that impact upon
the resolution of the case on the merits, even procedural decisions. See generally Louis, supra note
23 (discussing the difference between procedural matters treated as warranting de novo review, for

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1996

7

Hofstra
Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 3
HOFSTRA LAWREVIEW

[V/ol. 24:677

Article argues that this contextual element provides additional norms and
goals that guide the courts' exercise of their discretionary decisionmaking
authority.29 Part II develops this contextual dimension for Rule 11 from
a historical perspective. This Part describes how the courts' discretion has
been shaped by the larger institutional debate 0 reflecting the tension
between the courts' managerial and adjudicative roles and functions.3 1
In Part EI, the decisionmaking paradigm of discretion as "skill" is
examined. The focus is on the courts' sanctions practice, and how that
practice has been shaped by the paradigm ofjudicial discretion as "skill"
32
and the corresponding shifting institutional priorities of the courts.
Another goal of this Article is to address whether or not the courts'
exercise of judicial discretion under Rule 11 is unique or sui generis. In
order to answer this question, this Article examines an extensive body of
commentary and case law discussing judicial discretion and relates it to
the Rule. One modest goal of this endeavor is to see whether the
theoretical insights developed in the commentary can address pressing
questions of judicial practice. In this way, this Article attempts to put the
question of judicial discretion and Rule 11 in a larger theoretical
context.3 3
It is important to realize that the paradigm ofjudicial discretion that
has shaped the courts' Rule 11 practice is not unique to the Rule. This
paradigm, judicial discretion defined as the trial court's unique experien-

example, summary judgment, and others).
29. For example, the paradigm of discretion as "skill" in the administrative context underlies
the theory of judicial deference to the agency decisionmaker. As stated by Professor Sunstein,
Agency decisions that involve pure issues of law are subject to independent judicial
examination. No judicial deference is appropriate because strictly legal competence is
sufficient to resolve the question. But decisions that involve the application of law to fact
call for a different standard, since the agency's specialized fact-finding capacity and
accountability are highly relevant.
Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2094 (1990).
30. See James A. Gardner, The Ambiguity of Legal Dreams: A Communitarian Defense of
JudicialRestraint, 71 N.C. L. REv. 805, 808 (1993) (asserting that traditional adjudicative norms
favoring judicial restraint are more in keeping with an open, diverse system of law and the diversity
of today's society); Stempel, supra note 12, at 260-61 ("[T]he sanctions debate is a distributional
political battle. ... "). If Rule 11 is applied stringently, claims will be lost but efficiency gained.
If it is interpreted in a more forgiving manner, managerial goals must give way to zealous advocacy.
Id. at 260.
31. See infra notes 63-146 and accompanying text. Discretion is not "peripheral to the
operation of law" and once this is recognized "then the interaction between law and other schemes
of values becomes of central importance." John Bell, Discretionary Decision-Making: A
JurisprudentialView, in THE USES OF DISCRETION, supra note 17, at 89, 110.
32. See infra notes 165-97 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 147-257 and accompanying text.
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tial skills and institutional competence, is part of a larger institutional
trend and is one of the dominant judicial decisionmaking models used by
the courts today.34 Understanding this enables one to apply insights
gained from other procedural3 5 and substantive36 arenas to the courts'
evolving sanctions practice under Rule 11.
A short digression is in order here to define the term "practice" as
it is used herein. 7 Courts, commentators, and practitioners use the term
"practice" to describe a variety of activities. For purposes of this Article,
when reference is made to the courts' Rule 11 sanctions "practice," the
term encompasses all of the activities undertaken by a court in rendering
a sanction decision.3 8 Use of the term "practice" to describe these
decisionmaking activities assumes that they are not merely random
activities, that there is an element of skill involved in rendering the
decision, and that this skill is acquired through experience.3 9 The term
"practice" is used to distinguish between judicial activity that is largely
rule-driven and is justified primarily in terms of its compliance with

34. See infra notes 147-98 (discussing a variety of writers who have looked at different
dimensions of the paradigm).
35. The substantial amendment of Rule 16 in 1983 reflects the judicial institutions' reliance
on judicial discretion as skill. Like Rule 11, Rule 16, prior to the 1983 amendments, had not been
amended since being created in 1938. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note (1983).
Overall the rule is intended to guide the courts' actions, while deferring to their discretion to
properly manage individual cases. Cf Alvin B. Rubin, The Managed Calendar:Some Pragmatic
Suggestions About Achieving the Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive Determination of Civil Cases in
Federal Courts, 4 JusT. SYs. J. 135 (1978) (discussing the importance of the judge's role as
manager/administrator of cases to the proper functioning of our system ofjustice); Note, Pretrial
Conference: A CriticalExamination of Local Rules Adopted by FederalDistrict Courts, 64 VA. L.
REV. 467 (1978) (proposing that local rules be altered to ensure flexibility of pre-trial practice, and
provide a proper balance of judicial guidance and attorney preparation in pretrial conferences).
36. The paradigm of discretion as "skill" occurs in the adjudicative arena as well, although
often under a different guise. See, e.g., Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making
Authority Between the Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the
Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REv. 993, 1012 n.138 (1986)
("Assessments of relative competence are usually made primarily in terms of the nature of the
question presented."). In many instances these questions include fact questions for the jury, questions
of "predominantly legal content," and those that involve fact sensitive evaluations of legal issues.
Id.; see William D. Popkin, A Common Law Lawyer on the Supreme Court: The Opinions ofJustice
Stevens, 1989 DuKE LJ. 1087, 1135 ("Judicial restraint implements principles of comparative
judicial competence."); Yablon, supranote 18, at 262-63.
37. While the concept of the courts' "practice" is used in slightly different ways and with
different nuances in this piece, Professor Yablon's work helped pull these ideas together. See Yablon,
supra note 18, at 261-68.
38. Professor Yablon has written about the paradigm of discretion as "skill" and the courts'
decisionmaking practices under the paradigm in a narrower adjudicative context. See id. I have taken
this concept and developed and expanded it for purposes of this Article.
39. See id.
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applicable rules and judicial activity that is not viewed so narrowly by
the court. 4' The term is used to capture the intangible elements of the
courts' decisionmaking that cannot be reduced to a neat formula, but
nevertheless make their presence known.4' As seen in Part I, the
federal courts' current sanctions practice is characterized largely by an
emphasis upon the unique facts of the case and by numerous subjective
or intuitive judgments. 42 A variety of practice elements are involved in
sanctions decision and these are described in more detail
rendering the
43
rn.
in Part

The purpose of the Article, however, is not simply to describe the
courts' current practices. Rather, the goal is to develop the normative
assumptions of the paradigm of discretion as "skill" that are used to
justify its use by the courts in their sanctions practice.' This Article
takes the paradigm and fleshes it out using both case law and commentary in order to establish its normative contours. Only then can the fit
between the paradigm and the courts' practice be evaluated at both the
trial and appellate level.
Discretion is not an abstraction to a judge, it is part of her daily life.
To a sitting jurist, the paradigm of judicial discretion as "skill" has its
own internal logic. 46 If the matter is delegated to the trial courts'
discretion because of their perceived skill and institutional competence,
a legitimate exercise of that discretion requires the courts to exercise that
skill and expertise rather than engage in highly subjective, idiosyncratic
decisionmaking. 47 This Article argues that the courts' sanctions decisions can be evaluated by examining how carefully the courts adhere to
the internal criteria of the paradigm and the relevant contextual goals and
decisional norms, in rendering a skillful (and therefore legitimate)
decision.4' This approach enables one to discuss the "fit" between the

40. Id. at 261.
41. Id. at 262.
42. See id. at 262. While Professor Yablon touches briefly on other elements of the "skill"
paradigm, the primary focus of his analysis is on the fact/skill dimension and the normative
assumption shared by the trial and appellate courts that there are right answers and the trial courts
are in the best position to make them. Id. at 264.
43. See infra notes 352-412 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 337-51 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 352-412 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 352-412 and accompanying text.
47. Commentators have grappled with the question of objectivity as a decisional norm ensuring
predictability and consistency in judicial decisionmaking. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and
Interpretation,34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982).
48. See infra notes 352-412 and accompanying text.
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courts' sanctions practice and the paradigm of discretion as "skill" and
what, if anything, needs to be done to improve the practice to make it
better fit the paradigm.4 9
Analyzing the courts' discretion in this way points out an important
distinction between criticisms aimed at improving the courts' sanctions
practice and criticisms that challenge the practice on its face." Even if
particular instances of the courts' sanctions practice adhere to the criteria
of a skillful sanctions decision, the practice itself can be criticized by
reference to values and norms which are "recognized as relevant to
judging the practice as a whole."5 1 Much of the criticism of Rule 11 has
been of this type. Critics of Rule 11 have routinely challenged the
assumption that a sanctions practice shaped by the paradigm of discretion
as "skill" can yield fair results. 2 In effect, these criticisms reflect a
desire for a more doctrinally circumscribed, rule-based sanctions practice
that adheres more explicitly to the adjudicative norms of the "legal
paradigm," thereby restraining the courts' exercise of discretion. 53 These
critics reject the normative assumptions that shape the paradigm of
discretion as "skill" and justify its application in the Rule 11 arena as a
legitimate exercise of judicial discretion.5 4 Understanding the difference
between these two critiques of the paradigm of discretion as "skill" and
the courts' sanctions practice helps explain why it is so difficult to

49. The goal of this Article is to develop a normative model of judicial discretion as "skill"
that makes explicit the assumptions courts bring to these types of decisions. This normative model
can then be used to guide the courts' sanctions practice. Asking whether or not a discretionary
decision is correct raises normative questions that cannot be answered solely by referring to the
courts' sanctions practice. What is needed is a method that enables the courts to look at their practice
critically. See Cavanagh, supra note 3, at 518 ("The Federal Rules are replete with vague
terminology ....It may be further argued that the drafters of Rule 11 intentionally employed vague
terminology to provide the courts with flexibility, enabling judges to develop clearer guidelines over
time."); Yablon, supranote 18, at 256-57 ("[D]ebates over whether institutional decisionmakers have
too much or too little discretion demonstrate that little consensus exists among practicing lawyers
as to when discretion is exercised appropriately.").
50. See Yablon, supra note 18, at 265-66; infra notes 337-51 and accompanying text
(discussing these different types of criticisms).
51. Yablon, supranote 18, at 266. This insight has been touched on in other works discussing
judicial discretion. The decisionmaker is usually most concerned with improving the decisionmaking,
while the critics are most concerned with the inevitable discretionary character of the decision. See
infra notes 337-51 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 65-148 and accompanying text (discussing the body of criticism that
followed the 1983 amendments to the Rule); cf.Lacey, supra note 25 (critiquing the assumptions
underlying legal theorist's "law-discretion" dichotomy and questioning the utility of "legal methods"
to limit or control discretionary power).
53. See infra notes 65-148 (discussing a variety of criticisms of the courts' sanctions practice).
54. See infra notes 65-148 and accompanying text.
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respond to the latter. When the paradigm and the practice are challenged
in this5 way, little can be done to fix the problems short of starting all
5

over.

Part IV of this Article examines the 1993 amendments to Rule 11
in light of the paradigm of discretion as "skill. 5 6 This Part argues that
the 1993 amendments, interpreted and applied pursuant to the paradigm
of discretion as "skill," can significantly improve the courts' sanctions
practice. It also points out critical gaps in the fit between the courts'
practice and the paradigm that were not directly addressed by the
amendments and suggests methods to continue to improve the courts'
sanctions practice and this "fit."
This Article also challenges the assumption that because the courts'
highly discretionary decisions under Rule 11 fall outside of the traditional
"legal paradigm,"57 there is no "legal" standard by which they can and
should be judged.5 8 Obviously the paradigm of discretion as "skill" is
a legal paradigm to the extent that it describes legal decisions made by
the court and legitimizes those decisions as an exercise of judicial
authority. The term "legal paradigm" however is used here to denote the
narrower decisionmaking model that emphasizes principled
decisionmaking--the application of law to fact 5 9-which is largely
characteristic of substantive or merits-based decisions.' This Article
argues that the courts need a different normative model to evaluate their
sanctions practice. The paradigm of judicial discretion as "skill" has its
own internal logic and can provide such a normative decisionmaking
model.61
Different matters, here sanctions, are routinely delegated to the trial
courts' discretion because of their perceived skill and institutional

55.
response
56.
57.

See infra notes 414-35 and accompanying text (discussing the Advisory Committee's
to these critiques).
See infra notes 436-500 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 168-200 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional legal paradigm).

58. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990). For a more in-depth discussion
of this aspect of the Cooter opinion, see infra notes 261-336 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 355-412 and accompanying text.
60. Cf Kent Greenawalt, Policy,Rights, and JudicialDecision, 11 GA. L. REV. 991, 1035-53
(1977) (noting that it is when the courts have to address questions of substantive rights that the legal
paradigm comes to the fore, especially in cases in which there is consensus that there should be one
right answer).
61. See Catharine Wells, Situated Decisionmaking, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1727, 1737 (1990);
infra notes 355-412 and accompanying text (discussing the need to develop a normative model of
pragmatic decisionmaking).
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expertise in handling them.62 A legitimate exercise of that discretion
requires the courts to justify their discretionary decision by demonstrating
that the decision was skillfully made.6 ' Approaching the problem of
discretion from the "inside-out" is not designed to be a purely academic
exercise. Requiring the courts to undertake this explication and explanation to test their adherence to the paradigm of discretion as "skill" in
rendering a sanctions decision will help build an experiential database of
case law, yielding a more coherent sanctions jurisprudence.' At the
very least, it will better respond to the critics' concerns.

II. RULE 11 IN ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT-DEVELOPING THE
COURTS' SANCTIONS PRACTICE

The enactment of the 1983 amendments to Rule 11 were intended
to fundamentally alter the federal courts' sanctions practice.65 The
Advisory Committee's Note to the 1983 Amendment to Rule 11 made
it clear that the Committee viewed the paucity of Rule 11 sanctions in
the case law' as reflecting unwarranted judicial reluctance to punish
colleagues in the face of a perceived litigation explosion threatening a
crisis in the courts.67 This "crisis in the courts" motivated the Committee to encourage aggressive judicial regulation of the litigation process
to punish and deter the filing of frivolous claims.6"
62. See, e.g., Yablon, supra note 18, at 260-67 (discussing the courts' exercise of their
discretion as "skill" in the area of criminal sentencing); infra notes 413-35 and accompanying text.
63. See Yablon, supra note 18, at 267-68.
64. See infra notes 503-28 and accompanying text.
65.

See COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES, AMENDMENTS

TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, H.R. DOC.. No. 54, 98th

Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1983) [hereinafter CHIEF JUSTICE COMMUNICATION]; COMMITTEE ON RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY

DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 7-10 (June 1981)
[hereinafter 1981 PRELIMINARY DRAFT]; Julian A. Cook, Rule 11: A Judicial Approach to an

Effective Administration ofJustice in the United States Courts, 15 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 397, 421-22
(1988); Thomas E. Patton, New Rules Intended to Streamline PretrialProcess, LEGAL TIMES, May
16, 1983, at 14.
66. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983); see ADVISORY COMM. ON THE CIVIL
RULES, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., CALL FOR WRITTEN COMMENTS ON RULE I1 OF THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND RELATED RULES, AS AMENDED IN 1983 2-4 (July 24,

1990) [hereinafter CALL FOR COMMENT]; D. Michael Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its

Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problemswith FederalRule of Civil Procedure11, 61 MINN. L. REv.
1,5 (1976).
67. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983) ("The new language is intended
to reduce the reluctance of courts to impose sanctions ....
").
68. See id.; cf.Stewart Jay, The World Accordingto JudgePosner,73 GEo. L.i. 1507, 1522-29
(1985) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985))
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Originally amended in an era of judicial reform, 69 Rule 11 can only
be understood within that historical context. The procedural reforms of
the 1980s were driven by concerns that the federal rules 70 encouraged
unrestrained adversarialism on the part of litigants and unwarranted
neutrality on the part of the judiciary.71 This "critique of adversarialism"
challenged the traditional tripartite structure of adjudication-a neutral
judge 72 refereeing all-out combat between two trained advocates 73 as

(critiquing Posner's views on methods by which the federal court system could better regulate its
caseload).
69. See Stempel, supra note 12, at 262-67. Stempel describes the procedural reforms of the
1980s as a decade of "counter revolution" spawned by the profession's increasing belief that existing
pretrial termination procedures were not being effectively used by the courts. Id. While efforts to
amend Federal Rule 68, rendering it a de facto fee shift, were thwarted, the conservative elements
of reform gained ground in Rule 11. Id. at 264-65.
70. See Louis, supra note 9, at 1061-62 (urging expansion of pretrial interception procedures
and the adoption of a modified English Rule as needed reforms to improve the functioning of the
judicial system); Melissa L. Nelken, One Step Forward,Two Steps Back: Summary Judgment After
Celotex, 40 HASTNGS L.J. 53, 85 (1988) (questioning changes in summary judgment procedures
reflecting this impetus to reform); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A DistortedMirror: The Supreme Court's
Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process,49 OHIO
ST. L.J. 95, 178-81 (1988) (describing the impact on summary judgment procedures of the 1980s
impetus to reform aimed at making the system efficient); Stempel, supra note 12, at 257-60; cf
Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundariesof a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit Structurefrom
the Field Code to the FederalRules, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 101 (1989) (discussing the desirable
balance in rules of procedure between the flexibility of judicial discretion and the "utility of [a]
general rule and form to guide and constrain decision").
71. See John B. Attanasio, A Duty-OrientedProcedurein a Rights-OrientedSociety, 63 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 597, 603-05 (1988); Judith Resnik, The Domain of Courts, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2219,
2224 (1989) [hereinafter Resnik, The Domain];Judith Resnik, FailingFaith:
Adjudicatory Procedure
in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 513-14, 523-26 (1986) [hereinafter Resnik, Failing Faith];
William W. Schwarzer, Sanctions Underthe New FederalRule 11-A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181,
181 (1985) ("Widespread concern over frivolous litigation and abusive practices of attorneys led to
the amendment in 1983 of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.").
72. Cf Harry T. Edwards, The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of Principled
Decisionmaking, 1991 WIS. L. REv. 837, 856-64 (discussing the political aspect of judicial
decisionmaking as sometimes undermining the goal of neutrality); Michael Herz, ChoosingBetween
Normative and Descriptive Versions of the JudicialRole, 75 MARQ. L. REv. 725, 727-30 (1992)
(offering a critique of the model of neutral, apolitical judicial decisionmaking).
73. Judge Schwarzer was an early critic who focused on the lack of balance within the
adversarial paradigm in defining the role of the attorney. He argued that there was an over-emphasis
on the duty of the zealous advocate and an inadequate emphasis on lawyers' duties as officers of the
court, including the duty ofcandor. See Schwarzer, supranote 71, at 184 (noting that the attorney's
"duty to place his client's interests ahead of all others" is "subject to the correlative obligation to
comply with the rules and to conduct himself in a manner consistent with the proper functioning of
[the justice] system"); cf. John B. Attanasio, Foreword: Verstehen and Dispute Resolution, 67
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1317, 1317 (1992) (discussing the adversarial method of dispute
resolution-each party putting forth their strongest arguments to a neutral judge and jury to
determine who wins-as one among many methods of legal dispute resolution representing a
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being inefficient and burdensome on the courts. 74 The 1983 amendments
to Rule 11 were one of a number of procedural reforms intended to alter
the basic character of the federal judicial system.7 5 As stated by one
observer of the process of reform: "We have moved from arguments

about the need to foster judicial decisions 'on the merits' by simplifying
procedure to conversations about the desirability of limiting
the use of
'7 6
courts in general and of the federal courts in particular.
The procedural reforms of the late 1970s and 1980s represented a
significant change in attitude toward the judicial system." The system

had been characterized by a "deep distrust of the tribunal's. .. competence and neutrality" and emphasized instead strong party control of the
litigation process. 78
The procedural reforms of this era favored expanding judicial

discretion to aggressively manage the courts' dockets and cases as the
strategy most likely to achieve the goal of an efficient and effective court

continuum of formal, principled methods); Elliott, supra note 23, at 309-10 (discussing the merits
of the managerial judging movement and its emphasis on reforming the civil litigation system to ease
overburdened federal courts); Resnik, supra note 23, at 383-86 (describing the traditional model of
judicial neutrality as contrasted to the new managerial model).
74. See, e.g., Lambros, supranote 13, at 794 (1989) (noting "the spirit ofjudicial management
and control evinced in the 1983 amendments" to the federal rules); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., American
Law Institute Background Paper, Study on Paths to a "Better Way": Litigation, Alternatives, and
Accommodation, 1989 DUKE L.J. 824, 830-31.
75. See Schwarzer, supra note 71, at 181-84. For example, the "bad faith" standard in the
original version of Rule I1 was deemed underinclusive in its regulatory reach and too tolerant of
current litigation practice norms. Id. at 191; cf Louis, supra note 9, at 1028-29.
76. Resnik, Failing Faith, supra note 71, at 497 (footnote omitted).
77. See Stephen McG. Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary System, 44
HAsTNGs LJ.1, 4 (1992) (challenging the assumptions that underlie the critique of adversarialism,
the favorable treatment of settlements, and this shift in attitude toward the courts).
78. Id. at 5. The judicial bias that bedevils the critics of Rule 11 is not the highly personal or
subjective bias that periodically distorts judicial action, although that can be a problem. See, e.g.,
Elona v. Frederick, 952 F.2d 410 (11th Cir.) (reported without published opinion, full opinion
available at 61 U.S.L.W. 3161) (11th Cir. Dec. 31, 1991)), cert. denied,506 U.S. 915 (1992); Goad
v. Rollins, 961 F.2d 1575 (5th Cir.) (reported without published opinion, full opinion available at
61 U.S.L.W. 3161 (5th Cir. April 30)), cerL denied, 113 S. Ct. 193 (1992). Critics are more
concerned about the personal and institutional biases that a sitting judge develops and that inform
his normative choices regarding worthy litigation and questionable claims. See SAuL M. KASSIN, AN
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RuLE 11 SANCTIONS 8-9 (1985) (raising questions about how differences in
enforcement norms and demographics amongst different judges account for disparity in sanctions
case law following the 1983 amendments); Martin H. Redish, The FederalCourts, JudicialRestraint,
and the Importance ofAnalyzing Legal Doctrine, 85 COLUM. L.REV.1378, 1383 (1985) (reviewing
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985)); Martha Minow, Stripped
Down Like a Runner or Enrichedby Experience: Bias and Impartialityof Judges and Jurors,33
WM. & MARY L. Rv.1201 (1992).
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system.79 Trial court judges were deemed to have the institutional skill
and expertise necessary to implement this reform strategy."0 Commentators at the time questioned whether the impetus to judicial reform was in
fact fueled "solely by a 'neutral' agenda of. . . 'efficiency'
and... 'economy,"' since it appeared to reflect, at least in part, a
political agenda of exclusion."' One observer expressed her concerns as
follows: "I am concerned about the hostility to and trivialization of
individual claims. I have often heard from federal judges that they don't
have the time to spend on a small claim--that it's not 'worth it,' that
82
their time (and they) are too important. ....
In keeping with their criticism of the adversarial method of
adjudication, reformers of this era also challenged the ethical boundaries
of the attorney-client relationship by challenging the assumption that an
attorney owed her sole and ultimate allegiance to her client. According
to the commentators and the courts, this definition of the attorney's
obligations failed to give due emphasis to other significant dimensions
of the attorney's role. 83 The reformers particularly emphasized the role

79. See Bundy, supra note 77, at 376-77; Resnik, supra note 23, at 378-79. Two strategies
available to the courts to achieve that goal, settlement and sanctions, share similarities. Each addresses the need for court reform by attempting to limit potential litigants' access to the courts, thereby
conserving scarce judicial resources. At their core, many of the policies of Rule 11 sanctions and
the policies encouraging private dispute resolution-i.e., settlement--are aimed at the same thing,
limiting the adversarial process and the expenditure of institutional resources on formal dispute
resolution. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073, 1075 (1984) (rejecting
settlement as preferable to judgment and looks at it as a "highly problematic technique for
streamlining dockets [and] a capitulation to the conditions of mass society [which] should be neither
encouraged nor praised"); Carolyn L. Dessin, Recent Case, 31 VILL. L. REv. 1073, 1088-91 (1986);
Jennifer O'Heame, Comment, Compelled Participationin Innovative PretrialProceedings,84 Nw.
U. L. REV. 290,293-95 (1989); David A. Rammelt, Note, "Inherent Power" and Rule 16. How Far
Can a Federal Court Push the Litigant Toward Settlement?, 65 IND. L.J. 965, 967 (1990).
80. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation ofAmerican Civil Procedure:The Example
ofRule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1954 (1989); Resnik, supra note 23, at 395-97; infra notes
330-44 (discussing the paradigm of discretion as judicial "skill" and "institutional competence"); cf
Attanasio, supra note 73, at 601; Nelken, supra note 70, at 83-85.
81. Resnik, The Domain, supranote 71, at 2220; see also THE PoLITCS OF JUDICIAL REFORM
I (Philip L. Dubois ed., 1982) (arguing that court reform is not merely a process of modernization,
but involves organizational and procedural changes that redistribute power within and without the
court system). Changes aimed at restricting access to the courts or undermining the legitimating triad
of a neutral judge applying law to facts and publicly explaining the outcomes undermine the
legitimacy of a judicial system in a democracy. See id. at 76-77. The legitimacy of the courts'
exercise of power rests on their perceived neutrality and the availability of public scrutiny. 1d. at 73.
82. Resnik, The Domain, supra note 71, at 2228.
83. See, e.g., Karen S.Beck, Note, Rule 11 and Its Effect on Attorney/Client Relations, 65 S.
CAL. L. REv. 875, 878 (1992) (examining the "tension between Rule Il's goals and traditional
notions of the attomey/client relationship'); cf Anthony V. Alfieri, ImpoverishedPractices,81 GEO.
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of attorneys as officers of the court and their duty to consider both their
client's interests and the courts' interest when pursuing litigation. 4
On balance, the 1983 amendments to Rule 11 were greeted with
enthusiasm as one of the court reforms most likely to increase the
efficiency and effectiveness of the judicial system 5 by deterring the
filing and pursuit of frivolous litigation. 6 Recited with almost mantra-

L.J. 2567, 2596 (1993) (noting that formalism is a "weak version of modernist lawyering [which]
presupposes lawyer autonomy and cognitive capacity"); Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients,34
UCLA L. REV. 717, 720 (1987) (discussing the nature of the attorney-client relationship and the
value of client autonomy); Kenneth L. Penegar, The Five Pillarsof Professionalism,49 U. PTrr. L.
REV. 307, 311 (1988) (discussing competing views of the representational relationship as reflecting
competing societal norms: individualism, contractual relationships, and adversarialism versus
cooperation and communalism). See generally William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy:
ProceduralJustice andProfessionalEthics, 29 Wis. L. REV. 30 (1978) [hereinafter Simon, Ideology]
(engaging in a critical examination of the ideology of advocacy as defining the ethical boundaries
of the representational relationship); William H. Simon, Visions of Practicein Legal Thought, 36
STAN. L. REV. 469 (1984) [hereinafter Simon, Visions] (contrasting the vision of law practice
expressed in the professional culture with that derived from critical legal writing).
84. See William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1024 (1988)
(discussing the scope of the attorney's duty of disclosure under Rule 11 and "where to draw the line
between inadequate lawyering and litigation abuse"); Schwarzer, supra note 71, at 204 ("The rule
therefore should be viewed as a part of an integrated system created by the federal rules for the just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of actions."). These concerns continue to shape the debate
over Rule 11. See generally Schwarzer, supra note 11 (discussing the goal of the 1993 amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to regulate lawyers' behavior and maximize judicial
efficiency).
85. See, e.g., Schwarzer, supra note 71, at 183; cf Herbert Kritzer et al., Rule 11: Moving
Beyond the Cosmic Anecdote, 75 JUDICATURE 269, 269 (1992) (asserting the connection between
attorney conduct and the "litigation explosion" without reference to an empirical basis for either).
There is, however, no data linking the "alleged" litigation explosion with an increased filing of
frivolous litigation. In light of the plethora of empirical studies undertaken since Rule Il's amendment in 1983, it is ironic that the impetus for procedural reform resulting in the amendment of Rule
11 lacked an empirical justification. Reformers relied instead on the anecdotal experience of judges
with individual cases and dockets to support their conclusion that "frivolous" litigation was
overrunning the courts. Nor is there any data that indicates docket congestion and litigation delays
were due in any substantial part to the lack of a reasonable prefiling inquiry or that cases intercepted
prior to trial, through summary judgment or motions to dismiss, raised legal or factual issues that
could have been resolved prior to filing by this investigation. See Arthur B. LaFrance, FederalRule
11 and Public Interest Litigation, 22 VAt. U. L. REV. 331, 344-46 (1988) (noting that Rule 11
directly challenged Congressional policy favoring open courts and yet it did so without providing
any statistics substantiating the problem of frivolous litigation).
86. See Paul A. Batista, Introductory Remarks, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 1 (1985) (discussing
the use of Rule 11 to sanction "abuse of the litigation process"); Robert L. Carter, The Historyand
Purposesof Rule 11, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 4, 7 (1985) (asserting that the amended rule "replaces
the vague good faith formula with a reasonableness standard[;] a stricter and more precise standard
than good faith"); Cavanagh, supra note 3, at 500 (discussing the dual purpose of Rule II: "(1) to
deter dilatory or abusive behavior, and (2) to streamline litigation"). Cavanagh noted that Rule 11
was one of several rules amended in 1983 to address the problem of docket load, litigation delay,
and court costs. Id. at 499-500; see Roger M. Baron, Stepping on Board the Rule 11 Bandwagon,
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like regularity in the Rule 11 commentary, the "litigation explosion" had
become an article of faith-an unquestioned assumption underlying the
perceived need to reform and aggressively apply the Rule. 7
The response to the courts' efforts to use Rule 11 to further the
goals of managerial reform was immediate and defined the Rule 11
debate for the next ten years. The Rule's critics questioned its use to9
limit access to the courts; its inconsistent and variable application;8

its potential
use of attorney fee shifts in violation of the American
9
Rule; " and the limited appellate review provided sanction decisions

35 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 249, 249-51 (1987) (arguing that the Rule 11 standards are being uniformly
applied throughout the circuits to deter frivolous litigation); Cook, supra note 65, at 397 (examining
the "efforts of the federal judiciary to deal with a burgeoning civil case load" through the mechanism
of Rule 11); Howard D. DuBosar & Ubaldo J. Perez, Jr., Comment, Ask Questions Firstand Shoot
Later: ConstrainingFrivolity in Litigation Under Rule 11, 40 U. MIAMt L. REV. 1267, 1271 (1986)
(claiming Rule 11 is being applied consistent with its standards and that continued enforcement will
achieve the purpose of deterring litigation abuse). While noting extensive criticism of the Rule, in
particular its inconsistency with the traditional adversarial model, the authors are sanguine that the
costs are warranted and the rule will give rise to a new adversarial model. See id. at 1295-97. See
generally Michael E. Peeples, Note, Litigant Responsibility:FederalRule of Civil Procedure11 and
Its Application, 27 B.C. L. REv. 385 (1986) (claiming Rule 11 is accomplishing the purpose of
deterring litigation abuses and streamlining litigation without stifling creative and zealous advocacy).
87. See Vairo, Where We Are, supra note 3, at 481.
[T]he recent Federal Judicial Center Preliminary Report ... suggests that the problem of
frivolous lawsuits is illusory and that Rule I1 may not be the best deterrent for improper
filings. Indeed, approximately three-quarters of the responding judges thought groundless
litigation was either only a small problem or no problem at all.
Id.; cf. id. at 481 n.37 (noting that efforts to develop any baseline measure of frivolous litigation for
purposes of comparison with Rule I1 activity have uniformly relied on self-reported rough thumb
perceptions of the courts' dockets). Furthermore, there has been no hard baseline data developed
since 1983 to evaluate the actual impact of Rule 11. See id. at 480-82.
88. See Edward Greer, Rule 11: Substantive Bias in Formal Uniformity After the Supreme
Court Trilogy, 26 NEw ENG. L. REv. 111, 117 (1991); Donna Marino, Rule 11 and Public Interest
Litigation:The Trend Toward Limiting Access to the FederalCourts, 44 RUTGERS L. REv. 923, 923
(1992); Nelken, Chancellor'sFoot, supra note 3, at 393-94; Note, A Petition Clause Analysis of
Suits Against the Government. Implicationsfor Rule 11 Sanctions, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1111, 1126
(1993).
89. Even proponents of the Rule such as Judge Schwarzer note the problem of "subjectivity
and inconsistency" in the application of the Rule, particularly as applied to evaluating the threshold
merits of the case. Schwarzer, supranote 84, at 1023-24; see, e.g., Burbank, supranote 80, at 1930;
Nelken, Chilling, supra note 3, at 1326; Tobias, Public Law Litigation, supra note 3, at 303-05; cf
Carl Tobias, The Transformation of Trans-Substantivity, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501 (1992)
(responding to the argument that some procedural rules impact disproportionately upon certain
classes of litigants).
90. See Nelken, Chancellor'sFoot,supranote 3, at 401 (noting that most "courts have resisted
the argument that a losing paper is necessarily a sanctionable paper, the ultimate cost-shifting view").
Nelken notes the tension in the rule between sanctioning attorney conduct and legal product. To
avoid problems with the American Rule, Nelken argues that "'Rule I1 focuses on inputs, not
outputs, conduct rather than result."' Id. at 402 (quotingMars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A.,
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under the Rule. 9' A substantial body of the critical commentary focused
on "fine tuning" the Rule's application on a case by case basis and
improving the courts' sanctions practice. 2 There was, however, a more
fundamental concern raised by some critics: the discretionary nature of

the courts' decisions whether or not to deem a claim legally or factually
frivolous, the threshold liability issue. These critics were concerned that
the lack of doctrinal limitations in the Rule generated inconsistent and
conflicting case law and gave undue play to the individual judge's
normative assumptions about worthy litigation.93 These critics also
expressed concern that these matters were delegated to the trial courts'
skill to resolve on a case by case basis-a strategy not designed to yield

a coherent body of case law or sanctions jurisprudence. 94 Yet the critics
acknowledged the difficulty of fundamentally altering the courts'
sanctions practice and limiting the Rule's reliance on the trial courts'

discretion in generating a decision.95 Overall, what was most problemat-

880 F.2d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1989)); see NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL COURTS: SANCTIONS AND ATTORNEYs' FEEs 25-27 (1987) (discussing how
the sanctions' exception to the American Rule may have swallowed it whole). "Rule 11, amended
in 1983, goes well beyond the limited 'bad faith' exception.... Thus fee shifting as a result of a
sanction, is becoming a common exception to the American Rule." Id. at 26; see Stephen B.
Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some
Questions About Power, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 997, 1003 (1983); Joseph C. Kopec, Note, The Use
of Rule 11 Sanctions and Prevailing-PartyFee-Shifting Statutes After Rule 41(a)(1)(i) Notice
Dismissal, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1512, 1516 (1988); cf E. Richard Larson, The Origins and History
ofAttorneys'Fees Law, PLI Order No. H4-5015 (April 1, 1987); John Leubsdorf, Toward a History
of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 9,
13 (discussing the historical emergence of the American Rule); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal
Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 653 (discussing the
various rationales for fee shifting).
91. See Louis, supra note 23, at 740-41; Vairo, Prologue,supranote 3, at 62; Christopher A.
Considine, Note, Rule 11: ConflictingAppellate Standardsof Review and a Proposed Uniform Approach, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 727, 734-37 (1990); Louis Greco, Note, StandardofAppellate Review
of Rule 11 Decisions, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 251, 255-60 (1989).
92. See infra note 357 and accompanying text (discussing use of the rule to regulate attorney
conduct).
93. See supra note 3; infra notes 355-412 and accompanying text (discussing criticismof Rule
11).
94. See supra note 3; infra notes 201-60.
95. See Byron C. Keeling, Toward a BalancedApproach to "Frivolous" Litigation:A Critical
Review ofFederalRule 11 and State Sanctions Provisions,21 PEPP. L. REV. 1067, 1071-72 (1994)
(discussing various drafting strategies used by courts to address the lack of a regulatory brightline
distinguishing sanctionable from nonsanctionable litigation and noting the trend to tie sanctions to
a conduct based standard, and not the legal merits of the case or an attorney's legal product);
Nelken, Chancellor'sFoot,supranote 3, at 1352-53 (outlining Professor Nelken's efforts to redraft
the Rule and address the problem of indeterminacy in its form, variability in its application, and
deterrence in its effect).
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ic in the courts' sanctions practice was the extent to which the courts'
subjective judgments were inevitably involved in the interpretation and
application of the Rule. 6 The critics wanted to see fundamental changes
in the courts' sanctions practice under Rule 11, including an increased
emphasis on the traditional judicial norms of neutrality, objectivity,
reasonableness, and restraint. 97
Emphasizing the managerial utility of the Rule and the need to let
the courts develop their Rule 11 expertise, proponents of the rule favored
allowing the courts' sanctions practice to evolve.98 According to them,
the practice of delegating sanctions to the courts' discretion was not a
fundamentally flawed procedural strategy. The trial courts possessed the
necessary skills and institutional competence to effectively and fairly
oversee the implementation of the Rule. 99 The Rule's critics did not
want to wait, and favored immediate amendment in order to forestall
what they saw as the Rule's adverse impact on the courts. In their view,
the highly subjective judgments of the courts that formed the basis of
their sanctions decisions failed to generate a sufficiently bright regulatory
line to guide attorneys, or at least put them on notice as to the limits of
acceptable advocacy. The critics argued that the resulting highly variable,
potentially overinclusive application of the Rule, with its threat of
sanctions, undermined the fundamental values of an open court system
and the institutional commitment to decisions based on law."°
Historically, interception systems designed to deter or terminate
litigation prior to a full trial on the merits have "err[ed] on the side of,

96. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 80, at 1932; Keeling, supra note 95, at 1157; Nelken,
Chilling, supra note 3, at 1329-30.
97. Cf notes 65-148 and accompanying text (discussing the Advisory Committee's Note as
to the judicial reluctance to punish colleagues).
98. See Arthur R. Miller, The New CertificationStandardUnder Rule 11, 130 F.R.D. 479,481
(1990).
99. See, e.g., Schwarzer, supra note 84, at 1019.
100. See Bench-BarProposalto Revise Civil ProcedureRule 11, 137 F.R.D. 159, 162 (1991);
cf Sam D. Johnson et al., The ProposedAmendments to Rule 11: Urgent Problems and Suggested
Solutions, 43 BAYLoR L. REv. 647, 675 (1991) (critiquing Rule I1 as an exception to the American
Rule, and arguing for limited sanctions, vigorous appellate review, and a "[c]all
for [j]udicial
[t]olerance"); Tobias, Civil Rights Plaintiffs,supra note 3, at 1790-91; Kerian Bunch, Note, Taming
the Fury:Do the 1991 ProposedAmendments to Rule 11 Go FarEnough?, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs
957, 971 (1992) (arguing that the Rule needs to include a definition of frivolousness that excludes
any claim that "could gather the support of a significant number of competent and well-informed
attorneys" (quoting Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on Federal Courts,
Comments 6 & nn.10-12 (revised Nov. 20, 1991))).
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or give~n] the benefit of the doubt to, the party opposing interception."' 0 ' This policy is designed to avoid the overinclusive application
of these systems'0 2 and the potential erosion of such institutional values
as an open court system, the resolution of disputes through neutral
adjudication, and the litigants' right to unfettered representation and
adversarial zeal." 3 In drafting the 1983 reform of Rule 11, the Advisory Committee intended to change this and encourage a more aggressive
sanctions practice.'" Yet, mentioned nowhere in the 1983 rule or
accompanying Advisory Committee's Note were the "countervailing
considerations that formerly commanded the opposite result"; an

institutional bias favoring restraint in the sanction process.'

5

The

assumption made in 1983 was that aggressive enforcement was
needed. 6 Those who took this position argued that the federal courts
were being crushed by an onslaught of litigation,0 7 including doubtful
or frivolous claims. According to this view, the "litigation crisis" posed
such a threat to the courts that the risk of overinclusive application of the
Rule was warranted.' 8 This position has been debated in the commen-

101. Louis, supra note 9, at 1052. Other commentators have focused on judicial restraint as a
necessary element in a sanctions jurisprudence. See Burbank, supra note 80, at 1933-34; Nelken,
Chilling, supra note 3, at 1346; Vairo, Prologue,supra note 3, at 77-78.
102. See Louis, supranote 9, at 1029 (noting the extent to which countervailing considerations
under the older doctrines disposed the courts to err on the side of no sanctions in a close case or in
a case that did not present a clear violation of the sanction rule).
103. Id. at 1030-32.
104. See FED. R Ctv. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983).
105. Louis, supra note 9, at 1036.
106. See id, at 1053. Professor Louis argues that the potential institutional cost of overdeterrence or chilling is warranted in light of the improvement in the judicial system. Id. at 1055.
107. There is, in fact, substantial evidence indicating that there is an under-filing of meritorious
lawsuits. See Howard H. Hiatt et al., Special Report: A Study of Medical Injury and Medical
Malpractice, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 480, 484 (1989); William P. McLauchlan, Courts and
Caseloads, in THE AMERICAN CoURTs: A CRrrlCAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 5, at 395, 395-407
(discussing the range of empirical work that has looked at "caseload" as the variable of concern and
the lack of understanding of what has caused the increase in case filings leading to larger court
caseloads); William B. Eldridge, Research on JudicialAdministration and CourtAdministration at
the FederalJudicialCenter, 10 LAW. LETrER, Oct., 1992, at 5 (discussing the five year project being
undertaken by the Federal Judicial Center to measure demand on court time from various types of
litigation).
108. Louis, supra note 9, at 1055.
Inevitably some judges will exceed these limits, appeals will become necessary
and sometimes fail, injustice will be done, legitimate advocacy will be chilled, and access
to the courts will be denied. The question is not whether such evils will occur but how
often. Thus far their incidence has been very small, small enough to make them, for the
time being, an acceptablecost of eliminating other,greater evils from the system. This
is not to deny that access to the courts and the right to advance factual and legal
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tary.1°9 One commentator described the development of Rule 11 case law
following the 1983 amendments as follows:
This new, more balanced [sanctions] doctrine... often amounts to
little more than a set of new, countervailing cliches from which the
judges may pick and choose. Such flexibility, which amounts to a
discretionary license or its functional equivalent, is sometimes desirable,
but here it involves judicial power to resolve the merits. "
However, the debate over Rule 11 is not just a debate about the relative
merits of an underinclusive or overinclusive approach to sanctions, or the
relative merits of an approach that errs on the side of managerial
activism versus one that embraces a policy of judicial restraint. The
regulatory line of Rule 11 that defines frivolous litigation". and
distinguishes it from merely meritless litigation, also limits disputants'
access to a powerful arm of the state and the legitimating function that
power plays in resolving social conflicts. n 2 The power and authority
of the judiciary to enforce Rule 11 does not simply refer to its power to
regulate lawyers' conduct" 3 and their potential for abusing that power
by imposing undeservedly large fines." 4 The judiciary's power under

contentions are fundamental goals of our legal system. Without some controls on these
goals, however, the system almost failed.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

109. See infra notes 149-260 and accompanying text.
I10. Louis, supra note 9, at 1036 (footnotes omitted).
I11. Defining frivolous litigation is not a new activity for the courts. The common law has long
regulated the filing of frivolous claims through private litigation. See WARREN FREEDMAN,
FRIVOLOUS LAWSUITS AND FRIVOLOUS DEFENSES: UNJUSTIFIABLE LITIGATION (1987) (discussing

common law actions for malpractice, abuse of process, malicious prosecution, false arrest, barratry,
champerty and maintenance, and remedies such as contempt of court).
112. See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER (1991); cf P.S.

Atiyah, From Principlesto Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the JudicialProcess and the
Law, 65 IowA L. REV.1249, 1251 (1980) (discussing the potential decline in moral authority of the
courts as they move away from principled decisionmaking).
113. This narrower view of Rule I1 is espoused by many of the Rule's supporters. See, e.g.,
Alex Elson & Edwin A. Rothschild, Rule 11: Objectivity and Competence, 123 F.R.D. 361, 361
(1988); Lawrence M. Grosberg, Illusion andReality in RegulatingLawyer Peformance:Rethinking
Rule 11, 32 VILL. L. REv. 575, 578-79 (1987); Victor H. Kramer, Viewing Rule 11 as a Tool to
Improve ProfessionalResponsibility, 75 MINN. L. REV. 793, 803 (1991); Judith L. Maute, Sporting
Theory ofJustice: Taming Adversary Zeal with a Logical Sanctions Doctrine, 20 CONN. L. REV. 7,
28 (1987) (citing Rule I1 as the cornerstone for enforcing acceptable standards of conduct); Richard
H. Underwood, CurbingLitigation Abuses: JudicialControlofAdversary Ethics-The Model Rules
of ProfessionalConduct and ProposedAmendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure,56 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 625, 628 (1982).
114. See Keeling, supra note 95, at 1139 ("If litigants perceive that the objective standard in
a sanctions provision will allow a court to impose severe sanctions against them for asserting certain
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Rule 11 includes defining what disputes may be brought into the judicial
arena, and by implication, what disputes may not be brought without risk
of public censure and sanction. 115 When sanctions are issued under
Rule 11, the Rule explicitly excludes the availability of the courts to
"others similarly situated.... 6 These sanctions decisions will inevitably
shape the courts of the future." 7
It is clear from the history of the Rule that something more than the
routine managerial or procedural goals of efficient and effective dispute
resolution are at issue. The public debate concerning Rule 11 and its use
by the courts reflect the ongoing institutional debate regarding the role
and function of the federal courts. Which role and function of the courts
should be given priority in the sanctions arena--the courts as efficient
managers of disputes or the courts as open, accessible adjudicative fora?
If the answer is neither, how should the courts balance these competing
institutional interests, goals, and policies on a case by case basis? Should
the courts approach their sanctions practice with an eye toward defending
and maintaining the public adjudicative role of the courts,"' or should
the courts give more free play to managerial and procedural concerns that
emphasize the need to restrict adversarialism in the dispute resolution
process?" 9
arguments, then regardless whether the court imposes severe sanctions frequently, the litigants will
decline to run the risk of asserting the arguments."); Jeffrey A. Pamess, Fines Under New Federal
Civil Rule 1 : The New Monetary Sanctionsfor the "Stop-and-Think-Again" Rule, 1993 B.Y.U. L.
REv. 879, 893-94 (reporting a proposal to amend Rule I1 to replace the sanctioning scheme with
fixed, but reduced fines, as a way to "provide protection against sanctions that are unfairly large"
(quoting Letter from John Leubsdorf, Visiting Professor, Columbia University School of Law, to
Professor Paul Carrington 2 (Nov. 16, 1990))).
115. See, e.g., REDISH, supra note 112, at 1385. See generally THE POLITICS OF JuDIcIAL
REFORM, supra note 81 (containing a series of essays which look at court reform as a function of
larger political forces and as a means to redistribute power).
116. FED. R. Crv. P. 1l(c)(2). The 1993 amendments focus on deterrence as one of the primary
functions of the rule. FED. R. Civ. P. 1l(c)(2) advisory committee's note (1993).
117. Cf.GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTONs: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE 99-100
(1989) (describing Rule II as unique in the scope of its delegation of discretion to sanction good
faith or de minimis mistakes, and its intent to regulate negligent, rather than intentionally abusive,
litigation practices under an objective standard); Stempel, supra note 70, at 178-81 (describing the
impact on the courts' summary judgment practice of the managerial reforms of the 1980s); Stempel,
supra note 12, at 262 (describing the procedural reforms of the 1980s as a decade of "[c]ounter[r]evolution').
118. See infra note 373 (noting cases in which the courts treated this as the overarching
institutional goal).
119. Cf Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle". JudicialPromotionand Regulation
of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1339, 1342 (1994) (addressing whether the myriad judicial and
legislative efforts to promote settlement over full-blown adjudication is "a good thing"); Robert M.
Parker & Leslie J. Hagin, "ADR" Techniques in the Reformation Model of CivilDispute Resolution,
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Courts have grappled with the challenge of developing a sanctions
practice that is able to balance the need for enforcement with judicial
restraint. The early case of GoldenEagle DistributingCorp. v. Burroughs
Corp.2' illustrates this tension within the Rule. The court in Golden
Eagle construed the Rule 11 standard requiring "objective reasonableness" in the presentation and pursuit of claims to mean the reasonableness of the advocate.' The emphasis in Golden Eagle is worth noting
since other courts have adopted a similar "close case" approach in
attempting to draw the line at tolerable advocacy. "[T]he Rule discourages wasteful, costly litigation battles by mandating the imposition of
sanctions when a lawyer's position, after reasonable inquiry, will not
support a reasonable belief that there is a sound basis in law or in fact
for the position taken."'" The Golden Eagle court emphasized that the
question is whether a competent advocate could not have believed in the
merit of the position taken, not whether an officer of the court would
have. 23 The position espoused by Golden Eagle recurs throughout the
case law. As one district judge stated: "This judge is a believer in a
policy of judicial restraint with regard to Rule 11 that is perhaps in
24
contrast with the more activist role that is envisioned" by the circuit.
Routinely, the courts that talk about the need for judicial restraint in the

46 SMU L. REV. 1905, 1906 (1993) (advocating "true reform of our system of civil dispute
resolution"); Kenneth Penegar, Preface: The Elusive Promise of Legal Reform, 46 SMU L. REV.
1889, 1889 (1993) (critical analysis of Alternative Dispute Resolution within the context of the call
for legal reform and the move toward "less formal justice").
120. 801 F.2d 1531, 1538 (9th Cir. 1986).
121. Id. at 1542 ("It is not in the nature of our adversary system to require lawyers to
demonstrate to the court that they have exhausted every theory, both for and against their client.").
122. Id. at 1538.
123. Id. at 1542 (the reasonableness of the attorney does not assume a duty to step into the
shoes of your opposing counsel or to step into the shoes of the judge); accord Harlyn Sales Corp.
Profit Sharing Plan v. Kemper Fin. Servs., 9 F.3d 1263, 1270 (7th Cir. 1993); Thomas v. Capital
Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 873 (5th Cir. 1988) (discussing the need to develop a reasonable
inquiry standard that looks at the particular circumstances of the attorney).
124. Naked City, Inc. v. Aregood, 117 F.R.D. 634, 636 (N.D. Ind. 1987); see, e.g., Curtis
Management Group, Inc. v. Academy of Motion Pictures Arts and Sciences, 717 F. Supp. 1362,
1370-71 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (asserting that sanctions are warranted precisely because this is not a close
case); South Shore Bank v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 688 F. Supp. 803, 806 (D. Mass.) (denying
sanctions in a "close case" in order to avoid chilling zealous advocacy), afJ'd,867 F.2d 607 (1st Cir.
1988); International Shipping Co. v. Hydra Offshore, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 146, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(noting the potential chill if sanctions are misapplied, yet imposing sanctions with reluctance on
ground that "[tihis is... an egregious example of the violation of the spirit and letter of Rule 1I"),
aff'd, 875 F.2d 388 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,493 U.S. 1003 (1989); Skepton v. County of Bucks, 613
F. Supp. 1013, 1020 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (denying sanctions in this "close case" in deference to the
attorney's efforts to create a novel claim).
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"close case" have done so in situations in which they find themselves
confronted with a case that, under a purely objective analysis, seems to
call for sanctions. Yet there is some hesitation to impose sanctions when
the courts cannot readily characterize the violation as an egregious or
clear violation of the rule:
In many respects, this is a close case; the record is scant, the disputes
are great, the objective evidence is minimal. Rule 11 has no application
in such a case. Sanctions are merited only where a party has not even
a glimmer of succeeding, where it is clear to all that the actions taken
could serve only improper purposes. Rule 11 applies where the case is
black and white, not where it is a matter of shading and degree."as
What underlies this analysis is the tension between the dual function of
the courts and the dual role of counsel. On a case by case basis, many
courts are reluctant to further the managerial goal of an efficient judicial
system by imposing upon counsel a role inconsistent with that of the
zealous advocate. 26
The question of the proper balance between the duties of counsel to
her client and to the court have not been laid to rest by the most recent
amendments.' 27 The Advisory Committee's Notes indicate a desire to
emphasize a duty of candor to the court. 12 Questions have already
been raised whether this duty of candor is "intended to do more than stop
abuse"' 29 and whether it will undermine the role of attorneys as zealous
advocates. One of the inevitable concerns is whether this expanded
emphasis in the Rule on the lawyer's duty of candor will drastically alter
125. MacBride v. Caravelle Broadcast Group Consol., Inc., No. 89-0008-C, 89-0028-C, 1990
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19619, at *8-9 (W.D. Va. June 4, 1990) (unpublished decision); see, e.g., Marco
Holding Co. v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 204, 211 (N.D. Ill. 1985) ("IT]hough this is an
extremely close case and our initial inclination is to assess costs and sanctions, defendants' legal
theories are not so unreasonable... as to justify sanctions under Rule 11.").
126. See Vairo, Prologue, supra note 3, at 57. Professor Vairo articulately points out the
fundamental threat to the legal system posed by demands made upon trial counsel to step into the
shoes of the judge or comply with a "duty of candor" that limits advocacy. Id. at 56.
127. See Schwarzer, supra note 11, at 12-13 (noting that the 1993 revisions are "motivated by
a purpose to expand the enforcement of attorneys' professional obligations ....The 1993 Notes
state that the Rule 'retains the principle that attorneys... have an obligation to the court to refrain
from conduct that frustrates the aims of Rule 1. The revision broadens the scope of this
obligation .. .- (quoting FED. R. Crv. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993))); Vairo, Prologue,
supra note 3, at 42 (arguing that Rule 11 shifts the "attorney's duty away from client advocacy
toward judicial efficiency and case management as an officer of the court"). Additionally, Professor
Vairo argues that this "model of lawyering ... may be moving lawyers too far away from the
traditional model of a legal profession independent from the state." Id.
128. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993).
129. Vairo, Prologue,supra note 3, at 57.
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the way courts approach the definition of "objective reasonableness"
under the Rule. In the past, many courts erred on the side of no sanctions
in close cases in deference to the open court system and the lawyer's
duty of aggressive advocacy within the adversarial model. Is this change
in the Rule instructing these courts that the balance should tip the other

way? Once more, the new amendments require courts to revisit the
problem of balancing institutional policies favoring an open court system

with institutional policies favoring the harboring of scarce judicial
resources and restricting access to the courts. In a close case, should the
judge favor restraint or should she authorize sanctions? 3 °

Rule 11 will play an increasingly important role in this ongoing
institutional debate.' With the recent amendments to the Rule, courts
will find themselves dealing with fewer, harder sanction decisions.'32
Whether the content of a claim is so marginal, or the conduct of the
litigation so exceeds the bounds of zealous advocacy that it should be
sanctioned, are decisions that will require the courts to balance competing

institutional interests. These concerns and tensions have had some
constraining influence on the courts' sanctions practice in the past. The
new Rule, putting aside the question of the "duty of candor," further
reflects the Advisory Committee's intent to limit and focus the courts'
use of sanctions. But as with any rule, while there may be agreement
about the conduct that is clearly sanctionable, the question is less clear
at the margins.'33 In his recent article on the amendments, Professor

130. See id. at 86 (expressing hope that courts will "exercise greater restraint by moving for and
imposing sanctions only in clear cases of Rule 11 violations"). One method suggested by Professor
Vairo to ensure this is to improve appellate review requiring "detailed descriptions of the Rule II
violation and careful explanations of the sanction imposed." Id.
131. This is particularly so now that de mininis violations cease to require the attention of the
courts and obvious, but remedial, problems are dealt with via the "safe harbor" provisions of the
rule. See FED. R. Cr. P. ll(c); FED. R. CIv. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993) ("Rule II
motions should not be made or threatened for minor, inconsequential violations of the standards
prescribed by subdivision (b).").
132. See infra notes 436-500 and accompanying text.
133. The idea that rules generate "easy" cases and "hard" cases has existed for a long time. See
infra note 197. Much of the commentary on judicial discretion talks about the radiating control of
rules. As the courts move farther from the core meanings there is less clarity and less doctrinal
control exercised by the rule over the decisionmaking. For these commentators, the interesting
question has always been: How does a rule guide or control decisions that occur at the margins?
How do courts decide what principles, standards, or policies to use in making their decisions other
than the black letter of the law? See, e.g., Christie, supra note 25, at 754-72 (discussing the urge to
narrow judicial discretion and the urge to expand judicial discretion, and whether the legal system
can be reconciled to open-ended judicial decisionmaking); Dworkin, supra note 25, at 32-40
(outlining his theory of the discretionary nature of principles and rules, and those entrusted to
interpret them).
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Tobias points once more to the fact of judicial discretion as a significant
element in the Rule. He argues that their substantial discretion should
both constrain trial courts and encourage appellate courts to watch out for
overzealous enforcement."' This analysis brings everything full circle.
There is a growing awareness that Rule 11 exists in large part to
regulate conduct that is not merely inefficient or questionable, but that
threatens the integrity of the courts.'35 This is especially true where
litigants improperly use judicial process to pursue frivolous claims.' 36

134. See Tobias, 1993 Revision, supra note 3, at 180 (discussing the Advisory Committee's
Interim Report on the proposed 1993 amendments of the rule). The report "admonished that Rule
11 should not be considered as the major vehicle for deterring groundless lawsuits." Id. at 181. The
article notes that the Committee's care in drafting and its intent could be undermined by inevitable
slippage in the process of judicial interpretation and enforcement. Id. at 189. "Some pragmatic
realities, therefore, apparently required that the revisers place their trust in judicial discretion when
effectuating the new Rule... "'Id. Professor Tobias notes the ongoing problems inherent in
attempting to define "frivolous" litigation which have given rise to a wide spectrum of formulations
in "terms of stringency." Id. at 198. Ultimately Professor Tobias argues that the "approach leaves
district judges with too much discretion while providing for insufficiently rigorous appellate review."
Id. at 208. Harkening back to earlier commentary, Professor Tobias argues that such "discretion"
should breed restraint. Id. Yet a call for restraint poses its own problems. See Posner, supranote 10,
at 22-23 (pointing out that self-restraint is not a principled basis for action). The same problems exist
for Tobias's call for appellate review: What is the overzealous application of the Rule that warrants
reversal? Tobias, like so many others grappling with the Rule, falls back on the reasonable jurist
standard and admonishes courts to trust their gut instincts: "[I]f district judges entertain reasonable
doubts that these litigants have contravened Rule 1I,they should be extremely reluctant to find
violations or should at least exercise their discretion in favor of not awarding sanctions." Tobias,
supra note 3,at 208. Is Rule IInow merely a question of one jurist's gut instinct versus another?
135. See Burbank, supra note 90, at 1006 (discussing the source of the courts' power to enact
and use Rule 11 to sanction merely negligent conduct); infra notes 436-500 and accompanying text
(discussing the 1993 amendments). In the early case of United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
32 (1812), the Court stated that "[c]ertain implied powers must necessarily result to our [c]ourts of
justice from the nature of their institution." Id. at 34. These powers reflect "the control necessarily
vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition
of cases." Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962). Equally important is the use of this
power to ensure the legitimacy and respect due court actions. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501
U.S. 32, 43-45 (1991); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59
(1975); John Papachristos, Comment, Inherent Power Found, Rule II Lost: Taking a Shortcut to
Impose Sanctions in Chambers v. NASCO, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 1225, 1225-27 (1993).
136. See Harrisv. Marsh, 123 F.R.D. 204,228 (E.D.N.C. 1988), affd in part, rev "din partsub
nom. Blue v. United States Dep't of Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990), cert.denied, 499 U.S. 959
(1991). In upholding Rule 11 sanctions the court stated as follows:
Today concludes, at least at this level, a disappointing chapter in the history of
American litigation. Pursuit of this seriously flawed and meritless case was a disservice
to its purported objective-the eradication of racial discrimination in the workplace. The
egregious conduct of the case has eroded confidence in our judicial system. This court's
personal disappointment is inconsequential. But the erosion of confidence of the court,
as an institution, is a serious matter for both the Bench and Bar. No litigant, no lawyer
and no cause warrants a lack of integrity in the presentation of a case, for such lack is
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Allowing litigants to intentionally misuse the courts impairs the court
system's effectiveness and undermines their legitimacy as public,
adjudicative fora. 137 Rule 11 addresses a significant institutional, as
well as political, concern-how to improve the courts' functioning by
reducing adversarialism and imposing needed limits on potential litigants
access to the judicial process? The courts must address these questions
within the larger institutional context and with an emphasis on consciously reshaping and protecting their public adjudicative role. The question
is whether the courts' current sanctions practice under Rule 11 adequately addresses these concerns. 38
In her most recent Rule 11 article, Professor Georgene Vairo
suggests that one solution to the problem of ensuring accountability and
restraint in the courts' sanctions practice is already provided by the
Rule.139 The 1993 amendments require courts ordering sanctions to
make findings. 4 ' The Rule provides that these findings must describe
the conduct that violates the rule and why sanctions were ordered.'
Professor Vairo suggests that "as a practical matter, it is likely that the
[appellate] courts will move toward closer scrutiny"'4 of sanctions
decisions in these situations and this increased appellate scrutiny will
help further develop and clarify the Rule. Professor Louis has taken a
similar position,'4 3 also criticizing the use of the single highly deferen-

corrosive to the court as an institution responsible for the dispensation of justice. Just as
civility breeds civility, so does integrity breed integrity, and all who participate in our
judicial system must exemplify such qualities.
Id. at 229; see, e.g., Resnik, supra note 5, at 1527 (discussing the real and symbolic "meaning of
courts as institutions[, including a vision] of the public as having an interest in adjudication beyond
its function of concluding disputes").
137. Cf NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television & Radio, Inc., 894 F.2d 696,702 (5th Cir. 1990)
(defining the courts' inherent powers as a "zone of implied power incident to their judicial duty"
which "as a product of necessity... contains its own limits"), aff'dsub nom. Chambers v. NASCO,
Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991). The courts must have the power to regulate conduct which threatens the
courts' integrity. Id. Institutional necessity is both the ultimate justification for, and limitation on,
the courts' inherent power to sanction. Id.
138. Professor Vairo points out that the Supreme Court's current "literal" approach to the Rule
has resulted in "aggressive" enforcement "that ignores the chilling effect and satellite litigation problems." Vairo, Prologue, supranote 3, at 69. She argues in favor of an approach that focuses on the
Rule's strict enforcement to combat abuses in federal litigation practice Id. at 71.
139. Id. at 77-78.
140. Id. at 77; see also infra notes 436-500 and accompanying text (discussing 1993
amendments to Rule 11).
141. FED. R. CIv. P. ll(c)(3).
142. Vairo, Prologue,supra note 3, at 78.
143. See Louis, supra note 36, at 997; Louis, supra note 23, at 758-59 (building on Professor
Louis's extensive study of appellate review).
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tial standard of appellate review, abuse of discretion, for all Rule 11
appeals." He argues that a more flexible appellate approach is needed, 4' one that provides an appropriate level of review depending upon
the nature of the decisionmaking involved in the issue raised on
appeal. 4 6 Professor Louis's and Professor Vairo's comments signal a
significant evolution in the courts' sanctions practice. It is time to
solidify and build on the courts' experience and growing expertise.
By 1991, the pendulum of reform had begun a backward swing. The
Advisory Committee recognized the need for care, restraint, and
accountability in the courts' sanctions practice. 47 Yet the Rule continues to rely on the discretion of the courts to fill any interpretive gaps,
and weigh conflicting institutional policies and goals on a case by case
basis.'48 The courts' sanctions practice is clearly evolving, but it is
difficult to predict whether and to what extent the courts will follow the
direction set by the Advisory Committee.
The next Part examines the dominant decisionmaking paradigm of
the courts' sanctions practice, discretion as "skill," and its evolution. It
also examines the following questions: How can the courts justify their
"discretionary" sanction decisions, because that is precisely what they are
being asked to do by the new rule? How should the "abuse of discretion"
standard be applied on appeal in light of this procedural mandate?
IMI.

THE COURTS' EVOLVING SANCTIONS PRACTICE--DEFINING THE
PARADIGM OF DISCRETION AS SKILL

Judicial discretion stands at the core of Rule 11, yet the term is
often used without ever being defined:
[I]t has been argued that the rule leaves more discretion with the
district courts than is necessary or desirable, or perhaps tolerable. At

144. Professor Louis wrote his article before the Supreme Court decided Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmarx, Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990), the case establishing the standard of review on appeal of Rule
11 sanctions. But he correctly predicted the outcome: an abuse of discretion standard. See id. at 405;
Louis, supra note 23, at 758.
145. Louis, supranote 23, at 760. Professor Louis notes that this is taking place to some extent.
Id. This "undisclosed flexibility" is problematic because it fails to give the litigants and other courts
adequate notice of what is in fact going on. Id. at 761.
146. This call for gradation in appellate review is raised by other commentators, see, e.g.,
Friendly, supra note 25, at 755-67, including those writing about Rule 11. See, e.g., Vairo, Prologue,
supra note 3, at 72-74.
147. See Tobias, 1993 Revision, supra note 3, at 182-83; Vairo, Prologue,supra note 3, at 5253.
148. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993).
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the same time, it has also been proposed that the 1983 amendments
were too mandatory49in language, that 'may' should be substituted for
"shall" in Rule 11.1

Other comments emphasize this reductive approach: "The Civil Rules
have generally favored judicial discretion as a means to secure just
results and have avoided procedural rigidity. On the other hand,
indeterminacy in the sanctions rules can weaken their instructive
value.""' )Whether ill-defined or not, the element of judicial discretion
in a Rule 11 decision is not a mere by-product of the drafting process,' 5 ' but is instead a "favored... means" to achieve the purpose of
the Rule. 152

This reductive approach to the element of discretion in Rule 11 is
subject to criticism because it inevitably interweaves different senses of
judicial discretion in a single term.'53 If the term "discretion" simply
describes the personal input of decisionmakers, what results is a
discussion at cross purposes. Is discretion an essential dimension of
judicial decisionmaking under the Rule or do courts only have discretion
when the Rule fails to adequately constrain their decisionmaking? Is'

The problem is that treating discretion in this reductive fashion blurs
important differences in judicial decisionmaking and reduces "the entire
range and diversity
of decisional possibilities ... to one repetitive
55
description."'

From the judge's perspective, it is possible to identify two models
of decisionmaking, the "legal" paradigm and the paradigm of discretion

149. CALL FOR COMMENT, supra note 66, at 6.
150. Id.
151. Many writers have focused on discretion as what is left over after the legislature or court
has done its best to draft a law, but that is not the case here. The Advisory Committee and the
United States Supreme Court, in its decision in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., treat the element
of judicial discretion as a necessary and essential part of the rule. 496 U.S. 384,400; see infra notes
170, 178.
152. CALL FOR COMMENT, supra note 66, at 6.
153. See George P. Fletcher, Some Unwise Reflections About Discretion,47 LAw & CONTEMp.
PROBS. 269, 279 (1984).
154. Some commentators define discretion as the decisionmaking authority of the courts that
exists in the "absence of 'governing rules."' Id. at 278.
155. Id. at 279. Decisions are also discretionary in the sense in which they could be further
constrained, id. at 282-83, or in the sense that the decisionmaker is justified in referring to their
"discretion" in justifying the decision, id. at 283. This "self-referring appeal to one's own judgment
and subjective input in the decisionmaking process" has limited scope and would not be acceptable
in determining a matter of merit or substantive law. Id. at 284. However, it is usually deemed
appropriate in areas involving the courts' exercise of managerial authority or procedural expertise.
Id. at 284-85.
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as "skill." These are explicitly referred to in the case law, including Rule
11 case law, and the courts consciously use these two paradigms 1 to
56
justify their exercise of decisionmaking authority or discretion.
Implicit in the courts' view that their decisionmaking needs to be
explained or justified is an awareness that all judicial decisions raise
concerns about the human element-the judge-and the institutional
commitment to produce decisions based on law. Thus, the fact and
process of justification, the explication and explanation of a decision, is
an integral part of the judicial system and the courts' decisionmaking
activities. This Part looks at how courts should justify their discretionary
sanctions decisions under the "skill" paradigm, and by doing so ensure
enhanced appellate review and accountability.157
Viewed within the larger historical context, the Advisory
Committee's deference to judicial discretion as a key element in the
implementation of Rule 11 is understandable as the by-product of an era
of managerial reforms that gave rise to the courts' current sanctions
practice. 5 This helps explain why the Committee treats the discretionary component of Rule 11 as though it were self-implementing, coming
into play only as needed, and self-limiting, as if by its nature it could not
exceed acceptable judicial and institutional limits. While somewhat
confusing on its face, this approach is consistent with the historical trend
in procedural reform which increasingly relies upon the courts' specialized skills and unique institutional competence to implement procedures

156. See, e.g., Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 844 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1988)
(reversing an order of sanctions, not deferring to the trial court on the state of the law or a litigant's
reasonable belief regarding that law, and instead pursuing its own analysis of precedent and the
reasonable legal inferences to be drawn therefrom); Noonan v. Cunard S.S. Co., 375 F.2d 69, 71 (2d
Cir. 1967) (relying upon the paradigm of trial court discretion as "skill," the court's "feel of the
case," the impracticality of rules, and the reality of disparate facts).
157. Accountability is defined for these purposes as how the risk of error is allocated. See Pierce
v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 563 (1988) (noting that the appellate standard of "abuse of discretion"

shifts the risk of error to the litigants).
158. The development of a species of judicial decisionmaking denoted "managerial" in nature
was one result of these reforms and represents a significant expansion in the courts' authorized
decisional activities:
In itself, there is nothing remarkable about portraying a judge as a decisionnmaker.
The business of judging is the business of deciding. But by conceiving of certain
decisions as "managerial" decisions, rather than legal decisions, the concept of managerial
judging posits a kind of decisionmaking that is different from what we traditionally
expect of judges. Proponents of managerial judging generally overlook this distinction.
Elliott, supra note 23, at 310-11.
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for the courts, and manage dockets and pending litigation through
trial.'59 This trend in the procedural arena has been aptly denoted by

one commentator as "pragmatic proceduralism."'
This trend toward delegating the practice of legal problem-solving
to the trial courts' discretion extends beyond the procedural arena.
Increasingly when the formal adjudicative process of the courts is
invoked, the resulting substantive legal decisions are made expressly
contingent upon, or otherwise limited in their impact to, the unique facts
of the particular case at hand,'6 1 foreclosing any broad or formal
hortatory role for the adjudicative process. 62 This highly contextual or

"situationalist ' " 63 approach to resolving legal problems is also reflected

in the courts' reliance upon legal standards and norms that are in their
application fact specific, grounded in the particular context'(A of the

159. This growing reliance upon the courts' procedural pragmatism is grounded in large part
in the assumed expertise of the decisionmaker to address the underlying issue with little appellate
supervision. See Bone, supra note 70, at 98 (discussing the "critical mechanism at work in the
reformers' pragmatic approach" to procedural reform, judicial discretion coupled with flexible
procedures). Flexible rules allow jurists to amend procedures to accommodate the realities of practice
and ensure their fair application in the individual case. Id. at 99-100. Yet, even early reformers
expressed concem that "judicial discretion should play a much narrower role with respect to ...the
parties' substantive rights. To the extent possible, these questions were best left to clearly drawn
rules in order to guard against bias and error." Id. at 100. See Linda S. Mullenix, User FriendlyCivil
Procedure:PragmaticProceduralismSlouching Away from Process Theory, 56 FORDHAM L. REV.
1023 (1988) (book review). This review discusses how to turn current procedural theory from its
"avowedly practical orientation towards thinking more broadly and critically about underlying
premises," id. at 1029, including the potential for practical procedural problems to warrant "attention
to process values other than efficient administration." Id. at 1029 n.32 (quoting Stephen B. Burbank,
The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1463, 1487 (1987) (book review)).
160. See Mullinex, supra note 159, at 1023.
161. See Atiyah, supra note 112, at 1259 ("The bulk of the law has grown exceedingly as the
search for individualized justice has proceeded."); Maurice Rosenberg, JudicialDiscretion of the
Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 642-43 (1971) (noting the need for
courts to fashion highly individualized responses to new cases or matters not amenable to regulation
by rule). See generally Yablon, supra note 18 (outlining a range of legal standards giving rise to
highly individualized responses from the court).
162. See Atiyah, supra note 112, at 1258-59 (looking at an increasingly pragmatic judicial
process that emphasizes fact finding, flexible legal standards, and the exercise of judicial discretion
to achieve the goal of "individualized justice"); Yablon, supra note 18, at 276-77 (pointing out an
increasing emphasis on legal standards that rely more on equitable considerations and the personal
dimensions of the dispute than traditional legal analysis of rights and duties).
163. See Ruth A. Putnam, Justicein Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1797, 1808 (1990) ("'Situated'
judges' intuition is shaped by their prior training, their character, and the totality of their past experience. What 'situationalist' and 'formalist' judges share is precisely that they were trained in the same
legal system . . ").
164. This "situationalist" approach to sanction decisions must confront the critics who have
rejected efforts to expand the procedural context within which the courts operate to include, or at
least address, the special interests or needs of particular groups of disputants. See Tobias, 1993
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individual case, and expressly limited to the courts' exercise of their
specialized skill and expertise. 165 A diverse array of critics has chal-

lenged this trend toward pragmatic decisionmaking on grounds that it
creates power without guidelines or procedural restraints, erodes
traditional due process safeguards, and threatens the tradition of judicial
objectivity and impartiality with regard to litigants, individual attorneys,
and their cases.166 Critics of the courts' sanctions practices under Rule
11 have expressed many of these same concerns. 67
A.

DescribingDiscretionfrom the Inside-Out

Many of the concerns, criticisms, and questions raised by the critics
Rule
11 have been raised in other contexts. This Article uses this
of
commentary for two purposes. The first is to develop a larger perspective

Revision, supra note 3, at 212 (arguing for an expanded contextual consideration in Rule 11
sanctions decisions); Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Conundrum, 26 GA. L. REV. 901, 921-24 (1992).
Contra Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An
Exorcism ofthe Bogy ofNon-Trans-SubstantiveRules of Civil Procedure,137 U. PA. L. REv. 2067,
2074 (1989); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the
Politics ofRulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795,830-36 (1991) (questioning whether procedural reforms
should take into account the special needs of groups adversely impacted by the rules).
165. See Atiyah, supra note 112, at 1271 (expressing concern that this decline in use of the
formal decisional elements of law and principled decisionmaking in resolving disputes might
ultimately undermine the moral authority of the courts).
166. In the procedural arena Professors Mullenix and Resnik have both challenged the
increasing pragmatism of the courts. See Mullenix, supra note 159, at 1025; Resnik, supra note 23,
at 497-98. In the adjudicative arena Professor Atiyah's seminal critique stands as an early comment
on the courts' movement away from highly structured, doctrinally driven decisions--the "legal"
paradigm. See Atiyah, supra note 112. More generally, critics challenge this approach on grounds
of "radical indeterminacy" and their pragmatic opponents have helped clarify the debate. Cf Michael
S. Moore, The Need for a Theory of Legal Theories: Assessing Pragmatic Instrumentalism, 69
CORNELL L. REV. 988,1012-13 (1984) (attacking the theory of"pragmatic instrumentalism" as being
inadequate as a "new" theory of adjudication); Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100
YALE LJ. 409, 423, 439 (1990) (noting that the pragmatic perspective does not look at
indeterminacy in rule structures as undermining the legitimacy of the legal system, but as providing
flexibility within which a fact sensitive response can be crafted by the judiciary). The competence
of the decisionmaker to make the decision is a crucial element in pragmatic theory. Id. at 430-34.
Cf Robert S. Summers, On Identifying andReconstructinga GeneralLegal Theory-Some Thoughts
Prompted by Professor Moore's Critique, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 1014 (1984) (advocating the
pragmatic instrumentalism approach to theorizing).
167. See generally Keeling, supra note 95 (pointing out that such an approach can have an
obvious chilling effect on litigants' access to the courts); Tobias, 1993 Revision, supra note 3
(discussing the erosion of due process with respect to certain classes of litigants brought about by
harsh standard of Rule 11 prior to the 1993 amendments); Vairo, Prologue,supra note 3 (asserting
that even after the 1993 amendments, the fear of sanctions creates overwhelming disincentives for
lawyers to take certain cases and is undermining the lawyers' duty to clients and making them
extensions of the state).
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from which to approach the question of how to define the courts'
evolving Rule 11 practice, and how to analyse the problem of discretion,
decisionmaking, and sanctions. The method used is simply to note the
points of convergence between this general body of commentary on
discretion, and the case law and commentary generated by Rule 11. The
second purpose is to use this substantial body of commentary on judicial
discretion as a lens through which to look at the courts' and
commentators' approach to this topic in the Rule 11 context.
Using this method, it is possible to develop a descriptive paradigm
of the courts' discretion defined as its skill and institutional expertise. 6 This paradigm of discretion is characterized primarily by an
emphasis on the individualized facts of the case, the specialized expertise
and "situatedness" of the decisionmaker, and the broad delegations of
discretion afforded to the decisionmaker to exercise that expertise' 69 in
fashioning an individualized response. 7 This paradigm of judicial
discretion is further shaped by the institutional context within which it
is exercised. The question to be considered is whether the court is
looking at a managerial problem, attempting to resolve a procedural issue
with a substantive impact, or attempting to render a decision on the

168. This definition ofjudicial discretion is used by Professor Yablon in a narrower context than
in this Article. See Yablon, supra note 18, at 261-68.
169. A number of writers have focused extensively on the concept of the specialized
institutional competence of the courts to handle a range of matters without undue guidance from the
law or the appellate courts. See Fletcher, supra note 153, at 283-86; Thomas M. Mengler, The
Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 IOWA L. REV. 413, 414-15 (1989)
(explaining how the discretion built into the rules of evidence reflects the perceived expertise on the
part of the trial judge to "consider the cumulative effect of the close prejudice and reliability rulings
and to split them fairly among the parties"); Rosenberg, supra note 161, at 663 (discussing the trial
courts' special expertise to address matters not amenable to regulation by rules as a function of "his
nether position ... he sees more and senses more"); Yablon, supra note 18, at 244-52; cf George
C. Christie, JudicialReview ofFindings ofFact,87 Nw. U. L. REV. 14 (1992) (looking at appellate
standards as a function of the relative expertise and skill of the trial and appellate courts).
170. In the Rule I1 arena, this paradigm of judicial discretion is articulately set forth in Cooter
& Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990). See Atiyah, supra note 112, at 1258-59 (discussing
fact sensitive nature of the legal process and the growth of the law as a search for individualized
justice); Smith, supra note 166, at 439 ("[A] certain degree of indeterminacy does not necessarily
threaten the basic legitimacy of the legal system; indeed, it may provide desirable flexibility within
which a fact-responsive equity has room to operate."). The competence of the decisionmaker to make
the open decision is a crucial element in pragmatic theory. Id.; cf.Moore, supranote 166, at 1002-10
(discussing how the theory of adjudication comes into play in the decisionmaking process);
Summers, supra note 166, at 1018 (suggesting that "[j]udges and other officials should not pretend
that the law is always determinate"). But see Donald N. Bersoff, JudicialDeference to Nonlegal
Decisionmakers: Imposing Simplistic Solutions on Problems of Cognitive Complexity in Mental
Disability Law, 46 SMU L. REV. 329 (1992) (criticizing the courts' pragmatic preference for
professional, rather than judicial, decisionmaking in mental disability cases).
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merits. 7 This institutional context largely defines the goals of the
practice 72 and the decisionmaking norms' to be applied.
The paradigm of discretion as "skill" contrasts sharply with the
traditional "legal" paradigm of judicial discretion. 74 The successful
outcome of this decisionmaking process-the courts' exercise of judicial

discretion adhering to this paradigm--has traditionally been measured by
the specificity of its fact findings and the clarity of its legal reasoning in
the interpretation and application of law to fact.

7

This paradigm of

judicial discretion focuses in part on the success with which the court
171. The concept that a courts' institutional competence is shaped by the particular context in
which the discretionary decision is raised is touched on by numerous theorists. See Fletcher, supra
note 153, at 283 (noting that the internal point of view of the judge is not tolerated in traditional
legal discourse, even though it is often "appropriate for a decisionmaker to refer to his or her own
discretion in offering a justification" for decisions in the managerial or procedural arena); Louis,
supra note 23, at 734-35 (discussing how courts treat various procedural issues differently if they
raise issues affecting the outcome or merits of the case, and observing that courts of appeals are less
likely to defer in the latter case).
172. The term "practice" is used throughout this Article to describe the courts' application of
its "skills" in a particular context. For example, the Article talks about the courts' sanctions practice
and how the courts exercise their "discretion as skill" in the Rule 11 arena. See supra part III. In the
procedural and managerial arena the success of the practice is largely measured by the practical
efficacy of the result. See Bone, supranote 70, at 5. In the adjudicative arena, the goals are different.
Originally, the institutional goal was to produce an acceptable legal decision, but now the goal is
measured more in terms of individualized justice. See Atiyah, supra note 112, at 1259.
173. See BARAK, supranote 16, at 114-15 (noting that adjudicative discretion is defined by its
restraint, objectivity, neutrality, and logic all applied to find or render the best or "right" decision);
Bone, supra note 70, at 5 (noting that the procedural reforms of the twentieth century "made
practical efficacy the test of a sound procedural system and relied on community experience and
judicial expertise as guides to normative judgment"). Whether or not there is in fact a single best
or right legal answer to a problem is a question beyond the scope of this Article. See generally
Brilmayer, supra note 26 (attempting to define the concept of legal error within the context of the
determinacy/indeteminacy debate). For the purposes of this analysis, it suffices that this is a norm
used by the courts to guide their decisionmaking.
174. See, e.g., BARAK, supra note 16, at 222-34 (detailing the nature of the judge's adjudicative
discretion as a decisional paradigm); WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, JUDICIAL PROCESS INA NUTSHELL 12106 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing judicial decisionmaking including the craftsmanship of the opinion,
the analysis of precedent, and the interpretive goals of judging and judicial lawmaking). See
generally BENJAMIN N. CARDOzO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) (early work
describing judicial decisionmaking).
175. Adjudication is used here to describe a decisional paradigm of the courts and is distinct
from adversarialism, a process model leading up to an adjudication. In the former, a judge, sitting
as a neutral decisionmaker in a legal dispute, develops a factual record, researches the applicable
law, and then applies the law to the factual record. The model of adversarialism assumes that the
best way to prepare and present the factual and legal arguments of the case to the court is through
two advocates, each attempting to engage and persuade the judge on the contested legal and factual
issues. See generally Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353,
382-84 (1978) (discussing the necessity of adversarialism in the process of adjudication and its
corresponding prominent role in a democratic society).
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resolves the dispute before it. However the court's decision is not
evaluated primarily by how well it provides "individualized" justice to
the parties, but by how well it states, clarifies, and applies the law
ensuring its future development. 76 This paradigm is also shaped by the
institutional context. In the adjudicative arena, the courts' use of the
paradigm of legal decisionmaking emphasizes the public dimension of
adjudication--the formal, state-sanctioned resolution of controversies
involving conflicting legal rights.' The goal of adjudication, as a
normative theory or model of decisionmaking, is to produce uniform
results in similar cases in a manner that demonstrates consistency and
predictability in the courts' application of the law. 78 By way of
contrast, the successful application of the paradigm of discretion as
"skill," whether in the managerial or adjudicative arena, is measured

176. See Atiyah, supra note 112, at 1249-51 (noting the hortatory goals of the traditional legal
paradigm and principled decisionmaking). The Cooter Court defined the same process and goals for
a traditional analysis using the "legal" paradigm. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S.
384, 404-05 (1990).
177. The distinction between adjudicative and managerial decisionmaking as descriptions of
different functions and roles of the courts is based in large part on the work of Professor Judith
Resnik. See Resnik, The Domain, supra note 71, at 2230 (discussing the pressures undermining
adjudication, in particular, "rational factfinding based upon a limited record'); Resnik, FailingFaith,
supra note 71, at 534-39 (looking at the rise and decline of adjudicatory process in the face of
increased emphasis upon managerial judging and alternative dispute resolution); Resnik, supranote
23, at 380-414 (documenting a shift in the perceived role and function of the federal judiciary from
the neutral, dispassionate arbiter of legal claims to an active managerial stance); Judith Resnik, Tiers,
57 S. CAL. L. REv. 837, 840 (1984) ("Procedure is a mechanism for expressing political and social
relationships and is a device for producing outcomes."). Procedure also reflects assumptions
regarding the adjudicative process and, in particular, the difficulty of rendering legal decisions and
the role of government in resolving social conflicts. Id. at 844-45. ContraElliott, supra note 23, at
326-36; Steven Flanders, Blind Umpires-A Response to ProfessorResnik, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 505,
520-22 (1984) (questioning whether in fact managerialism has not increased the quality, not just the
quantity, of decisions); Jon 0. Newman, Rethinking Fairness:Perspectiveson the LitigationProcess,
94 YALE L.J. 1643, 1652-56 (1985) (arguing that procedural fairness, viewed as a benefit to the
individual and larger community, comes at too high a cost, including the adverse impact on others
involved in the litigation process).
178. In Cooter, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the goal of uniformity and consistency
is the goal of appellate review under the traditional legal paradigm: Has the judge correctly stated
and applied the law? In doing so, the Court emphasized the extent to which that goal of appellate
review was tied to the trial and appellate courts' ability to ground their legal analysis in repeating
factual paradigms. Cooter, 496 U.S. at 405. See generally BARAK, supra note 16 (reviewing and
integrating disparate writings on judicial discretion; pulling together numerous threads into a richly
detailed description of the process of adjudication); REYNOLDS, supra note 174, at 48-70 (discussing
judicial decisionmaking and what makes a good decision). The idea that the courts' interpretation
and application of the law is tied to repeating fact paradigms has been addressed in other contexts
as well. See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, The JurisprudenceofClassification,41 STAN. L. REv. 661,696716 (1989) (discussing paradigms as pertains to classification in areas such as contract and tort law).
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primarily by criteria that focus on individualized outcomes. Here the
primary concern is whether the solution is skillfully tailored to the unique
facts and circumstances of the case, and the extent to which it successfully resolves the litigants' immediate problem.179
The two paradigms differ in another important way. The "legal"
paradigm approaches decisions with the normative assumption that there
is always a best or right answer, a correct application of law to facts.18
There is an obvious parallel here between the internal logic of the "legal"
paradigm and the adjudicative function and institutional role of the court.
The "fit" between the two is not inadvertent. If the goal of adjudication
is to produce uniform results in similar cases in a way that affirms and
develops the law, it is not surprising that variability in outcomes is seen
as problematic when the "legal" paradigm is applied in the adjudicative
context.'81 In the paradigm of discretion as "skill," there is no expectation that similar cases will necessarily produce observably similar results
precisely because of the fact-sensitive nature of the courts' judgments

179. There is evidence that this trend toward decentralizing and deemphasizing the legal
dimension of dispute resolution is part of a trend that reflects larger social pressures. See, e.g.,
Atiyah, supra note 112, at 1255-59 (discussing pressures to achieve decisions designed to realize
justice versus the hortatory effect the judge wishes the decision to have); Rowe, supra note 74, at
830 (pointing out complaints in the system including "excessive complexity and formality; stress and
aggravation of tensions between parties; [and] lack of access to justice for many"). When complex
social relationships are at issue participants prefer mediation and negotiation. When relationships and
conflicts are simpler, participants prefer adjudication. See generally THE DISPUTING PROCESS-LAW
INTEN SOCIETIES (Laura Nader & Harry F. Todd, Jr. eds., 1978) (looking at mediation, harmonization strategies, and private dispute resolution as motivated by a desire to avoid encounters with state
power); LAURA NADER, HARMONY IDEOLOGY: JUSTICE AND CONTROL IN A ZAPOTEC MOUNTAIN
VILLAGE (1990) (arguing that limited access to adjudicative procedures creates unequal power
relationships); No ACCESS TO LAW: ALTERNATIVES TO THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM (Laura
Nader ed., 1980).
180. For purposes of this Article, I am treating this as a normative assumption to which courts
attempt to adhere in their decisionmaking. Whether there is in fact a single right answer and all other
answers are "error" is a theoretical question beyond the scope of the Article. See Brilmayer, supra
note 26, at 369-71; Anthony D'Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 148, 150
(1990) (discussing indeterminacy and the lack of rational constraints on judges' decisionmaking that
may in fact be present in our system of justice).
181. Much of the work on judicial discretion has focused on the question of acceptable
variability in the adjudicative context. If the legal paradigm assumes a decision determined by the
law, how are the presence of discretion and variability reconciled with this assumption? See
generally Brilmayer, supra note 26 (discussing a permissible level of variability in outcomes and the
failings of such characterizations as "wrongly decided" and "legal error" resulting from the natural
indeterminacy of legal decisionnmaking); Thompson, supra note 26 (critiquing Brilimayer and
generally agreeing with her, but arguing that the "decisional inconsistency" deemed entirely
acceptable by Brilmayer does not always carry out normative goals and is therefore not always
"right"); infra notes 227, 247 (discussing various writers who have attempted to address this
question).
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and intuitions involved in the decisionmaking.'" The goal of the

paradigm is to produce "skillful" decisions, a decisional norm that clearly
tolerates wider variability in outcomes. 3
To summarize briefly, there are two different paradigms of
discretion which, for ease of reference, have been labeled as the "skill"
paradigm and the "legal" paradigm. The different institutional contexts
that shape the courts' exercise of discretion are also examined. Is the
court being asked to address managerial or simple procedural issues, or
is the court looking at issues of substantive law traditionally addressed
through the process of adjudication? This approach enables examination
of the two distinct dimensions of a judicial decision. Which paradigm is
being applied and what context is being invoked?"'I When a judge
looks at a discretionary decision, what does she think she is supposed to
do and how is she supposed to do it?
The paradigm of discretion as "skill" has obvious utility in the
managerial and procedural context. It is equally true, conceptually, that
using the "legal" paradigm to address issues of substance or merit poses
few problems for decisionmakers. There is a clear institutional reluctance,
however, to use this narrower, more demanding decisionmaking paradigm
to address issues of court management or procedural questions other than
those raising important substantive issues.'8 5 The more problematic
situation involves the application of the paradigm of discretion as "skill"

182. See Cooter, 496 U.S. at 404-06 (recognizing that fact sensitive decisions generate greater
variability in their outcomes).
183. Cf id. at 404 (discussing the problem that occurs when there are not easily classifiable fact
patterns for the appellate courts to check for "fit"); Feinman, supra note 178, at 696-705 (discussing
the "fit" between legal theories and certain repeating fact paradigms or templates); Martha Minow
& Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1597, 1617-21 (1990) (discussing the
impact of the "call for context," on traditional legal analysis, in particular, the inability to identify
routinized fact paradigms in the face of increasingly rich factual detail).
184. Any effort to clarify or classify judicial discretion in this fashion runs the risk of being
criticized as too simplistic or as failing to take into account important dimensions of the courts'
decisionmaking. This approach is not offered as a comprehensive theory of discretion. This Article's
more limited goal is to develop descriptive paradigms of two dimensions of the courts' discretion
or decisionmaking that are referred to and relied upon to justify the courts' decisionmaking activities.
The goal is to be able to evaluate the fit between the courts' practice and the paradigm in any given
case.
185. Jurists addressing managerial and procedural issues want flexible rule structures that
provide guidance without unduly burdening the decisionmaking process. See Cavanagh, supra note
3, at 518 (pointing out that the vagueness of Rule 11 is typical of the federal rules and may reflect
the drafter's strategy to "intentionally employl] vague terminology to provide the courts with
flexibility"); Mengler, supra note 169, at 457-58 (discussing the need for flexible evidentiary rules
to enable the courts to address these issues quickly and without becoming bogged down in a
traditional "legal" analysis).
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when issues of substance are raised in an adjudicative context.1 6 Here
the internal logic of the paradigm appears to be at odds with the
decisional norms and institutional goals that largely define this type of
decisionmaking.'i 7 Yet, increasingly this occurs."' 8
There is little doubt that sanction decisions, particularly those
considered to be close cases,8 9 are resolved in part by reference to
norms, factors, policies, and principles that are external to the black letter
of Rule 11 and beyond the scope of its Advisor Committee's Note and
the Rule's "legislative history."'1'9 Many of the decisionmaking norms,
policies, standards, and principles applicable to the courts' exercise of
their discretion are grounded in the decisionmaking paradigm itself. The

decisional norms and principles found in the two decisionmaking
paradigms at issue here, the "skill" paradigm and the "legal" paradigm,
are discussed in more detail below.'91 Additional norms, policies, rules,

186. The controversy regarding application of the de novo standard on appeal to the threshold
legal determinations in a Rule 11 case reflects this tension. Those courts who favored the "three
tiered" standard clearly viewed the question of whether a claim was factually or legally frivolous as
invoking the courts' adjudicative discretion. See, eg., Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d
866, 872 (5th Cir. 1988) (discussing the split in the circuits as to what the proper standard of review
for Rule 11 sanction decisions of the district courts). For these courts, that this was a fact sensitive
question did not destroy its essentially legal character or their obligation to address it as an
application of the "legal" paradigm at the trial and appellate level. Id. at 873. Courts using the
unitary abuse of discretion standard viewed the threshold issue differently and as falling within the
paradigm of discretion as skill. Id.
187. The author is aware that efforts to categorize or classify the courts' activities in this way
are problematic. The distinction is used for two reasons. First, it mirrors the debate of the last 20
years regarding the institutional role and function of the courts. Second, jurists seem to understand
what they are about, what they are expected to do, and how they are expected to do it, differently
in these contexts.
188. See Atiyah, supra note 112, at 1251, 1258 (discussing a variety of different types of
adjudicative decisions approached pragmatically); Rosenberg, supra note 161, at 646-50 (outlining
a variety of types of decisions that do not neatly fit the legal paradigm primarily because of their
unique fact dimension); see also Martinez, supra note 20, at 611-18 (questioning whether an
adequate factual context was provided in rendering civil rights decisions involving MexicanAmericans); Minow & Spelman, supra note 183, at 1602-06 (looking at the role of context as a
dynamic element in judicial decisions that can vary in its scope or kind with the particular situation).
189. The utility of the "close case" as a rough rule of thumb to describe more problematic
sanctions decisions is discussed in more detail below. See infra notes 380-99 and accompanying text.
190. The role of legislative history in the rulemaking process of the United States Supreme
Court is open to question. Do we refer to all prior criticisms, those specifically mentioned by the
Rules Advisory Committee, or only those problems directly addressed in the Advisory Committee
Note? Recent commentary on the 1993 amendments to Rule 11 have focused extensively on the
context of those amendments and characterized the new rule as an explicit response to numerous
prior criticisms. See infra notes 484-500 and accompanying text.
191. For example, criticisms that the courts' sanctions practice fails to adhere to the norm of
judicial "self-restraint" can be construed as emphasizing the adjudicative dimensions of the rule. See
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and principles that guide the courts' decisionmaking, including defining
the goals of the practice, are imbedded in the institutional context.
One of the problems with Rule 11 is that it cannot be neatly
classified. 92 Some have viewed it as one rule among many in the

courts' procedural arsenal to control and manage litigation. 93 Others
approach it more circumspectly, particularly when addressing the
threshold issue of whether or not a claim is legally or factually frivolous.
This question is treated by many courts as raising a legal question calling
for the application of the "legal" paradigm. 194 Yet others argue that the
rule should not be construed in this fashion precisely because of the
problems such an approach creates.195 These commentators argue that
the Rule is primarily intended to regulate the conduct of the litigation,
not its content, and that regulation is wholly proper under the paradigm
of discretion as "skill."196 If the courts' sanctions practice is looked at
from the perspective of the decisionmaker, the picture is one of the
courts grappling with a series of complex issues in order to ensure the

Phelps, supra note 10, at 381 (arguing that the broad grant of discretion under Rule 11 should
encourage judicial self-restraint); Wilder, supra note 10, at 808-09 (discussing various arguments
explaining why judges may restrain themselves before imposing Rule 11 sanctions). But see Posner,
supra note 10, at 9 (discussing the problem of treating judicial self-restraint as a norm to guide the
courts' principled decisionmaking-it fails to tell the jurist what principles to pick and apply).
192. As one commentator states, what is needed is an "internally consistent theory in which the
rationales for imposing rule 11 sanctions provide the basis for developing a clearer set of guidelines"
for enforcing the rule. KASSiN, supra note 78, at 45.
193. See, e.g., Schwarzersupranote 71, at 204 (discussing other disciplinary actions that courts
might take, including disbarment, referring the matter to the local bar for sanctions, or banning the
attorney from appearing for a period of time).
194. The courts adopting the three-tiered standard of review clearly fall into this class. These
courts were of the opinion that the threshold question of liability, the application of Rule 11 to the
facts of the case to determine whether or not a claim had adequate legal or factual merit, should be
decided at the trial court level using the legal paradigm and reviewed "de novo" as a question of law
on appeal. These courts' opinion that the "legal" paradigm was the proper method ofjustification
may say less about the nature of the decision and more about the importance of the decision.
Adoption of a de novo standard on appeal acts as a judicial restraint. For cases adopting this standard
of review in sanctions cases, see Brown v. Federation of State Medical Bds. of the United States,
830 F.2d 1429, 1434 (7th Cir. 1987); Robinson v. National Cash Register Co., 808 F.2d 1119, 1126
(5th Cir. 1987); Zaldivar v. City of L.A., 780 F.2d 823, 828 (9th Cir. 1986). In other circuits, the
decision regarding the legal sufficiency of the claim was reviewed de novo, while other grounds for
sanctions were reviewed deferentially. See, e.g., United States v. Milam, 855 F.2d 739, 742 (11 th
Cir. 1988).
195. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 404-06 (1990) (explaining why
application of the traditional legal paradigm is not preferred in the Rule 11 context).
196. See Schwarzer, supra note 84, at 1019 (rejecting notion that the Rule is an "adjunct to case
management," while agreeing that this position "finds implicit support in the Advisory Committee's
unfortunate reference to 'streamlin[ing] the litigation"). Schwarzer argues that other mechanisms
exist to address pure issues of merit and that Rule II is designed to regulate conduct. Id.
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full and fair implementation of the rule. 197
It is easy to understand the confusion. Courts routinely manage
cases and lawyers, imposing their norms and expectations, in bringing the
litigation to trial. This highly variable exercise of the courts' managerial
discretion emphasizes the subjective dimension of the courts' judicial
expertise. 98 In this arena, the courts' have had little appellate oversight.' 99 Then along comes Rule 11, which seems to give these same
courts the power to sanction lawyers who violate the courts' norms or
expectations regarding acceptable advocacy. But now the courts'
regulation is viewed from an objective standard-would a reasonable
attorney have filed the suit or proceeded in this manner-and not simply
from the perspective of the court. This tension between the subjective
and objective dimensions of Rule 11 standards is an ongoing concern and
reflects the conflicting normative assumptions brought to bear in the
interpretation and application of Rule 11 2

197. The decision to treat the threshold issue of liability as a legal question sent a clear
message. Rule 11 raised important issues calling for restraint and objectivity in the analysis. The fact
that these questions were "fact" sensitive did per se render them beyond the reach of the "legal"
paradigm. See supra note 194. Other courts developed alternative ways to articulate their perception
that Rule 11 decisions should be approached with care. Many courts approached the problem by
developing standards that required them to err on the side of no sanctions. See, e.g., Indianapolis
Colts v. Mayor & City Council, 775 F.2d 177, 181 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding claim must be utterly
meritless for imposition of sanctions); see supranotes 120-30 (discussing the standard of the "close
case" as a way to avoid sanctions). In this same vein, a body of "easy" cases began to build. See,
e.g., Hecht v. United States, 609 F. Supp. 264,267 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that seeking injunction
barred by statute merited sanctions); McLaughlin v. Bradlee, 602 F. Supp. 1412, 1418 (D.D.C. 1985)
(holding history of meritless cases and frivolous motions merited sanctions), aff'd, 803 F.2d 1197
(D.C. Cir. 1986). But when the cases did not present easy issues, the courts responded in kind. See,
e.g., Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 574-75 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)
(holding that Rule 11 should be enforced in such a way that it does not "chill" advocacy), modified,
821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987). This does not mean that other jurists did
not take a more aggressive approach. See, e.g., Jennings v. Joshua Indep. Sch. Dist., 877 F.2d 313,
321 (5th Cir. 1989) (imposing sanctions on A.C.L.U. participating attorney in a "sniffer dog" case),
cert. denied, 496 U.S. 935 (1990); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1280 (2d Cir. 1986)
(holding no special treatment for attorneys that represent poor or indigent clients or who bring
difficult claims), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987); International Shipping Co. v. Hydra Offshore,
Inc., 675 F. Supp. 146, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (authorizing the sanctioning court to consider an
attorneys prior behavior and matters off the record in issuing sanctions), aff'd, 875 F.2d 388 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1003 (1989).
198. See Elliott, supra note 23, at 316-17 (discussing the potential for arbitrariness under a
managerial judging model due to the dearth of procedural safeguards); Resnik, supra note 23, at 380
(describing this emerging "managerial" role as a new form of judicial activism" with few procedural
safeguards and the potential for the abuse of authority).
199. See supra note 65-148 and accompanying text (discussing managerialism).
200. Professor Louis argues that focusing Rule 11 on legal product emphasizes objective
standards and results in a type of decisionmaking amenable to review as a question of law. See
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B.

The Courts' Evolving Sanctions Practice

The paradigm of discretion as "skill" is aptly characterized
throughout the commentary as a pragmatic model of decisionmaking
which emphasizes decentralized decisionmaking at the trial court
level.20 ' The courts' evolving sanctions practice clearly parallels this
institutional trend. By looking at the two dimensions of judicial
discretion developed in the preceding section, a number of different
approaches to the courts' sanctions practice under Rule 11 can be
identified. Following the amendment to the rule in 1983, some courts
approached their sanctions practice as a natural evolution of their touted
managerial skills.202 Other courts treated their sanctions practice, or at
least that aspect of the practice that required the court to evaluate the
legal or factual merits of a case, as invoking the "legal" paradigm and
the adjudicative context.20 3 Still others grappled with the conceptual

Louis, supra note 23, at 748-5 1. He notes that Professor Burbank, in his Third Circuit Study of Rule
11, emphasizes the conduct dimension of the rle and argues that it is appropriate to use more
subjective standards. Id. at 745. Ironically, Professor Burbank, in turn, is of the opinion that courts
are more likely to agree on sanctionable conduct then they are to agree on what makes a frivolous
lawsuit. See Burbank, supra note 80, at 1932-33. Some courts have tried to merge the two
approaches by looking at the objective dimensions of the litigation first, and then moving onto a
subjective approach if needed. See, e.g., Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 854 F.2d 1452,
1470 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Pavelic & Leflore v. Marvel
Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120 (1989).
201. See Mullenix, supra note 159, at 1027-29. Care should be taken to distinguish between
overlapping, yet distinct uses of the term "pragmatism" in the procedural arena and its use in a
broader, philosophical context which this Article attempts to illuminate. Pragmatism focuses on the
context of the decision and the situatedness of the decisionmaker. This dimension of the courts'
discretion is defined in commentary and case law as the courts' institutional expertise. Professor
Mullenix attempts to use the critique of legal pragmatism, which focuses on pragmatism's lack of
a normative structure or content, to raise questions about the courts' procedural strategy of relying
on the courts as pragmatic decisionmakers. Id. See generally Moore, supra note 166, at 988-92
(discussing whether pragmatic instrumentalism can support a normative theory of adjudication);
Smith, supra note 166, at 424-29 (analyzing the apparent tension between pragmatism, with its
emphasis on experience, context, and future outcomes, and legal formalism or theory development,
with its focus on the normative structure of the law).
202. "Rule 11 came onto the scene amidst high hopes for streamlining the litigation process.
It was designed as much more than a procedural rule; a societal goal was to be achieved." Charles
M. Shaffer, Jr., Introduction:Rule 11: BrightLight, Dim Future,in LITIGATION SECTION, AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION FEDERAL PROCEDURE COMMITEE, SANCTIONS: RULE I1 AND OTHER POWERS
1, 15 (2d ed. 1988). See, e.g., Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 873 (5th Cir. 1988)
(claiming that trial judges have the daily hands-on experience with the litigants needed to resolve

the case).
203. See supra note 194 (discussing courts who adopted de novo review as the appropriate
standard to evaluate the trial courts' decision whether or not the product/conduct violated Rule 11).
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middle ground. Should the courts' sanctions practice be driven by the
managerial goals of efficiency and efficacy, or by the adjudicative
concern of developing the exclusionary function of Rule 11 as a
regulatory bright line? And how are the courts to apply the paradigm of
discretion as "skill" in order to avoid the potentially chilling impact of
an overinclusive interpretation of the Rule?2"
Professor Yablon has looked at the courts' adaptation of the
paradigm of discretion as "skill" in a similar context."' The significant
adaptation on which he focused was the development of a normative
dimension to the paradigm that emphasizes "right" answers when
significant adjudicative decisions are posed.2"
One underlying assumption is that there are right answers to sentencing
decisions and that trial courts are more likely to make them than
appellate courts. The superior institutional competence of trial courts is
derived from the assumption that sentencing is not a rule-determined
activity but a practice, a skill acquired through experience involving a
finely tuned set of subjective judgments based on facts. This assumption of right answers in practice, which cannot be generalized or stated
of institutional competence that legitimizes
in rules, leads to a theory
07
trial court discretion.
It is difficult to define this normative element or answer the question
whether a "right" answer is anything more than a skillful answer. For the
purposes of this Article, Professor Yablon's study provides important
insight into the process of justification: How do courts explain, and how
do they see themselves as needing to explain, their discretionary
decisions? What norms of justification do the courts call into play in
order to ensure that the decision rendered is perceived as legitimate?
The problem is that the paradigm of discretion as "skill" has no
internal norm defining acceptable variability or "error" other than its

Issues similar, if not directly related, to the issues raised in a Rule 11 sanction are decided using the
legal paradigm and reviewed "de novo." See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 15361 (1970) (reviewing courts' summaryjudgment de novo); Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S.
363, 371-74 (1966) (analyzing motion to dismiss through the legal paradigm).
204. One of the most illuminating bodies of case law on this point looks at the "close" case;
that is, cases in which the courts saw themselves as approaching the limits of their discretion. See
supra notes 120-26 and accompanying text (discussing the "close" case).
205. Professor Yablon studied "sentencing" cases as those involving "discretion as skill" as well
as significant substantive issues. See Yablon, supra note 18, at 260-68.
206. Id. at 264.
207. Id.
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commitment to produce skillful decisions. 2°" This normative element
does not exist for many managerial or procedural matters. 2, 9 In the
managerial arena, a court's skillful decision regarding discovery, pretrial
orders, docket control, or settlement is the most to which one is
entitled.2 10 Here the courts' exercise of their discretion is assumed to
give rise to a range of acceptable alternatives because of the diverse
nature of the problems and the need to make these decisions quickly and
without undue investment of institutional resources.2 ' There is also the
view that spending more time will not necessarily make the decision any
"better," or that "right" decisions are even at issue.
The courts' evolving sanctions practice occupies a conceptual
middle ground defined largely by the tension between the paradigm of
discretion as "skill" and the "legal" paradigm, and the competing
institutional perspectives regarding the role and function of the courts and
sanctions.' 12 As a result, one end of the sanctions spectrum is defined
largely by the courts' managerial concerns and pragmatic
decisionmaking. The other end of the sanctions spectrum is defined
largely in terms of the courts' adjudicative concerns and their commitment to a decision based on law. To be successful, the middle ground of
the courts' evolving sanctions practice must resolve the tension between
the two.2" 3

208. See generally Brilmayer,supra note 26 (discussing different types of decisions and the type
and degree of variation in outcomes that is tolerable).
209. The courts' willingness to treat certain procedural issues as questions of law requiring
justification under the "legal paradigm" has been noted in the commentary as a deviation from the
institutional norm. Cf. Louis, supra note 23, at 734-760 (discussing procedural questions reviewed
under the stricter standard of de novo review).
210. See Fletcher, supranote 153, at 271 (pointing out that discretionary decisions are reversed
only if there is an abuse of discretion and the decision falls outside of the "range of normal

practice").
211. See Elliot, supra note 23, at 307-355 (discussing the ad hoc and highly personalized
perspective of the managerial judge). Numerous commentators focus on this highly individualized
response. See Mengler, supra note 169, at 414 (arguing that courts need flexible rules that enable
the judge to decide "on the run," that more detailed rules are not feasible because of time constraints
and that ultimately the decision is driven largely by concerns to mitigate and apportion the potential
harmful effects of the evidence equitably amongst the litigants); Yablon, supra note 18, at 268
(discussing decisions made with little information under time constraints and with a limited range
of outcomes, for example, whether to admit or exclude evidence).
212. See supra notes 65-148 and accompanying text.
213. The Cooter Court made it clear that the paradigm of discretion as "skill" that defines the
courts' sanctions practice is defined as an alternative to the "legal" paradigm as a decisionmaking
model. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 400-04 (1990). In Cooter, the Court
adopted "abuse of discretion" as the standard of review, but it did so while acknowledging the
importance of the analysis. See id. at 399-406. The Court did not relegate Rule 11 to the courts'
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The managerial reforms of the late 1970s and early 1980s were
attractive in large part because they were easy to implement-simply

allowing the judiciary more discretion to manage their own affairs.214
The courts' managerial discretion, as distinguished from the courts'

adjudicative discretion, took shape as a conscious institutional strategy
for reform.21 Whether or not it can be said that there was a coherent
theory of "managerial discretion" driving these reforms, there was a
growing consensus among the advocates of reform, including the
judiciary, regarding its characteristics, scope, and exercise. When
examined from the perspective of the analysis laid out here, it is possible
to see the courts' managerial discretion as the paradigm of judicial

discretion-as "skill" practiced within the managerial or procedural
arena. Rule 11 was one of the managerial reforms of the 1980s and yet
it is fundamentally different from its kindred rules governing pre-trial
procedures and discovery. Unlike its procedural cousins, Rule 11 is
inevitably tied to a determination regarding the merits of the pending
litigation.2" 6

Elements of managerial discretion inevitably surface throughout the

early Rule 11 commentary and case law.217 Points of convergence

managerial discretion. See id.; infra notes 261-336.
214. See Bone, supra note 70, at 89-95 (discussing the added discretion given to judges in
various areas, including the field of Rule 11 sanctions); Burbank, supra note 80, at 1936-37 ("The
question ... is whether and when the only or the best answer... lies in reliance on the discretion
ofjudges, guided by general directions that usually are not informed by empirical study, to deliver
on the promise of equal justice.").
215. See Resnik, supra note 23, at 374-80 (describing the widespread modem trend of judges
toward a managerial role as distinguished from their former adjudicatory role).
216. See Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 55470 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (pointing out the inevitable link between Rule 11 and a
determination on the merits). It is easy to understand the move to reconcile Rule 11 with Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal, but more importantly, with Rule 56's summary judgment procedures and case
law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993) Oinking Rule 11 to a summary
judgment determination and statutory fee shifts); see also Stempel, supranote 12, at 261-62 (arguing
that factual and legal issues which violate Rule 11 should be dismissed by summary judgment);
Dyer, supra note 12, at 425-29 (proposing a presumption that claims surviving the pre-verdict stage
be immune from Rule 11 sanctions).
217. See, e.g., White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 683-84 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating
that Rule 11 was enacted to streamline court dockets and facilitate case management), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1069 (1991); Sussman v. Salem, Saxon, & Nielsen, P.A., 152 F.R.D. 648, 652 (M.D. Fla.
1994) (noting that Rule 11 designed to aid in "streamlining court dockets and facilitating case
management"); Harris v. Marsh, 123 F.R.D. 204 (E.D.N.C. 1988) (discussing Rule 11 as a rule
enacted to improve the efficient litigation of meritorious claims while assessing sanctions in case
involving an attorney who unsuccessfully litigated a race discrimination case), afffd in part andrev'd
in partsub nom. Blue v. United States Dep't of Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
499 U.S. 959 (1991); Shaffer, supra note 202, at 15 (noting that Rule 11 enacted to streamline the
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between the structure of Rule 11, the nature of sanctions decisions, and
the courts' managerial discretion are easy to isolate. First, both are
characterized by an express delegation of authority, whether through the
rule-making process or as part of the courts' inherent powers, to the trial
judges to act in areas essential to the courts' day to day operations."'
This delegation is coupled with a mandate to consider efficiency and the
disposition of disputes, as distinct from their formal adjudicative
resolution, as an institutional priority." 9 The delegation of discretion
in both instances is characterized by few procedural restraints2 20 and
open legal standards.22 These open standards were designed to ensure
that the court had sufficient flexibility to respond to the diversity of
matters it must handle quickly and efficiently. 2" While the courts
exercised this discretion with an emphasis on the law, there was more
emphasis in the Rule 11 arena on elaborating and clarifying the basic
standards of the rule. This often took a tremendous amount of the courts'
time.2

litigation process by deterring the filing of frivolous litigation).
218. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993); FED. RLCiv. P. 11 advisory
committee's note (1983); Burbank, supra note 90, at 1006-11 (discussing whether the express
delegation of discretion to trial courts under Rule 11 was authorized under the inherent power
doctrine or the Rules Enabling Act); Resnik, supra note 23, at 396-97 (describing the sources of
power for judges and how the powers delegated by Congress have played a role in the shift toward
managerialism).
219. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993); FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory
committee's note (1983); CALL FOR COMMENT, supra note 66, at 2-3; Fletcher, supra note 153, at
283-86 (discussing cases in which an internal reference to the courts' discretion and ability to
achieve the goals is legitimate and when it is not); Mengler, supra note 169, at 463-66; Resnik,
supra note 23, at 395-431.
220. See Burbank, supra note 80, at 1929-37; Cavanagh, supra note 3, at 500-15; Mengler,
supra note 169, at 457-58; Resnik, supra note 23, at 397-410. The courts and the 1993 amendments
changed this by imposing procedural obligations on courts considering sanctions. This is a significant
point of evolution in the courts' sanctions practice. In 1983 there were no procedural restrictions in
the rule. During the early years the courts' increasingly added process as it was deemed due. See
Maureen Armour, Fifth Circuit,in SECTION OF LITIG., AM. BAR ASS'N, SANCTIONS: RuLE 11 AND
OTHER POWERS 99, 104-05 (Melissa L. Nelken ed., 3d ed. 1992). Following the 1993 amendments,
Rule I I bears no resemblance to any other rule of civil procedure and includes an express mandate
to provide a hearing and make findings. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c) (1993); infra notes 436-500.
221. The 1993 amendments make the standards more specific and tie them to existing bodies
of law. See infra notes 436-500.
222. See Cavanagh, supra note 3, at 518.
223. See Mengler, supra note 169, at 415. This has been another significant point of
development. Early cases emphasized the need to make the procedural decision, often before a final
disposition on the merits, and move on. In addition, the vague standards of the 1983 rule did not
lend themselves to the typical process of interpretation and elaboration. While the courts saw a need
to fill in the interpretive gap, they did so in a fact specific manner generating a body of case law.
While there was little focus on traditional doctrinal explication or elaboration, the courts saw a need
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In both instances, the delegation of discretion explicitly acknowledged that the matters sought to be regulated were not easily reduced to
a series of formal rules or a routinized practice.224 In this context, the
courts were not expected to engage in a process of ad hoc rulemaking or
otherwise attempt to give deeper doctrinal definition or meaning to the
black letter law. Efforts to do this would undermine the Rule's inherent
flexibility and require an inordinate investment of time and resources. 5 In this situation, the system must rely on the trial judge's specialized skill-a combination of her professional expertise, personal
experience, and institutional perspective--to fairly balance the
institution's and the litigants' competing interests in pursuing the case to
a full trial on the merits. 6
What defines the nature of the courts' managerial or procedural
discretion is not so much the permissible range of alternatives to be

to develop the overarching, guiding principles and policies of the Rule. See Hays v. Sony Corp. of
Am., 847 F.2d 412, 419 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting the objective reasonableness standard does not make
allowances for the particular circumstances of the attorney); Thomas v. Capital See. Servs., Inc., 836
F.2d 866, 873 (5th Cir. 1988) (defining "reasonable inquiry" to mean reasonable under the
circumstances); Rachel v. Banana Republic, Inc., 831 F.2d 1503, 1508 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that
factual errors standing alone would not warrant sanctions); Vatican Shrimp Co. v. Solis, 820 F.2d
674, 680-81 (5th Cir.) (reversing sanctions where there was legal uncertainty surrounding the claim
found to lack merit and a potential for chilling advocacy), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 953 (1987);
Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253-59 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that the
standard to be applied was that of the objective reasonable person), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918
(1987); Century Graphics Corp. v. Harris Graphics Corp., No. 86-5375, 1987 WL 25132 (E.D. La.
Nov. 23, 1987) (unreported decision) (warning counsel of duty to reevaluate the reasonableness of
their claim periodically).
224. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384,404 (1990) (discussing the difficulty
of generalizing from the facts or otherwise doctrinally narrowing the scope of the analysis); Mengler,
supra note 169, at 425-27 (discussing the alternatives between a flexible system and a more rigid
rule-driven system).
225. See CALL FOR COMMENT,supra note 66, at 6-7 (illustrating this dilemma); Elliott, supra
note 23, at 311; Resnik, supra note 23, at 376-77.
226. See Fletcher, supra note 153, at 271-72 (stating that the trial court is in the best position
to balance the interests of the party in a particular decision and their interests in fair and speedy
trial); Mengler, supra note 169, at 441-46 (arguing that in making rulings, the judge must balance
the parties' interests); Resnik, supra note 23, at 445 (asserting that the judge must balance the
parties' interests). In the Rule 11 context, the assumption that the courts have the requisite "skill"
runs throughout the commentary and case law. Judges are expected to use that skill to balance the
one party's interest in the efficient disposition of the litigation against the other party's right to a full
and fair adjudication on the merits. See, e.g., Schwarzer, supra note 84, at 1018-19. But see Burbank,
supra note 80, at 1936-37 (arguing that the perception that the best or right answer lies in the
discretion of the judge is open to question). Burbank expresses concern that the lack of uniformity
in the Rule 11 case law reflects the play given to individual judge's normative preferences by the
rule. Id. at 1931-32 (expressing confidence that with some guidance from the Supreme Court there
will be more uniformity in lower court decisionmaking).
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considered, but the "implicit objective" of delegating the decision to the
expertise of the judge. 7 This delegation reflects the judge's institutional authority to select the appropriate managerial response from a wide
range of acceptable practices.2 8 As a result, the delegation of managerial and procedural discretion is routinely coupled with a policy of
extreme deference at the appellate level.22 9 This policy mirrors the
willingness of the institutional actors-judges and litigants alike--to
tolerate a wide range of variability in managerial responses because it is
difficult to argue convincingly that any particular judicial response is a
mistake. 3 Moreover, the need for expediency in the managerial
context is posed as a significant counterbalance to any efforts to unduly
burden the decisionmaking process by requiring formal hearings, 2briefs,
31
evidentiary records, and other accoutrements of appellate review.

This is not the case with Rule 11. While early claims for expediency
were noted, it soon became apparent that the sanctions question would
be decided after the litigation was resolved.232 Claims that Rule 11
would enhance case management quickly fell by the wayside. It also
became readily apparent that the Rule could be construed to compensate
the current litigant or deter future bad acts.2 33 The 1993 Amendments

227. See Burbank, supra note 80, at 1936-37 (discussing whether it is correct to assume that
delegating matters to the courts' discretion will produce correct or right answers); Fletcher, supra
note 153, at 272.
228. See Resnik, supra note 23, at 431-35. One difference between these types of decisions and
Rule I1 is the limited range of responses available--to sanction or not. It has become clear that the
courts' expertise is focused on defining and highlighting this decision. While there may be a range
of activities giving rise to the sanction decision, the decision itself is an either/or decision as a
threshold matter.
229. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 400 (1990) (discussing the express
delegation of discretion to the courts mandated by Rule 11 and the Advisory Committee's Note
calling for institutional deference); Louis, supra note 23, at 734-36. Contra Rosenberg, supra note
161, at 641-43 (challenging this assumption).
230. See Fletcher,supranote 153, at 271 (discussing variable outcomes in managerial decisions
and their insulation from strict appellate review); Mengler, supra note 169, at 415 (discussing
variable outcomes in evidentiary decisions); Rosenberg, supra note 161, at 662-63 (discussing
variable outcomes in cases presenting diffuse circumstances, which justifies vesting discretion in trial
judges).
231. This policy of deference is further justified by the assumption that there is no direct nexus
between the managerial issues and the substantive outcomes at trial. See Fletcher, supra note 153,
at 271. But see Resnik, supra note 23, at 429-31 (arguing that the managerial and adjudicatory roles
of the judges cannot be so easily separated, and that the managerial model of judging undermines
the judge's ability to fulfil this more important traditional adjudicatory function).
232. See Armour, supra note 220, at 109 ("While the dual goals of streamlined court
management and enhanced efficiency have pushed the circuit to define the trial court's discretion
in applying Rule 11 broadly, procedural limitations... have also been recognized.").
233. See infra notes 436-500 and accompanying text (discussing sanctions and Rule 11).
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have rejected compensation and narrowed the Rule's focus to deterrence. 234 Early on, it was obvious that the rule would do little to
improve the management of the pending case. To the contrary, it would

draw it out.
Unlike more typical managerial or procedural decisions, Rule 11
does not contemplate a range of tolerable responses to the threshold issue
of liability. Put simply, the courts must decide whether or not the case
is "frivolous." This type of decision is not unique and the courts often
address a limited range of alternatives.235 Often in these circumstances,
however, the range of alternatives represents equally acceptable results.
It quickly became clear that was not the case with Rule 11. The decision
to sanction would be hotly contested.236
The courts acknowledged that the fact patterns giving rise to a
sanction decision were potentially diverse, yet early on the courts began
looking for an internal guide or rough rule of thumb to help them. The
development of the "close" case as a way to define the limits of the trial
courts' discretion to sanction is part of the courts' search for such a
regulatory bright line.237 When the decision is either a yes or a no--to
sanction or not to sanction--it is not surprising that litigants are not
content to treat either one as falling within an acceptable range of

234. See infra notes 436-500 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 120-26 and accompanying text. The "close case" was one way for the
courts to conceptualize the problem of "conflicting" results. Another was to invest significant
resources into interpreting the threshold "standards" of the rule, looking for an outcome
determinative formulation that captured the uncertainty they faced. Numerous judges found it
difficult to get a fix on the meaning of "frivolous" litigation, and the formulations range from the
forgiving, to the unforgiving, to the "middle." See, e.g., In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 516 (4th Cir.
1990) (adopting a harsher standard for imposition of sanctions), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 969 (1991);
United States v. Stringfellow, 911 F.2d 225, 226 (9th Cir. 1990) (adopting relatively forgiving
standard); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1274-75 (2d Cir. 1986) (adopting forgiving standard), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987); cf Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181-82 (1962)
(reviewing denial of leave to amend under abuse of discretion even though decision is narrow and
impacts the development of the case's merits).
236. See infra notes 436-500 and accompanying text. For example, Rule 16 contemplates an
array of equally acceptable outcomes. The array of "formulations" available to define sanctionable
litigation in the Rule 11 context and others is impressive. See Hawaiian Engraving & Mfg., Inc. v.
Fujikami, No. 90-15997, 1991 WL 230187, at *2 (9th Cir. Nov. 8, 1991) (limited use opinion)
(reported without published opinion at 947 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1991)). What these formulations
illustrate is that legal judgments have both subjective and objective components. The former
represents the jurist's own "practiced"judgment and the latter the sense all such decisionmakers have
of the need to approach these decisions from an objective perspective. Trying to capture that sense
and skill in a linguistic formulation is inevitably a daunting task.
237. See supranotes 120-26 and accompanying text (discussing the analytical value of the close
case).
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discretionary outcomes.2 ' Numerous courts faced with an either/or
proposition, a close case, refused to treat each as acceptable. The close
case decisions reflect the courts' efforts to address this problem.
Despite efforts by commentators and drafters alike to encourage use
of the Rule only to regulate conduct, an approach consistent with the
courts' managerial expertise, the practice evolved more broadly.239 As
the practice evolved, there was concerted pressure from litigants and
lawyers alike to recognize that Rule 11 raised issues of merit and was
not limited to regulating "conduct." 2' Use of the Rule to regulate the
"content" of litigation, a practice roundly criticized in the commentary,241 caused increasing concern.
What expertise on the part of the courts is called into play in the
courts' sanctions practice? The points of tension and conflict within the
Rule reflect the institutional debate that has given it shape and substance.242 In designing sanctions to ensure deterrence, the courts display
the immediate hands-on experience of the local practice community. In
evaluating the conduct of the litigation, the court is again displaying its
managerial experience and expectations regarding the appropriate
standards to govern lawyers' behavior. But when addressing the threshold
legal issue--whether the claim is factually or legally meritless--this is
not as clear. If the court determines that the prefiling investigation was
adequate, but disagrees with the evaluation of the merits of the claim, the
court has used traditional legal skills.243 While it may still be applying
discretion as "skill," the perspective is different. Also different are the
normative assumptions that the decisionmaker brings to the practice

238. See supra notes 201-237 (defining the courts' discretion as an acceptable range of
outcomes, none of which would be considered error or problematic); infra notes 239-57 (same).
239. Cf.FED. a. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993) (linking Rule 11 to summary
judgment procedures and case law). See generally Stempel, supra note 12 (discussing the need to
harmonize Rule 11 and summary judgment and the perception that sanctions raise merit based
issues); Dyer, supra note 12 (discussing the confusion surrounding Rule 11 and the courts'
application of the Rule).
240. There was a parallel movement in the commentary to bring Rule 11 in line with these
procedures. See supra notes 65-148 and accompanying text.
241. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 80, at 1943-49; Schwarzer, supra note 84, at 1018-19; cf
Tobias, 1993 Revision, supra note 3, at 195-96 (pointing out the lack of a clear distinction between
the content and the conduct of the litigation in certain instances); Vairo, Prologue,supra note 3, at
49 (noting that it is difficult to make Rule 11 solely applicable to conduct).
242. See supra notes 65-148.
243. See supra notes 149-200 and accompanying text.
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regarding the range of tolerable variability, and the process of explication
and explanation. 2"
Although neat dichotomous variables do not exist, it helps to think
of the courts' adjudicative discretion in contrast to their managerial
discretion. Elements of the courts' adjudicative discretion recur throughout the sanctions case law as well, but it is clear that the courts find this
decisionmaking model difficult to apply broadly to the typical sanctions
case.245 The "legal paradigm" encompasses a set of decisional norms
that contemplate rationality, logic, objectivity, consistency, and predictability in the interpretation and application of law to fact. 246 The
decisional norm deemed most characteristic of the courts' adjudicative

discretion is its stated commitment to apply the law in rendering a
correct decision.247 While acknowledging that there are potentially
different outcomes in the adjudicative context, the tolerable differences
in results are expected to be narrower, explicable, and predictable by
reference to the legal standards, adjudicative norms, and relevant
facts.2 48 These adjudicative norms are inevitably coupled with a
decisional process that requires explication and explanation of the
adjudication as evidence of a legitimate, nonarbitrary exercise ofjudicial
power.249 Finally, the process of adjudication is subject to relatively
244. The move to reform the Rule focused on such issues. The reforms were two-pronged: fine
tune the legal standards and impose procedural restraints. See infra notes 436-500.
245. See, e.g., Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 401-05 (1990). The Court
pointed out that appellate review of sanctions decisions are, by their nature, highly fact specific and
are "unlikely to establish clear guidelines for lower courts; nor will it clarify the underlying
principles of law." Id. at 405.
246. This paradigm is used here as a normative paradigm defining for the courts what they are
about. Adherence to the paradigm is viewed as essential in the adjudicative context to render the
courts' decisionmaking legitimate. See BARAK, supra note 16, at 122; Resnik, The Domain, supra
note 71, at 2222-27; Resnik, FailingFaith, supra note 71, at 546-55.
247. See BARAK, supra note 16, at 12-18; Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARv. L. REv.
1057, 1060-65 (1975) (arguing that legal materials should generate a single right answer for every
legal issue).
248. See Carl E. Schneider, Discretion and Rules: A Lawyer's View, in THE USES OF
DISCRETION, supra note 17, at 47, 48-49 (discussing normative values imbedded in a system of
justice based on rules fairly applied and the tension between rules and judicial discretion). Professors
Brilmayer and Thompson have discussed the issue of acceptable variability as distinguished from
legal error. See generally Brilmayer, supra note 26 (describing the inherent variability in judicial
decisionmaking as "wobble" and arguing that the search for truly "right" answers is fruitless);
Thompson, supranote 26 (critiquing Brilmayer and asserting that she goes too far in claiming that
such sweeping decisional inconsistency does not threaten the process and integrity of judicial
decisionmaking).
249. See, e.g., REYNOLDS, supra note 174, at 55-60; cf.Owen M. Fiss, The Social and Political
Foundationsof Adjudication, 6 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121, 125 (1982) (theorizing that the role of
the judiciary is to give meaning and application to public values); Fuller, supra note 175, at 363-81
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strict institutional scrutiny.25 0 The appellate courts are deemed to have
equal if not greater institutional competence to review and revise the
doctrinal analysis, substituting their opinions for those of the trial judge
as needed. The appellate courts more readily defer to the trial courts' fact
competence than to those courts' doctrinal skills. This deference,
however, is not absolute and there are doctrines that enable an appellate
court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court's--or at least
require the lower court to revisit certain factual issues."'
Appellate review is deemed essential in this context to ensure that
the correct decision was reached, or at least that everything was done to
ensure that the court arrived at the best decision possible. The assumption
that underlies the adjudicative process is that the openness and thoroughness of the analysis at the trial court level, when coupled with a
commitment to provide a detailed record for appeal, fosters judicial
neutrality, objectivity, and adherence to external legal standards. 2 2 This
element of public and institutional scrutiny is intended to restrict the
courts' reliance upon highly personalized, subjective, or internalized
standards or the influence of bias in reaching the final result. More
simply stated, use of the "legal" paradigm, and the inevitable de novo
review on appeal, legitimate the courts' decision as an exercise of
judicial authority and not one of personal bias or preference.
This brings the entire issue back to Professor Yablon's analysis. The
question again is: What is going on when courts take the position that
"there are right answers.., and that trial courts are more likely to make
them than appellate courts"?25 3 Clearly, there is a range of variability
in "skills-based" decisions and it is hard to say that there is ever going
to be only one legally "correct" answer.254 It is also difficult, however,

(1978) (describing adjudication as an essential process to generate binding norms).
250. See, e.g., BARAK, supra note 16, at 20-27; Christie, supra note 169, at 38-39 (critiquing
law-fact distinction as the basis for appellate review and arguing appellate courts should look at the
analytic process that underlies decision); Louis, supranote 36, at 1017-18 (discussing the appellate

courts' function within the judicial system). See generally Anthony T. Kronman, The Problem of
JudicialDiscretion, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 481 (1986) (raising the issue of legitimacy in discretionary
decisionmaking).
251. See generally Christie, supranote 169 (discussing the nature of"fact" determinations and
appellate review of "fact" questions).
252. See Friendly, supra note 25, at 762-73 (discussing different types of deference to the trial
courts' judicial discretion); cf Christie, supra note 25, at 772-78 (noting the appellate courts'
increased willingness to tolerate more open-ended judicial discretion).
253. Yablon, supra note 18, at 264.

254. Once more, this refers to the normative assumption of a right answer as a norm imbedded
in the "legal paradigm" and assumptions about the adjudicative role of the court. See Atiyah, supra
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to look clients in the face and tell them that sanctions depend on the
court's discretion. What is at work here is the normative assumption that
the court is exercising skill and attempting to, through the exercise of its
skill, apply the law to the facts and render a correct decision. Judicial
skill is not simply to pick from an array of possible outcomes; it is to
pick the right outcome from the array.
Lawyers talking about this type of decision would likely say that the
judge is exercising his or her adjudicative discretion. They would be very
surprised if the court asserted that this decision was no different than
decisions regarding pretrial orders, discovery sanctions, or docket
management. In fact, this is one way these decisions differ. There are
some decisions where judge, lawyer, and litigant freely acknowledge that
the judge has broad discretion and others where this would be anathema.255 In Professor Yablon's study, the paradigm of discretion as
"skill" is shaped both by the decisional norms of the adjudicative context
and the "legal" paradigm . 56 In the situation described by Professor
Yablon, the paradigm of discretion as "skill" is, in effect, substituted for
the "legal" paradigm as the court's decisionmaking model.257 The latter
might be preferred because it produces a more "legitimate" decision, but
it is difficult to apply.258 This substitution occurs when the courts
determine that a more doctrinally circumscribed approach is simply not
feasible.259 Professor Yablon's work is further evidence of the trend
away from principled decisionmaking defined narrowly as the application
of the traditional "legal" paradigm. Yet this movement is inevitable, as
the courts become increasingly involved in an array of diverse and
difficult regulatory activities-like Rule 11.260

note 112, at 1255-59; D'Amato, supra note 180, at 184-88; Dworkin, supra note 25, at 29-40.
255. See Fletcher, supra note 153, at 271-73.
256. Yablon, supra note 18, at 262-68.

257. The idea that the paradigm of discretion as "skill" is used adaptively to substitute for the
traditional "legal" paradigm is discussed in Cooter. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S.
384, 400-05 (1990); infra notes 261-336 and accompanying text.

258. Professor Christie argues in favor of institutional deference by appellate courts reviewing
lower courts' findings of fact. Christie, supra note 169, at 20.
259. See Mengler, supra note 169, at 459-66; Yablon, supra note 18, at 266-68.

260. Commentators who criticize this pragmatic trend in the courts' decisionmaking do not
always address the question of the alternatives available to the courts. If it is decided that a highly
discretionary approach to the problem by the courts is unacceptable and the matter is not subject to
a rule-driven approach, must the court simply retreat? Professor Atiyah might argue that they should
because then the courts cannot legitimately render these decisions. See Atiyah, supra note 112, at
1270-72. Numerous others have less trouble with this role of the courts, although they too grapple

with the problem of justification. See, eg., Rosenberg, supra note 161, at 660-67 (arguing that the
discretion granted to trial courts and the deferential standard of review applied to their discretionary
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The next section examines the Supreme Court's efforts to define the
nature and scope of the trial courts' discretion in a particular Rule 11
sanctions case. This case helps define where the trial courts' discretion
falls on the continuum and reveals the Supreme Court's own normative
assumptions about Rule 11 and judicial discretion.
C. The Supreme Court's Definition of Discretion as Skill
The Advisory Committee's pragmatic response is in line with the
Supreme Court's, as indicated by its repeated citation of Cooter & Gell
v. Hartmarx Corp.26 ' in its notes to the 1993 amendments.2 62 This
opinion anchors the Advisory Committee's Note to the 1993 amendments. 263 The Cooter opinion is the clearest articulation of the paradigm of discretion as "skill" within the Rule 11 case law, but it does
something more than simply affirm the Court's commitment to this
model of legal decisionmaking. The Cooter opinion and 1993 amendments focus on the importance of the paradigm of discretion as "skill"
as a paradigm of legal decisionmaking able to address issues going to the
merits of the case. The Cooter Court's analysis treats this "skill"
paradigm as an appropriate substitute for the "legal" paradigm in certain
circumstances. The decisional goals nevertheless remain essentially the
same: identify the facts, state the law, and apply the law to the facts." 4
The fact that the practice is reviewed under the deferential "abuse of
discretion" standard does not mean that the overarching decisional norms
and goals that define the "legal" paradigm and the courts' exercise of
265
adjudicative discretion, do not apply.

decisions are warranted under our system of justice, ever though some traditional justifications are
less than compelling). Others would argue that courts often retreat by simply hiding behind the "false
objectivity" of the legal paradigm. See Martinez, supra note 20, at 611-18.
261. 496 U.S. 384 (1990).
262. See FED. R. CIv. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993) (citing Cooter, 496 U.S. 384).
Cooter involved an antitrust complaint filed by a retailer of men's clothing against a manufacturer
of men's clothing, alleging a nationwide conspiracy to fix prices and to eliminate competition.
Cooter, 496 U.S. at 388-89. The manufacturer moved to dismiss the complaint and moved for
sanctions under Rule 11. Id. at 389. After the retailer voluntarily dismissed the complaint, pursuant
to Rule 41(a)(1)(i), the district court imposed Rule 11 sanctions. Id. The Supreme Court affirmed
the sanctions on appeal. Id. at 405.
263. See FED R. Civ. P. 11 advisory conunittee note (1993).

264. See infra notes 296-317.
265. The "abuse of discretion" standard is sufficiently ambiguous itself to cover a wide range
of applications. See Friendly, supra note 25, at 762 ("All agree that the rule requiring deference to
the trial court's discretion is not absolute; an appellate court may reverse if discretion has been

'abused."). Friendly notes that "abuse of discretion" is defined in a number of ways, some coming
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The Supreme Court's analysis in Cooter outlines its policy of
institutional deference to trial courts in areas in which they are perceived
as having unusual expertise or skill. 266 The Supreme Court's deference
to the trial courts due to their unusual "fact competence" is an overriding
theme in the Court's analysis and is also ultimately used to justify the
Court's policy of deferring to the trial courts on essentially legal
issues.267 Yet, a significant difference exists between the two aspects
of the trial courts' "fact competence" called into play in rendering a

decision.
The Cooter Court recounted the courts of appeals' historical reliance
on trial judges as skilled fact finders.268 The fact competence of a court
sitting as a trier of fact and determining "historical, 269 facts to be

plugged into the legal paradigm is one type of fact competence. This
differs from the fact competence of a trial court exercising its discretion

as "skill" not simply to determine facts, but to substitute its subjective
and intuitive judgments for a more finely honed legal analysis involving
the application of law to fact.27 The Cooter Court views this latter
"fact competence"--the merging of the trial court's fact competence and
legal analysis-as the inevitable result of highly indeterminate rule structures.2 7' The Cooter Court's analysis of the "skill" paradigm treats it
close to approximating "legal error." Id at 762-64. See Louis, supra note 23, at 744 (arguing for a
flexible approach to appellate review that more accurately reflects what has gone on in the case);
George A. Somerville, StandardsofAppellate Review, 15 LITIG. 23, 24 (1989) (distinguishing standards of review by the presumption of correctness accorded trial courts and arguing that the intensity
of review should vary depending on what the appellate court is asked to do). The article
distinguishes between cases involving questions that the trial court is in a better position to review
and cases involving novel questions. Id. at 25-26. In the latter instance, the trial court is given
discretion as an experiment and there is an expectation that the law will evolve and stricter review
will result. Cf Vairo, Prologue,supra note 3, at 72-74 (distinguishing between a "careful 'abuse'
review" and a "loose 'abuse' review").
266. The traditional appellate paradigm distinguishing between factual and legal decisions as
a way to distinguish between the relative institutional competencies of the trial and appellate courts
has come under recent criticism. See Louis, supra note 23, at 735-36.
267. The fact/law dichotomy "act[s] as [a] surrogatefl for the system's division of decisional
authority between the trial and appellate levels." Louis, supra note 23, at 735. Louis notes that this
method of classification is most controversial when it involves the application of law to fact. Id. The
question is whether to review this decision freely or deferentially. Id. at 736.
268. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 399-405 (1990); see Christie, supra note
169, at 16-17 (discussing the historical transference of a portion of the jury's fact-finding function
to trial judges).
269. See Christie, supra note 169, at 20.
270. See supra notes 168-200. This issue consistently poses problems. See Cooter, 496 U.S. at
403-04; Christie, supra note 169, at 31; Louis, supra note 23, at 748-49.
271. See Cooter,496 U.S. at 404-06. Contra Louis, supra note 23, at 741-45 (looking at the
rationale justifying deference in procedural matters which require the application of law to fact, and
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as something of a default approach to be used when the "legal" paradigm
proves inadequate.
Yet the Court goes on to offer a devastating critique of the "legal"
paradigm itself. Reflecting a number of different trends in academic
scholarship, the Court points out that the distinction between "fact" and
"law," two essential elements of the "legal" paradigm, cannot stand up
under close scrutiny.272 If the application of law to fact, the core of the
legal paradigm, is a more fact-sensitive than doctrinally-driven, the
distinction between the two elements of the analysis becomes blurry. As
the fact side of the analytic equation increases, emphasizing a rich
contextual analysis of discrete, variable facts, it becomes increasingly
difficult to claim that the final decision is determined by law.273
A fundamental difference exists between the fact competence
involved in determining the "facts" of the case and the fact competence
involved in the analysis and classification of fact patterns--the factual
dimension of a traditional legal analysis.274 In the latter case, the trial
court is inevitably looking for points of convergence between the facts
of the case and the law. While this analysis may not rise to the level of
identifying repeating fact paradigms that "fit" the rule, it certainly
involves analytic skills beyond those involved in merely determining or
finding facts.275 The Supreme Court merges these two distinct dimensions of the courts' fact competence to achieve its objective. It is able to
use the trial courts' acknowledged fact competence to justify deferring
to the trial courts on questions that have traditionally been viewed as

pointing out that "not all fact-intensive procedural determinations are classified as discretionary").

272. The Cooteropinion is in line with a growing body of commentary that questions the real
difference between questions of law and questions of fact. See, e.g., Christie, supra note 169, at 18;
Louis, supra note 23, at 734-37; Adrian A.S. Zuckerman, Law, Fact or Justice?, 66 B.U. L. REV.

487, 489 (1986).
273. Cooter,496 U.S. at 401. "The Court has long noted the difficulty of distinguishing between
legal and factual issues .... 'Nor do we yet know of any other rule or principle that will unerringly
distinguish a factual finding from a legal conclusion."' Id. (quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456
U.S. 273, 288 (1982)). Yet mixed-question cases, that is cases involving the application of law to
fact, are not always classified as discretionary. See Louis, supra note 23, at 744; Minow & Spelman,
supra note 183, at 1602 (discussing how legal perceptions vary with context); Wells, supra note 61,
at 1734 (discussing contextual dimension brought to bear by decisionmaker).
274. See Christie, supra note 169, at 52-54 (arguing that courts should make these types of
distinctions based on the nature of the decisionmaking, not law-fact distinctions); Feinman, supra
note 178, at 679-80 (discussing the courts' "factual classification" of like cases and its doctrinal role
in the decisionmaking process).
275. See Feinman, supra note 178, at 679-80.
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legal in nature. 6 If a purely legal question is involved, the Court
points out that it is easily addressed by the appellate courts on appeal.277
This rationale, deference to the trial courts' unique skill described
as their hands-on experience, is well developed in the appellate case
law.278 It is therefore fair to ask what the Supreme Court means when
it defers to the trial courts' competence to determine facts, a competence
seemingly grounded in their up-front and personal view from the bench.
How does this fact competence translate into an ability to fashion law
from the subjective judgments and intuitions that characterize the "skill"
paradigm?2 79 The Supreme Court does not directly address this question
other than to point out that these are "fact sensitive" legal questions and
should be delegated to the trial courts because of their fact competence.280

276. Cf. David R. Keyser, State Constitutionsand Theories ofJudicialReview:Some Variations
on a Theme, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1051, 1075-76 (1985) (arguing that the fact that courts exercise
discretion and their decisions are based upon pragmatism instead of neutral principles does not
undermine the essentially legal nature of the decision).
277. See Cooter, 496 U.S. at 405 (noting that while deference is paid to the trial court's factual
determinations, it is the province of the appellate court to determine the proper legal standard to be
applied).
278. See Jennings v. Joshua Indep. Sch. Dist., 877 F.2d 313, 321 (5th Cir. 1989) (deferring to
the trial court judge where the imposition of sanctions did not amount to an abuse of discretion),
cert. denied, 496 U.S. 935 (1990); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 872-73 (5th
Cir. 1988). The court in Thomas did not wish to interpret the rule to
remove from the district court the discretion which it must enjoy to effectively regulate
its courtroom.... The perspective of a district court is singular. The trial judge is in the
best position to review the factual circumstances and render an informed judgment as he
is intimately involved with the case, the litigants, and the attorneys on a daily basis....
"[T]he district court will have a better grasp of what is acceptable trial-level practice
among litigating members of the bar than will appellate judges."
Id. (quoting Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of N.Y., 637 F. Supp. 558, 566 (E.D.N.Y. 1986),
modified, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987)); see Bryer v. Creati, No. 891520, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15721, at *11, *12 (Ist Cir. August 31, 1990) (decision reported
without published opinion at 915 F.2d 1556) (willing to give "appropriate weight to the district
court's greater familiarity with the case" and finding that the record failed to reveal "any meaningful
error of judgment"). But see Estate of Williams v. City of Harvey, No. 93 C 7253, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8556, at *22 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995) (dismissing portions of the complaint pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) and issuing a warning to the plaintiff that an amendment would be accepted, but that Rule
I I sanctions were possible). Here, the court exercised its traditional legal analytic skills in issuing
the Rule 12(b)(6) order and basing the Rule 11 warnings on the same standard. See id.
279. This rationale does not always apply in practice. In Automatic Liquid Packaging, Inc. v.
Dominik, 909 F.2d 1001 (7th Cir. 1990), the court held that the deferential standard applied even
where the district court judge who imposed the sanctions being appealed was not the same judge
who had heard the evidence in the case and had granted the summary judgment motion. Id. at 1004.
280. See Cooter, 496 U.S. at 401-05.
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In other cases, the appellate courts have treated this "expertise" as
the trial courts' sense of what is acceptable litigation practices at the
local level. 8' This might be true as to the reasonableness of the
prefiling inquiry, particularly where local practices are cited in mitigation
or defense by the targeted attorney.28 2 Yet to apply Rule 11 as a way
to enforce or endorse local practices is, on its face, contrary to the thrust
of the Rule283 and would undermine its broad exclusionary function.2 4 When applied to considerations of merit, whether approached
by the courts as a review of applicable law or as a question of the
attorney's state of mind-would a reasonable attorney have fied the
claim--this local practice variation becomes even more problematic.285
The Supreme Court and others have used this dimension of the decision
to raise questions about the good faith or motives of counsel, elements
traditionally used to raise questions about the reasonableness of professed
beliefs.2 86
And what of the trial courts' views of these matters? Do they agree
that they have the requisite skills to handle these issues? What do they
think of the notion that matters not on the record are assumed to support
their decision? 287 And how will this factor be addressed under the 1993

281. See, e.g., Thomas, 836 F.2d at 873 (noting that district courts are in a better position to
evaluate the propriety of attorneys' conduct at the trial level than appellate courts).
282. Professor Louis has pointed out the difficulty with this position. See Louis, supranote 23,
at 744 (arguing that "[s]uch local factors should not... affect the question whether the attorney
believed that the pleading or motion was well grounded in fact and law," and therefore have no place
in sanctions decisions).
283. See Burbank, supra note 80, at 1929-30 (discussing the goal of procedural uniformity and
the problem of increasingly diverse local practices).
284. Cf supra note 135 (discussing this exclusionary function as a necessary part of the courts'
managerial power over their own affairs).
285. STEPHEN B. BURBANK, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, RULE 11 N TRANsTON: THE
REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRcUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE I146-47
(1989) (endorsing deference to the trial courts' regulation of conduct as preferable to local regulation
of content).
286. See Louis, supra note 23, at 746-47. Yet it is questionable whether these matters will
continue to hold sway under the new amendments. Is the subjective belief of counsel a factor in
determining whether or not a claim is frivolous? This question recurs because this is the point at
which product and conduct overlap: Is our objective evaluation of the product influenced by the
attorney's conduct, including his thought processes? See a at 747 ("Perhaps the trial judge will not
limit her consideration to the attorney's conduct with respect to the paper in question, but will
consider the totality of the attorney's conduct in this and perhaps other litigation.").
287. Cf Rosenberg, supra note 161, at 663-65 (questioning cases in which the inability to
capture matters on the record is treated as warranting appellate deference).
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amendments and their mandate to develop a formal record for sanctions
decisions?2 8
When viewed from this perspective, the convergence is striking
between the Supreme Court's theory of institutional competence and
deference, and Professor Yablon's analysis of a trial courts' approach to
indeterminate, fact sensitive questions. 289 Both the trial and appellate
courts assume that the matters sought to be regulated are not subject to
a more rule-bound approach. They also share the assumption that the trial
courts have the practice skills necessary to produce correct answers. Here
the skill dimension of the courts' discretion "involve[s] the exercise' 2of
90
a practice that is neither reducible nor justifiable in terms of a rule.
The trial judge is deemed to have special knowledge that "enables her to
achieve an answer better than any that could be obtained by simply
29 She can bring this special knowledge to bear in
following rules.""
rendering a practical judgment.2 92 However the trial courts' activities
are conceptualized, this "skill" or "practice" 93 element lies at the heart
of the Supreme Court's and the Advisory Committee's pragmatic
strategy.
It is fair then to ask what the Supreme Court believes this "skill" or
"practice" entails and how the Court looks at sanctions decisions to
determine if they adhere to the norms of the "skill" paradigm or
"practice". Unfortunately, the Court does not directly address this issue
in Cooter other than to argue that the fact sensitive legal issues involved
are best handled by the trial courts.29 4 Nothing in the Cooter opinion
indicates that this dimension of the courts' "fact competence" is anything
more than the courts' own experience and subjective judgments
concerning the nature of local litigation practices or frivolous litigation.29 If that is so, the concerns of the critics are certainly justified,
absent some device to guide and limit subjectivity and potential bias in
the courts' decisionmaking.
288. See infra notes 436-500.
289. See supra notes 168-260.
290. Yablon, supra note 18, at 262.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 262-63.
293. Professor Yablon's definition of the "skill" paradigm from the perspective of the trial
courts is the most useful definition for purposes of our analysis. See id at 261-63; supranotes 149259 and accompanying text.
294. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 402 (1990).
295. The legal meaning of Rule I1 is inevitably influenced by the courts' subjective views. Cf.
Wells, supranote 61, at 1728 (asserting that judges' legal decisions are inevitably influenced by their

personal experiences).
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Having addressed the trial courts' fact competence, albeit somewhat
elliptically, Cooter went on to address the legal issues raised by the
appeal. The legal issues raised in Cooter posed a slightly different
problem for the court than the fact questions posed. The primary legal
issues in the appeal of a Rule 11 sanction decision were easily identified
by the Court: Has the trial court properly ruled that the claim is frivolous
and has the "attorney's conduct violated Rule 11,,?296 In Cooter, the
Court addressed the question of the proper standard of appellate review
applicable to these trial court decisions.297 The circuits had been split
on this issue. Some circuits adopted the position that all questions of law
should be reviewed de novo on appeal.298 In these circuits, sanctions
decisions were appealed under a three-tier standard. 2" Questions of law
were reviewed de novo. Questions of fact were reviewed under the
clearly erroneous standard. Questions regarding the nature and scope of
the sanction were reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.3°
Other circuits took the position that a single, unitary, "abuse of
discretion" standard on appeal was warranted. 0 t
In deciding to adopt the unitary "abuse of discretion" standard, the
Court made an interesting two-pronged argument. First, the Court
asserted that the appellate standard for reviewing facts, the "clearly

296. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 399 (1990).
297. The Court starts its analysis of the proper standard of appellate review by noting that where
a trial court is "empowered to exercise its discretion," a deferential standard of review is typically
applied. Id. at 400. This position is roundly criticized by Professor Maurice Rosenberg. See
Rosenberg, supra note 161, at 640-41, 645-47 (criticizing the notion that the express delegation of
discretion automatically mandates a deferential standard of review). Ironically, Professor Rosenberg's
article is cited in Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558-59 (1988), a case cited with approval in
Cooter, 496 U.S. at 403.
298. The de novo issue was limited to the threshold determination of the frivolousness of the
claim. See, e.g., Zaldivar v. City of L.A., 780 F.2d. 823, 828 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogatedby Cooter
& Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990); Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 117475 (D.C. Cir. 1985). It is interesting to note that the circuits viewed this as a two-step analysis: What
was the "legal" character of the claim; and did it warrant sanctions. The first step calls into play the
underlying doctrinal law while the second step calls into play the judgment that the claim is in fact
frivolous. See Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 872 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing
Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F. 2d 1551, 1556 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc)). This two-step analysis has
been reintroduced in the 1993 amendments to Rule 11. See Tobias, 1993 Revision, supra note 3, at
195-96 (discussing the threshold "calculus" to weigh merits and prefiling investigation); infra notes
436-74.
299. See, e.g., Thomas, 836 F.2d at 872.
300. Cooter, 496 U.S. at 399 (describing the three-tiered approach of the Ninth Circuit before
ultimately rejecting it).
301. See, e.g., Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 861 F.2d 746, 757-58 (1st Cir. 1988);
Thomas, 836 F.2d at 872.
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erroneous" standard, has essentially the same effect on appeal as an
"abuse of discretion" standard.0 2 Second, the Court noted "the
difficulty of distinguishing between legal and factual issues ... particularly... in the Rule 11 context [which] requires a court
to consider [legal] issues rooted in factual determinations. 30 3 Ultimately, in resolving the issue of the standard of review, the Court likened a
Rule 11 determination to a finding of negligence, "which is generally
reviewed deferentially." ° The heart of the Court's justification is as
follows:
Familiar with the issues and litigants, the district court is better situated
than the court of appeals to marshal the pertinent facts and apply the
fact-dependent legal standard mandated by Rule 11. Of course, this
standard would not preclude the appellate court's correction of a district
court's legal errors .... 305
The theme of institutional competence and judicial discretion as "skill"
is a large part of the Court's analysis.
A pivotal case cited in support of the Cooter ruling is Pierce v.
Underwood.30 6 The Supreme Court relies heavily on this case for the
proposition that deference is owed to the "'judicial actor... better
positioned than another to decide the issue in question.' 30 7 Adhering
to this proposition, the Court held that as between the trial court and the
court of appeals, the trial court was in the better position to render the
highly fact specific sanctions decision. 0 8
This question of competence cuts both ways. The Court went on to
state that institutional deference on the part of the appellate court to the
trial court was even more justified where, as here, the appellate court's
display of their institutional competence would accomplish little. The
Court reasoned that the "legal" questions involved in rendering a sanction
decision did not lend themselves to the normal law clarifying functions

302. Cooter, 496 U.S. at 400-01.
303. Id. at 401.
304. Id. at 402. The Court emphasizes that issues involving the application of law to fact are

generally reviewed deferentially. Id. at 403. The Court does not differentiate between the court sitting
as a fact finder in deciding that negligence has occurred and a court sitting in its more adjudicative
capacity making a similar ruling. Id. at 402-03.
305. Id. at 402.
306. 487 U.S. 552 (1988).
307. Id. at 560 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)).
308. Id. at 563; see Cooter,496 U.S. at 403 (explaining the decision in Pierce and arriving at
the same conclusion).
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of appellate review.3°9 The Court asserted that the utility of a traditional appellate review is limited in cases such as Cooter, where the
underlying legal issues involve "'multifarious,
fleeting, special, narrow
310
facts that utterly resist generalization."'
While deferring to the trial court's "fact competence," defined as
its ability to establish "historical" facts, the appellate courts have long
been willing to intervene and review the trial courts' legal analysis: Was
the law correctly stated and applied? 31 ' According to the Cooter Court,
however, even this dimension of appellate review raises questions
regarding the relative fact competence of the trial and appellate courts.
The appellate courts' review of these two elements of the "legal"
paradigm-stating the applicable law and applying the law to the
facts-depends largely on the courts' ability to identify similarities in the
fact patterns or paradigms between the cases offered up on appeal and
the decisional case law.312 When a given case's facts are not subject to
such generalizations or factual classifications, the typical method of
appellate review is no longer available. According to the Cooter Court,
without the ability to identify repeating fact patterns and paradigms, the
appellate court is unable to move from the decisional case law to the
case under review and test the application of law to fact against its
predecessor.3 3 If the court of appeals cannot engage in this limited
fact-based analysis, it cannot do much in the way of reviewing elements
of the trial court's legal decisionmaking and should therefore defer to the
lower court. 3 4 According to the Cooter Court, it is the trial court that
has the institutional expertise, or at least experience, to handle cases
involving "consideration of unique factors that are 'little susceptible ... of useful generalization""'3 5 including "fact-intensive, close
calls ' 316 regarding an attorney's violation of Rule 11. The Cooter Court
could not have done a better job of conjuring up the image of the lower
courts' pragmatic sanctions practice and the paradigm of discretion as

309. Cooter, 496 U.S. at 404-05.
310. Id. at 404 (quoting Pierce, 487 U.S. 561-62 (quoting Rosenberg, supra note 161, at 662-

63)).
311.

See Christie,supra note 169, at 772.

312. See Cooter,496 U.S. at 401-05; Feinman, supra note 178, at 696-700 (discussing "legal"
analysis as the ability to identify, develop, and classify repeating fact paradigms).
313. Cooter, 496 U.S. at 404.
314. Id. at 401-05.
315. Id. at 404 (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 562 (1988)).
316. Id. (quoting CHARLES M. SHAFFER JR. & PAUL M. SANDLER, SANCnONs: RuLE 11 AND
OTHER POWERS 15 (2d ed. 1988).
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"skill" if it had been consciously trying to do so.
The Cooter opinion makes a final telling point: While the courts'
pragmatic "skill" is rooted in the day to day experiences of the judge, the
paradigm of discretion as "skill" as used in this context is a substitute
decisionmaking model for the "legal" paradigm. The Court implies by its
analysis that it first looks to see if the "legal" paradigm, the analytically
preferred method ofjudicial decisionmaking, is available. The dimension
of the trial courts' legal analysis at issue in Cooter is not the "fact"
element that has long been an object of institutional deference. The
element of the "legal" paradigm actually at issue is the increasingly17 fact
sensitive legal analysis involved in applying the law to the facts.
It is important to appreciate how the Cooter opinion shapes our
understanding of discretion as "skill" as a normative paradigm defining
the courts' legitimate decisionmaking activities.31 The courts' pragmatic decisionmaking in the procedural or managerial context assumes a
highly variable approach to the day-to-day problems of court management and a subjective or even idiosyncratic view of effective judicial
administration."1 9 The experiential or fact-based legal skills invoked by
the Cooter Court are viewed differently. Here the Supreme Court is
forced to defer to the trial courts' discretion as "skill" as the only
effective decisionmaking method available to address the highly fact
sensitive questions involving the application of law to fact in a Rule 11
sanctions decision. Underlying this analysis is an assumption that the
appellate courts have tried to address this matter using the "legal"
paradigm and traditional standards of appellate review, and it didn't
work.32 In delegating the sanctions question to the situated

317. See, e.g., id. at 401-05.

318. This Article treats these decisionmaking paradigms as normative in the sense that they
shape the decisionmaking activities of the court. In addition, they largely define how the decision
can be justified as a legitimate exercise of judicial power. Cf. Sanford Levinson, What Do Lawyers
Know (And What Do They Do with Their Knowledge)? Comments on Schauer and Moore, 58 S.

CAL. L. REv. 441, 453 (1985) (criticizing theories of legal interpretation that unduly rely on the
judicial role). Levinson further points out that the judge's role is not limited to finding the single
right answer, but includes responding to advocates arguments. Id. at 454-55.
319. See supra notes 201-59.

320. See Cooter,496 U.S. at 401-05. The Court's analysis on this point is sketchy. It makes the
argument that these are fact sensitive questions, yet it fails to address in detail any of the appellate
cases using the three-tiered standard. See id. at 399, 405 (acknowledging, without expanding on, the
existence of the three-tiered standard for which petitioner was arguing, and flatly dismissing it in
favor of "abuse of discretion"). These courts seemed to have no difficulty with the process. The
Court never illustrates the utility or difference between the two paradigms. More importantly, the
Court never points out why those courts using the de novo standard were wrong or what was
problematic about their decisions.
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decisionmaker, the trial court judge, the Supreme Court nevertheless still
expects the decisionmaking process to adhere in some fundamental way
to the norms of the "legal" paradigm and the adjudicative arena.32
The paradigm of discretion as "skill" is invoked here as a "pragmatic" alternative to the traditional legal paradigm. The paradigm of
discretion as skill has no internalized norm defining the tolerable limits
of variability or the expectation of consistency in the courts'
decisionmaking. This is not true of the "legal" paradigm or the courts'
exercise of adjudicative discretion. This difference in the two paradigms
is a significant point of tension: When the courts emphasize the utility
of their pragmatic "skills" and the disutility of their "legal" skills, what
is their assumption regarding the tolerable limits of variability in the
resulting decisionmaking? On one level, more variability must be
tolerated simply because more factual variability is contemplated by the
process. But how much more variability? How should the courts
conceptualize this as a decisional "norm" to guide their own
decisionmaking? 3"
The Supreme Court freely acknowledges that this appellate
strategy" will do little to further the process of clarifying and developing the doctrinal basis of the Rule, or otherwise enhance uniformity and
predictability in Rule 11 decisions.324 This does not cause the Court
any undue discomfort, however. It appears willing to tolerate some level
of variability, inconsistency, and lack of predictability in the Rule 11
arena in exchange for increased regulation. Apparently the Court was of
the opinion that the trial courts' pragmatic sanctions practice was
generating good enough decisions. In this situation the Court saw that it
had two options. It could engage in a traditional appellate review of Rule

321. See Putnam,supranote 163, at 1799 (discussing the similar perspectives of the structuralist
and situationalist jurist).
322. Professor Yablon's study indicates that, in other adjudicative contexts, the substitution of
the "skill" paradigm for the "legal" paradigm was based on the assumption of right answers that
could be achieved in practice. See Yablon, supranote 18, at 264 ("This assumption of right answers
in practice, which cannot be generalized or stated in rules, leads to a theory of institutional
competence that legitimizes trial court discretion.").
323. The Supreme Court goes on to treat Rule I l's policy goals as further evidence of the need
for a deferential standard of review. The Court posits that if the purpose of the Rule is to regulate
local litigation practice, it is the trial courts who are acquainted with local litigation practices and
who are most familiar with the need for regulation. Cooter,496 U.S. at 404. The Court justifies its
position by arguing that appellate "[d]eference to the determination of courts on the front lines of
litigation will enhance these courts' ability to control the litigants before them." Id.
324. Id. at 405.
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11 sanction decisions" or it could adopt a policy of deference.
This article suggests that there is a third alternative, a middle ground
between the highly deferential review afforded by the routine application
of the "abuse of discretion" standard and the more restrictive "de novo"
review using the "legal" paradigm.326 As set forth in Part HI,327 trial
courts should be able to justify their exercise of discretion as "skill" by
reference to the internal logic of the paradigm.32 The logic of the
paradigm can also provide structure and content to the courts' appellate
review under the "abuse of discretion" standard. With this approach trial
courts would be found to have abused their discretion if they didn't
with the decisional elements that go into making up
address or comply
3 29
the paradigm.
As a first step, both trial and appellate courts would be required to
examine the case and present issues to determine what type of analysis
is appropriate.33 If the more traditional "legal" paradigm should apply,
even to parts of the analysis, the courts would do so. If the "skill"
paradigm, or at least components of it applied, it would also be used.33'
This method avoids the problem of appellate courts attempting to

325. The court expressed concern that such a standard would encourage appeals. Yet numerous
circuits had been operating under the unitary "abuse of discretion" standard and there was no
empirical evidence offered showing they experienced fewer or more appeals than the circuits using
the de novo standard. The Court's deference, particularly in "'fact-intensive, close calls,"' id. at 404
(quoting SHAFFER & SANDLER, supra note 316, at 14-15), is contrary to much of the commentary
on the problem or challenge of close cases. See James W. Nickel, UneasinessAbout Easy Cases, 58
S. CAL. L. REv. 477, 477 (1985) (worrying about using "easy cases" as the starting premise of an
analysis of the law); Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases,58 S. CAL. L. REv. 399, 410-11 (1985) (noting
that easy cases reflect the "fit" of law and fact, but they are not as easy as they seem); cf. Daniel
A. Farber & Phillip P. Frickey, PracticalReason and the FirstAmendment, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1615,
1654-56 (1987) (arguing that close cases should require courts to articulate the decisional principles
or standards used to decide in order to allow for adequate appellate review); Janice Toran,
Settlement, Sanctions, and Attorney Fees: Comparing English Payment into Court and Proposed
Rule 68, 35 AM. U. L. REv. 301, 324 (1986) (arguing the unfairness of attorney fee awards in close
cases under English system and the lack of deterrent potential of such awards).
326. This middle ground has been identified by Professor Vairo and Professor Louis as a place
to begin building a more coherent Rule 11 jurisprudence. See supra notes 138-48 and accompanying
text.
327. See infra part III.E.
328. See infra notes 355-412 and accompanying text.
329. See infra notes 355-412.
330. Professors Christie and Louis both criticize the appellate courts' over-simplified approach
to this question. In examining the trial courts' decisions, they seem to find the kind of complex
analysis they are calling upon the appellate courts to render. See Christie, supra note 169, at 49;
Louis, supra note 23, at 739.
331. This threshold analysis is similar to Professor Louis's multi-factor appellate review. See
Louis, supra note 23, at 739.
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substitute their judgments for those of the trial court in cases where it is
not feasible or appropriate to do so. The appellate courts' role is very
limited in these highly fact intensive cases. Their function is to ensure
that the trial court exercised the requisite "skill," as defined by the "skill"
paradigm, in rendering its decision. This approach provides a structure
for the trial courts' analysis of their fact intensive sanctions decisions and
the appellate courts' review under the "abuse of discretion" standard that
currently does not exist.
The Supreme Court's approach to Rule 11 reflects in large part the
Court's desire to vest the regulatory power created by the Rule in the
trial courts. This bias 3 32-- and the Court's approach--makes sense from
an institutional perspective. The trial courts are the courts in the best
position to use the power and authority created by the rule to address the
problems associated with the adversarial model of adjudication. Yet this
strategy does not address the need for accountability and clarity in the
form of standards to guide and limit the trial courts' exercise of their
discretion under Rule 11. As critics pointed out in response to the Cooter
decision, the highly deferential appellate standard of "abuse of discretion," when coupled with the subjective, fact intensive judgments that
make up the trial courts' sanctions practice, does little to address the
problems of variability, consistency, and predictability in the courts'
decisionmaking.3 33
It is difficult to tell from the Cooter opinion how much variability,
inconsistency, or lack of predictability is tolerable under the paradigm of
discretion as "skill" before a serious question is raised about the need for
the constraining influence of the "law." The Cooter opinion does,
however, analytically affirm the normative assumption of the courts that
they are or should be attempting to find the single right or best answer
in their sanctions practice. They cannot view all possible alternative
outcomes of the decisionmaking as equally acceptable. While the Court
is willing to defer to the trial courts' exercise of its discretion as "skill,"
it does not follow that the definition of a correct or right decision should
be defined solely by the limits of the practice. Reviewing the skillfulness
of the decision is one way to ensure that the courts are attempting to find

332. Cf Resnik, FailingFaith,supra note 71, at 527 (discussing the emergence of managerial
judging and pointing out the expanded discretionary power accorded to trial court judges under the
post-1983 Rule 11); Resnik, supra note 23, at 396 (discussing the delegation of power to the trial
courts to make local rules that aid in ensuring the just and speedy resolution of cases).
333. Cf CALL FOR COMMENT, supra note 66, at 6-7 (noting that the Advisory Committee
defined these as core problems to be addressed by amendment, if possible).
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the best or right answer, along with adopting the normative assumption
of the legal paradigm that there is a "right" answer. Adoption of this
decisionmaking norm will encourage the trial and appellate courts to look
at their decisions from a larger institutional perspective.334
The problem of defining an acceptable level of variability in the
application of the rule under the paradigm of discretion as "skill"
nevertheless remains.335 It is proposed that the trial courts must adhere
to the internal logic of the paradigm of discretion as "skill." How then
do they also address the normative assumption that their sanctions
decisions should determine the best fit between the facts of their cases
and the Rule defined from the perspective of the legal paradigm? How
does their decision define and develop the law of sanctions and the
tolerable limits of advocacy and adversarialism? The courts' evolving
sanctions practice makes this dimension of the sanctions analysis more
critical than ever. As will be seen below, the 1993 amendments
substantially restructure the rule by focusing on its exclusionary function.
The new rule, in turn, focuses on significant or important decisions that
define and exclude unacceptable dimensions of advocacy and
adversarialism. 336 A decision under the new rule has potentially far
reaching implications as the courts begin to build this decisional data
base. This is a significant evolution in the courts' sanctions practice and
warrants some consideration of the impact such decisions will have on
the doctrinal development of the Rule.
D.

The Evolving Paradigmof Discretion as "Skill"

The courts' Rule 11 sanctions practice is evolving. Courts unable to
fit their sanctions practice within the narrower "legal" paradigm are
337
comfortable with this trend emphasizing the courts' pragmatic skills.
There appears to be a clear consensus among the courts that the practice
is not easily reducible to rules and that the trial courts are well situated
to handle the regulatory problem of frivolous litigation. However, it is
less clear how the "shared [normative] assumption of trial and appellate
judges" that Rule 11 sanction decisions "can be made correctly at the

334. See infra notes 355-412 and accompanying text.
335. See Brilmayer, supra note 26, at 376 (discussing the difference between acceptable
variability and reversible legal error).

336. See infra notes 436-500 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 261-336 and accompanying text (discussing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx
Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990), the decision setting the standard for appeal).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1996

67

Hofstra
LawLAWREVIEW
Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 3
HOFSTRA

[Vol. 24:677

level of practice ' can be reconciled with the resulting inconsistency
or variability in the case law. One solution is simply to define a skillful
exercise of discretion as correct per se. Under this approach, the courts'
sanctions practice defines the tolerable limits of variability.33 9 Yet this
is precisely the perspective challenged by the Rule's critics. They argue
that there should be constraints other than the courts' experience and
subjective judgments that limit and guide the courts' exercise of
discretion. This "skill" element represents a major point of tension within
the courts' evolving Rule 11 practice. On the one hand, a judge's
managerial competence is defined largely by her highly personalized,
experiential view of litigation and the needs of her court.3 40 In the
adjudicative arena this experiential dimension of the courts' skill and
expertise is deemed to encompass a larger institutional context and reflect
a less personalized or idiosyncratic perspective. This difference can be
illustrated by the different ways courts justify their subjective or intuitive
judgments. In some instances it is deemed "appropriate for a
decisionmaker to refer to his or her own discretion in offering a
justification for a decision. 34' In other instances this internal reference
is viewed as inappropriate and the court must justify its decision as an
effort to reach the best or right result within an externally imposed legal
framework. There is little doubt that the courts' evolving sanctions
practice has a significant experiential basis.
This subjective, experiential base to the courts' Rule 11 competence
is the reason why a form of justification is needed that is less selfreferring or self-justifying. In a sanctions case, to pass muster, the
practice of delegating decisions to the courts' discretion as "skill" should
produce decisions that represent acceptable applications of this skill and
comply with the standards "recognized as relevant to judging the practice
as a whole."342 A highly idiosyncratic view is suspect. As a result, the
problem of variability continues to plague the rule, with some critics
inevitably arguing that it is too wide and others inevitably arguing that
it falls within tolerable limits.
How are the courts to justify these increasingly diverse, fact
sensitive, subjective judgments as a legitimate exercise of their judicial

338. Yablon, supra note 18, at 267.
339. See infra notes 355-412 and accompanying text.
340. See Elliott, supra note 23, at 309-11.
341. Fletcher, supra note 153, at 283.
342. Yablon, supra note 18, at 266.
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power?343 If the court's power ultimately derives from its authority and
ability to produce legal decisions-decisions based in the law--these
pragmatic decisions are problematic." Numerous critics have questioned this move away from rule-based decisions34 and the role of the
judge as a principled decisionmaker 3 6 These critics question the
practice of delegating decisions to the courts' discretion as "skill" in
matters that contemplate or call for a single best or right answer, or at
least a narrower range of tolerable variability. 7 While some of these
critics challenge this trend in the procedural arena,348 the harshest
criticism is reserved for "pragmatic" decisionmaking in the adjudicative
context. 9 These same concerns have been raised regarding the courts'
sanctions practice under Rule 11.
The paradigm of discretion as "skill" can be better understood, if
the paradigm can be challenged. There are two primary ways to criticize
the courts' exercise of discretion as "skill." The first is to accept the
decisional paradigm and utilize its internal criteria to evaluate its

343. See Putnam,supra note 163, at 1808.
"Situated" judges' intuition is shaped by their prior training, their character, and the
totality of their past experience. What 'situationalist' and 'formalist' judges share is
precisely that they were trained in the same legal system ....They differ in the way
they see themselves and in how they determine what to do at the next step (particularly
inhard cases).

Id.
344. This idea of legitimate judicial authority and the legitimating function of this "legal
paradigm" has been discussed previously. See supra notes 17-19, 26 and accompanying text.
345. The critique of radical indeterminacy challenges the legitimacy of legal decisionmaking
that is not narrowly grounded or driven by a formal rule structure. In the adjudicative arena the
critique of indeterminacy-the development of scholars exploring the work of legal realists-argues
that to the extent the law does not generate a single right answer it is radically indeterminate. See
Anthony D'Amato, Can Any Legal Theory ConstrainAny JudicialDecision?, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV.
513, 514 (1989) (arguing that "legal theory is inherently incapable of identifying which party should
win any given case" and that legal outcomes are largely a function of the interpretive community
within which we live-not of the law); D'Amato, supra note 180, at 148 (the "[indetenninacy
debate... is ...the key issue in legal scholarship today" and evidences "an immense paradigm
shift in the way we think about law"). But see Robin West, ConstitutionalSkepticism, 72 B.U. L.
REV. 765, 791 (1992) (arguing that the indeterminacy critique ignores the meaningfulness of the
written law).
346. See Atiyah, supra note 112, at 1251.
347. See Brilmayer, supra note 26, at 363 (challenging the assumption that the legal paradigm
assumes a single right answer and that deviations from that single right answer are "error").
Brilmayer asserts that tolerable variability, what she calls "wobble" in legal decisionmaking, is
defined differently depending on the circumstances. Id. at 366. See Yablon, supra note 18, at 264.
348. See Resnik, supra note 23, at 380; Yablon, supra note 18, at 244-52 (discussing this
"proceduralist" critique of discretion and the accompanying variability in discretionary decisions).
349. See Atiyah, supra note 112, at 1271 (expressing concern that this move away from
principled decisionmaking will undermine the "moral authority" of the courts).
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application on a case by case basis.35 ° The other acknowledges that
even if the given instances of the practice adhere to the criteria of a
skillful decision, the practice can be criticized by reference to values or
factors which are "recognized as relevant to judging the practice as a
whole."3 5' Some of the criticisms of Rule 11 are clearly aimed at
improving the skill dimension of the practice. Others challenge the
practice itself. This latter approach to the paradigm reflects a deep-seated
reluctance to treat the courts' Rule 11 practice, or at least the threshold
liability issues defining the frivolousness of the claim, as delegated to the
courts' broad exercise of discretion.
When the practice itself is challenged in this way, the institution has
a limited repertoire of responses available to it. The courts can attempt
to develop a more doctrinally circumscribed approach to the decision.
They can withdraw from the practice until the legislature acts to define
and clarify the regulatory reach of their practice, or they can continue to
develop and improve the skills dimension of the practice with an eye
toward developing a coherent jurisprudence and more detailed rule
structure. It is unlikely that the courts current "skills"-centered sanctions
practice will be set aside despite these criticisms, nor does a more
circumscribed, doctrinally driven rule appear to be in the offing. The
Advisory Committee is currently unwilling to revisit the underlying
assumption that trial courts have the skill and experience to make proper
Rule 11 decisions, nor are they willing to challenge the assumption that
the courts' sanctions practice is not amenable to doctrinal restrictions or
further reducible to rules. The question is whether improving the practice
can fully address the demand for decisions driven less by the subjective
judgments and personal experiences of the courts, and more by
articulated doctrine, rules, and a coherent sanctions jurisprudence. That
is, can the courts ensure that a matter that is not rule bound meets the
requirements of a decision based in the law? The answer is a hesitant
yes. The next section addresses the question of whether the practice fits
the paradigm, and if not, whether it can be made to fit better.
E.

Constructing the Paradigmof Discretion as Skill

The paradigm of judicial discretion as "skill" has its own internal
logic.352 If the matter is delegated to the trial courts' discretion because

350. See Yablon, supra note 18, at 265.
351. Id. at 266.

352. Professor Yablon argued this point persuasively. See Yablon, supra note 18, at 267-68.
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of their perceived skill and institutional competence, a legitimate exercise
of that discretion requires the courts to exercise that skill and expertise.
The decisionmakers' inability to fit these pragmatic decisions within the
traditional legal paradigm does not free them from the challenge of
developing a method of decisionmaking that addresses the underlying
normative concerns of the practice.353 This Article challenges the
assumption that because the courts' highly discretionary decisions under
Rule 11 fall outside of the traditional "legal paradigm," no "legal
standard" exists by which they can be judged other than a vague "abuse
of discretion" standard-itself viewed as inherently ambiguous.3 4 The
courts need a normative decisionmaking model for their sanctions
practice that addresses both the structural and contextual elements of the
courts' pragmatic decisionmaking. The paradigm of judicial discretion as
"skill" has its own internal logic and can at least provide part of such a
model.
One way to ensure the "fit" between the practice and the paradigm
is to require the courts to demonstrate that their decision was "skillfully"
rendered.3 55 The elements of this decisionmaking-what it takes to
ensure the practice fits the paradigm-are outlined below. The solution
being proposed-developing a model of normative decisionmaking for
the courts' pragmatic sanctions practice-essentially adds another
element to the practice. This element requires the courts' to justify their
decision as a legitimate exercise of their pragmatic "skill." The proposal
is simple to state-establish the fit between the practice and the
paradigm-but difficult to implement. One concern is whether expanding
the courts' sanctions practice in this fashion will unduly burden the
courts. This should not be a problem in light of recent changes to the
Rule. The Advisory Committee's Note to the 1993 rule makes it very
clear that Rule 11 is intended to reach serious breaches of conduct, and
that the exceedingly broad and variable uses to which it has been put in
353. See Wells, supra note 61, at 1737.
354. See supra note 265 (discussing the inherent ambiguity in the "abuse of discretion"
standard, which permits its application to a wide range of factual scenarios).
355. It is beyond the scope of this Article to resolve the underlying question regarding the
legitimacy of these types of decisions-that is, whether or not they fall outside of the legal paradigm.
For our purposes it suffices to attempt to bring the practice in line with more traditional legal
decisionmaking. See Wells, supra note 61, at 1728 (discussing pragmatism in legal thought-the
recognition "that all judges bring their own situated perspective to the case and do the best they can,
under all the circumstances, to reach a fair and just disposition"). Wells goes on to argue that

adopting a pragmatic perspective does not free the judiciary from adhering to a model of normative
decisionmaking which includes both structured decisionmaking and contextual elements, and which
must explicate both in order to justify the result. Id. at 1737-38, 1740.
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the past should cease.356 Reducing the focus of Rule 11 enhances its
institutional role and justifies consideration of the proposal set forth in
this Article. If the Rule is intended to define the limits of tolerable
advocacy and the courts' formal adjudicative role, and not merely
regulate attorney conduct, 35 7 expanding the courts' sanctions practice
to include a more structured element of explication and justification
should not pose an undue burden.
The decisional elements outlined here and proposed to be addressed
by the courts in their sanctions decisions are derived from the internal
logic of the paradigm. The first element, the courts' "fact competence,"
underlies the paradigm. Courts need to ensure that there is a record
reflecting the "fact" sensitive nature of the inquiry.35 How are the facts
so unique or variable that there is little opportunity for analysis,
classification, and other forms of legal manipulation? 35 9 The appellate

356. See FED. R. Civ. P. II advisory committee's note (1993).
357. This narrower approach to Rule 11 is seen in the commentary and was discussed earlier.
See supra note 113 and accompanying text (pointing out the commentators who view Rule 11
primarily as a means of forcing lawyers to fulfill their duties of professional responsibility). As
Professor Vairo points out, attempts to define Rule 11 as focused primarily on lawyers' conduct does
not mitigate the institutional impact of Rule 11 as a limit on the adversarial process. Vairo, Prologue,
supra note 3, at 40-42; see Morton Stavis, Rule 11: Which is Worse-The Problem or the Cure, 5
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHiCs 597, 597-99 (1992) (describing the relative "openness" of the federal courts
to litigants and lawyers alike prior to the harsher sanctions criteria embodied in the 1983
amendments to Rule 11); David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV.
801, 838-41 (1992) (noting that Rule 11 is merely a restatement of a lawyer's professional obligation
not to assert frivolous claims and that the rule is improperly used to gain economic or strategic
advantages over one's adversaries).
358. See, e.g., Ganheart v. Babbitt, No. 93-2013, 93-2570, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15103, at *6
(E.D. La. Oct. 17, 1994) (unreported decision) (treating the multiple filing of lawsuits as an easy
case without requiring much fact development and denying monetary sanctions, instead, issuing an
order of contempt requiring plaintiff to seek court permission prior to filing further claims); Whitmer
v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. 91C3067, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7163 (N.D. Ill. May 26,
1993) (unreported decision) (involving one of multiple suits filed by pro se plaintiffs in which
summary judgment and dismissal were granted, but sanctions denied). In Whitmer, the court
acknowledged the ongoing nature of the dispute between the parties, but refused to sanction despite
clear evidence in the record that the claims had no legal merit. Id. at *24-*26.
359. See Feinman, supra note 178, at 662 (asserting that the classification and categorization
implicit in legal decisionmaking determines the way in which the law is viewed and what normative
objectives are focused upon). In numerous cases, there doesn't appear to be any claim that the facts
require this type of deferential review. See Spiller v. Ella Smithers Geriatric Ctr., 919 F.2d 339, 346
(5th Cir. 1990) (sanctions granted with court castigating counsel for shoddy work and conclusory
allegation of a "public policy tort"). Nothing indicates that the record cannot capture the nuance of
the case or that sanctions are not based primarily on the court's "legal analysis." See Smith Int'l, Inc.
v. Texas Commerce Bank, 844 F.2d 1193, 1199-1201 (5th Cir. 1988) (reversing sanctions and
refusing to defer to the district court on what it saw to be an essentially legal analysis-whether a
courts retain the discretion to develop
reasonable attorney could have taken the position). Yet circuit
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courts routinely defer to the trial courts' "fact competence." Even in
close or hard cases, the appellate courts defer to the trial court particularly where they suspect that some factual nuance of the case could not be
captured on the record. s6° Care should be taken that this institutional
deference does not merely sanction the inadequate development of a
factual record. The paradigm of discretion as "skill" thus contemplates
a decision that is fact driven and the courts should adhere to this norm
in their decisionmaking. A brief review of the Rule 11 case law reveals
numerous cases in which the "facts" are well developed and discussed.361 Overall, this decisional element is acknowledged and addressed. However, there is little effort in the case law to argue that the
facts are unique or difficult to categorize, classify, or analyze under the
"legal" paradigm. 62 Yet, this aspect of the case justifies the courts not
a substantial factual record where they see fit. This stricter scrutiny is clearly seen in the following
case: Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 854 F.2d 1452 (2d Cir. 1988) (indicating little, if
any, deference to the trial court or any inability to develop the facts of the case), rev'd in partsub
nom. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120 (1989). Two more typical
cases illustrate the type of fact development routinely seen at the district court level. See Morris v.
Orman, No. 87-5149, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20923, at *9-*10 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 1992) (granting
sanctions, but facts not appearing difficult or so unique as to admit of no review); Allen v. Utley,
129 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 1990) (stating that facts were well developed and not particularly complex or
problematic).
360. In one case the circuit court deferred to the trial court's personal knowledge of the lawyers
and the dispute. Markwell v. County of Bexar, 878 F.2d 899, 903 (5th Cir. 1989). But in another
case the same circuit undertook to fully re-examine the factual record. See National Ass'n of Gov't
Employees v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 844 F.2d 216, 222-24 (5th Cir. 1988) (reversing
the award of sanctions after a detailed review of the facts and the inferences to be drawn therefrom).
This case may also stand for the principle that sanctions imposed after trial are more closely
scrutinized. But see Jennings v. Joshua Indep. Sch. Dist., 877 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1989) (awarding
sanctions after trial), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 935 (1990). There is a line of cases in which appellate
courts have deferred to the trial court in a close case. See Harlyn Sales Corp. Profit Sharing Plan v.
Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 9 F.3d 1263, 1269 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that "when the issue is not free
from doubt we should accord great deference to the judgment of the district court"); Ladner v.
Thornton Township, No. 91-2087, 1992 WL 163240, at *1 (7th Cir. July 14, 1992) (limited use
opinion) (reported without published opinion at 968 F.2d 1218) ("While this is admittedly a close
case, one that we might well have decided differently as an original matter, we defer to the district
court's findings in this ease"); Bass v. Southwestern Bell Tel., Inc., 817 F.2d 44,47 (8th Cir. 1987)
("While this is a close case, we find no abuse of discretion here"). There is also a line of cases in
which the courts of appeals have called for greater articulation. See In re Sham, 978 F.2d 850, 855
(4th Cir. 1992) (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (in a "close case," the court requires greater articulation
of the reasons for the decision); Markwell, 878 F.2d at 902 (in a "close case" involving a dismissal
for want of prosecution, the court looked for development in the record of aggravating factors).
361. See supra notes 359-60.
362. Courts can respond two ways to indeterminacy or "new' fact patterns. They can respond
by approaching the questions as calling for decisions characterized by "discretion." Alternatively,
indeterminacy and "new fact" patterns can call forth a legislative response with the courts attempting
to exercise traditional legal skills to fill in the interpretive gaps. That is not what has occurred in the
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applying the traditional "legal" paradigm because there is no neat fit.
The paradigm assumes that the courts have the specialized skill and
institutional competence to fairly and accurately evaluate these facts. To
address this element, the courts should describe and explain the

experiential basis of their decisions, particularly if the decision reflects
a kind of rough empiricism.363 In the sanctions arena if the judge is
relying on her knowledge of local lawyering practices or has developed
experiential data from sitting on the court on which it relies to define
acceptable advocacy, this should be made clear.3' 6 The judge must also
balance her personal experience and perspective against concerns
regarding personal and institutional bias in the sanctions arena. The
paradigm's appeal to the judges' skill and experience calls into play a
larger institutional perspective on the part of the courts.
The paradigm assumes that this specialized knowledge and expertise
renders the trial court judges competent decisionmakers and guides their
exercise of discretion. The courts' Rule 11 decisions must reflect more
than judges' personal views as judicial managers. Rule 11 calls upon
judges to sit as objective jurists faced with the challenge of defining the
limits of tolerable advocacy and the courts' future adjudicative functions.
The overriding assumption of the paradigm is that the courts' experience
Rule I I arena. See BARAK, supra note 16 at 113-51 (discussing courts' legislative acts as filling in
the gaps in the law); Yablon, supra note 18, at 274-77 (discussing discretion as creativity). While
courts grapple with the proper way to formulate the definition of a "frivolous" lawsuit, this activity
bears little resemblance to the formal adjudicative acts we associate with judicial legislation. As
Feinman points out, the traditional legal analysis would focus on developing and elaborating the fact
patterns/paradigms and showing how they fit with the law. See Feinman, supra note 178, at 704.
What we have here is the opposite. The courts assume that the facts are unique (that assumption is
open to question) and they grapple with ways to express their "practice" opinion regarding the
relative merits or "sanctionability" of the claims. These formulations tend to focus on the subjective
dimension of the courts' opinions-how to express that "gut instinct." This analysis does not address
the skill element in the paradigm of discretion as "skill." Courts need to move past this point and
begin to look for patterns and evaluate the objective components of their sanction expertise. The
"easy" cases may provide a model for this analysis. See Chapman & Cole v. Itel Container Int'l
B.V., 865 F.2d 676, 684 (5th Cir.) (ordering sanctions where counsel has relied on unverified
hearsay when other avenues of exploration were available), cert denied, 493 U.S. 872 (1989);
Callahan v. Schoppe, 864 F.2d 44,46 (5th Cir. 1989) (looking in the telephone book is not adequate
investigation, particularly when the error is brought to the attention of counsel); St. Amant v.
Bernard, 859 F.2d 379, 382-83 (5th Cir. 1988) (ordering sanctions when evidence was readily
available through means other than the client); Corpus Christi Taxpayer's Ass'n v. City of Corpus
Christi, 858 F.2d 973, 976-77 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding as a matter of law that judge had failed to
adequately explain his denial of sanctions when the claim was clearly barred by res judicata), cert.
dismissed, 490 U.S. 1032, cert. denied,490 U.S. 1065 (1989).
363. As noted by Professor Burbank, however, judges' subjective judgments are not always
grounded in an empirical reality. See Burbank, supra note 80, at 1937.
364. See cases cited supra notes 358-60.
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has solidified into "skill" and "expertise," the ability to make practical
legal judgments that will be acceptable to the relevant practice community. This "skill" dimension defines the contours of the courts' discretion
and it must in turn be defined by the courts. Yet this element of the
paradigm is rarely addressed in trial or appellate court opinions. The
"skill" is assumed, but never defined or tested. 6 In some instances
courts grapple with this "task" of defining the practical judgments they
need to bring to bear. More often than not, however, this dimension of
the decision is not addressed explicitly and is merely assumed as part of
the practice. This unwillingness to justify by any means other than to
point to the facts, their discretion and their experience may in fact be one
of the more interesting defining characteristics of the courts' practice.
Pragmatic decisions routinely require the courts to make principled
choices in selecting a context within which to evaluate the dispute which
represents the third element of the paradigm. The burgeoning body of
writings on this topic forcefully makes the point that the definition of
context largely defines the normative parameters of a dispute and its
outcome.' 66 In exercising this element of discretion the court should
select the context that best reflects the normative contours of the
underlying legal debate. 67 For example, in a Rule 11 case, is the
underlying legal debate viewed as narrowly focused on the steps to be
taken in a typical prefiling investigation? Or is the underlying legal
debate viewed more expansively as raising questions about the duty of
resource-poor litigants and lawyers to engage in the time consuming and
expensive process of prefiling investigation?161 When evaluating

365. The research has yet to unearth a district court case in which this experiential dimension
of the courts' practical judgments has been laid out. The skill is assumed as a given in most
analyses, as is the rough empiricism inevitable in such decisions. What is clear is that most courts
approach their task on a case-by-case basis, and there is little effort to classify the facts or otherwise
explain the fit between facts and law in an effort to explain the law. See cases cited supra notes 35862.
366. See supra notes 201-60 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of context and how
it impacts legal decisionmaking).
367. See Minow & Spelman, supra note 183, at 1598-99 (arguing that since different contexts
give rise to different legal interpretation, the courts' selection of and attention to context should be
principled and made subject to scrutiny); cf Tobias, 1993 Revision, supra note 3, at 171-75
(challenging the narrow normative context of typical Rule I I decisions).
368. See Naomi R. Cahn, InconsistentStories, 81 GEo. L.J. 2475, 2477 (1993) (discussing the
inherent difficulty that the legal system has appreciating the contextual dimensions of the
representational relationship); Tobias, 1993 Revision, supranote 3, at 191-205 (discussing the need
to expand the factual and contextual parameters of the attomey-client relationship in the Rule 11
context); Wilkins, supra note 357, at 814-19 (arguing that legal contexts can be defined by the
identity of the client and the regulatory systems available to enforce the related professional norms);
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whether a claim should be sanctioned as frivolous, should the court
consider the nature of the claim, such as whether it raises important
the court
questions of public policy and individual rights? Or should
3 69
level the playing field and treat all claims in the same way?
It is obvious that certain fundamental procedural principles regarding
the trans-substantivity of the rules are called into play by this "call for
context." However, so long as contextual elements play any role at all in
resolving the sanctions question, they must be addressed.37 The sanctioning court needs to be clear whether it is looking at the sanction issue
narrowly, with or without undue emphasis on the unique aspects of the
representational relationship, the type of claim being raised, or the role
of the lawyer viewed within a larger social or political context. This
element of the courts' pragmatic decisionmaking has not been well
developed in the sanctions case law.37' While the courts appear to
approach these contextual elements objectively, trends in sanctions
indicate that this is not always the case.37 2
The call to clarify the contextual elements of the case relied upon
by the court should also help the courts address questions of institutional
context. The courts can make it clear if they view the sanctions issue as
one calling for expediency and efficiency in its judicial resolution and a
simple rule structure to ensure future flexibility in the application of the
Rule. Or does the nature of the sanctions question require the courts to
apply the more traditional norms of restraint and objectivity with an eye
Beck, supra note 82, at 878 (discussing the tension between Rule 11 and the traditional attorney
client relationship).
369. See Tobias, 1993 Revision, supra note 3, at 190-91; Tobias, supra note 89, at 1508
(describing the process by which Congress and the federal courts have eroded the tran-substantive
nature of the Federal Rules by developing myriad judicial approaches to different species of cases).
370. Professors Mullenix and Tobias have largely pinned down the parameters of the debate for
purposes of Rule 11. Professor Tobias persuasively argues that assuming a "neutral" context is naive
and shields the courts' sanctions practice from the scrutiny it deserves. See Carl Tobias, Rule 11
Recalibratedin CivilRights Cases, 36 VILL. L. REV. 105, 120-22 (1991). Professor Mullenix argues
that the call to context raises political and normative concerns that should not be left to the courts
to handle on a case by case basis and that should not cloud the procedural goals of the rules.
Mullenix, supra note 164, at 798-802; see Kenneth F. Ripple & Gary J. Saalman, Rule 11 in the
Constitutional Case, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 788, 789 (1988).
371. Professor Tobias makes an effective argument in favor of including a contextual element
in the courts' sanction analysis of civil rights litigation. See Tobias, 1993 Revision, supra note 3, at
201, 214. He also argues that patterns in the sanction case law indicate the normative biases brought
to bear. Id. at 200-05. The goal is to challenge those biases by making them clear and requiring the
courts' to defend these choices. Id.
372. See Martinez, supra note 20, at 611-18; Tobias, Civil Rights Plaintiffs, supra note 3, at
1790 (arguing that the 1993 amendments allow for too much judicial discretion which has the
potential to impact unfairly upon civil rights plaintiffs).
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toward elaborating, interpreting, and developing the exclusionary function
of the rule? Regardless of how the individual court approaches its
sanctions practice, these contextual elements of the decision need to be
made clear.373 This is one way to get at the underlying normative
assumptions driving the decision. This enables other trial and appellate
courts as well as practitioners, to evaluate the practice for "bias," whether
good or bad.
Justification for a decision under the "skill" paradigm should address
the question of the fit between the practice and the paradigm. For
purposes of this discussion, the question is whether the sanctions issue
is one that falls within the paradigm of discretion as "skill."374 The
push to limit the regulatory reach of the Rule to "conduct" may be an
implicit recognition on the part of the Advisory Committee and courts
that the paradigm of discretion as "skill" does not fit well those questions
involving "legal content." The court should be able to address the
question of whether a pragmatic or a more doctrinally circumscribed
approach is appropriate. That is, does the question before the court in
fact involve unique or complex facts which are not currently amenable
to a traditional doctrinal analysis?375 Will this always be so or does the
court need to address the demands of an evolving legal practice that can

373. See Terrestrial Sys., Inc. v. Fenstemaker, 132 F.R.D. 71, 76-77 (D. Colo. 1990) (exercising
restraint in a close case and not sanctioning as a way to maintain a balance between the need for
deterrence and need for zealous representation); supra notes 120-26 (discussing judicial restraint in
close cases). In other cases the legal context has made a difference in how the court weighs the
balance in a close case. See United States v. Terzado-Madruga, 897 F.2d 1099, 1119 (11th Cir.
1990) ("[T]he balance in close cases is struck in favor of admissibility ....
");Rush v. McDonald's
Corp., 760 F. Supp. 1349, 1365-66 (S.D. Ind. 1991) (holding that in a close case, court should lean
toward the least severe sanction), affd., 966 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir. 1992); Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics
Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209, 224 (N.D. II. 1975) (holding that in a close case, court should err on side
of movant seeking disqualification), rev'd in parton othergrounds, 532 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1976);
In re Associated Bicycle Serv., Inc., 128 B.R. 436,456 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (holding that resolution of
the contractual relationship is resolved in favor of employment and not an independent contractor
in a close case).
374. There are numbers of Rule I decisions that can be construed as "bright line" or easy
cases. These are cases that lend themselves to an analysis that more closely fits the normative
assumption of a traditional legal analysis. However "easy cases" are themselves prey to a set of
normative assumptions about the "fit" between the "law" and the "facts" that should periodically be
questioned. See sources cited supranote 19. But see Tobias, 1993 Revision, supra note 3, at 195-202
(questioning the courts response to the fact paradigms that routinely define civil rights cases and
arguing that a broader definition of context can alter the courts' evaluation of these fact patterns).
375. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 401 (1990) (noting that it is
particularly difficult within the context of Rule I1 decisions to make the traditional appellate law/fact
distinction because "[r]ather than mandating an inquiry into purely legal questions ...the Rule
requires a court to consider issues rooted in factual determinations").
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be subjected to regulation under the rule on a more routinized basis?376
Nothing in the case law indicates that the courts have ever challenged the
"fit" head on when a trial court has relied upon its institutional "skill."
There is, however, case law in which the courts veered toward a more
traditional legal analysis when addressing different elements in the
courts' analysis, particularly threshold liability issues. 377 While the courts'
traditional doctrinal skills are not usually called into play in the paradigm
of discretion as "skill," even highly "indeterminate" rules such as Rule
11 require the courts to acknowledge the guidance provided by the
Rule's structure and applicable law. 78 Indeterminate rules by their
nature call forth a myriad of factors and facts generating a potentially
rich contextual analysis. But explication and explanation of the courts'
understanding of the rule is still an essential part of the decisionmaking
process.3 79 In addition, the court should exercise their doctrinal expertise by examining each decision rendered to see what general principles
and policies can be inferred from the facts and analysis. In particular, the
courts need to examine how the particular matter adds to the developing
case law and the courts' efforts to define the tolerable limits of advocacy.
The primary elaboration of the Rule to date has focused on
clarifying the basic structure of the Rule and developing the underlying
policies to guide decisions in "close" or "hard" cases. 80 The litigation
over the past ten years has resolved much of the early confusion
regarding the rule's scope and purpose. The ongoing debate over the
threshold issues will continue despite the amendments' attempts to
address the question of developing legal standards and the need for more

376. The Supreme Court also takes solace and comfort from the idea of "easy" or clear cases,

that is, those that generate regulatory bright lines. See id. at 403-05 (discussing situations in which
repeating fact patterns could become subject to a stricter application of the Rule).

377. Some courts construe the threshold liability issues more strictly than others. See, e.g.,
Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1081-82 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that a
court should determine if the litigant is arguing for a change in the law or is either intentionally
ignoring the law by relying on obscure and likely overruled authority or simply has failed to perform
adequate research), cert. dismissed,485 U.S. 901 (1988).
378. See West, supra note 345, at 791 (arguing that the critique of indeterminacy ignores the
fact that laws, even highly indeterminate laws, have meaning).
379. The Supreme Court made this point in Cooter. While deferring to the trial court's fact
competence and unique institutional perspective and expertise, the Court reserved for itself the right
to reverse if the law was incorrectly stated. Cooter, 496 U.S. at 402.
380. The courts' efforts to capture the essence of their practical judgments in formulas to guide

future application of the rule is exemplified and discussed above. See supra notes 120-27 and accompanying text; see also cases cited supra note 223.
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specificity and doctrinal guidance.3 st
In any legal decisionmaking, the courts need to develop a way to
address the "close" or "hard" case.3" While the practice tolerates
variability in the accumulated output of the courts,383 throughout the
commentary and the case law references to the "close" or "hard" case as
a problem become apparent. These are cases in which the full range of
options has been identified, to sanction or not, and the options are
deemed to be in equipoise or in conflict.3 The paradigm of discretion
as "skill" offers the courts a way to handle the question of the "close"
case. The paradigm assumes that any given discretionary decision can be
evaluated from the perspective of a similarly situated "skillful" practitioner.385 Viewed from this perspective the "close" case is a short hand
way to examine the logic of discretion from the decisionmaker's point
of view as well as a way to "test" the skillfulness of the decision.386
The "close" cases decided in the Rule 11 context are indicative of
how trial courts have tried to grapple with their own discretion. How do
they define acceptable variability in their own decisionmaking and how
do the courts determine whether their decision falls within this acceptable
range? The range of acceptable variability in highly discretionary
decisions is defined in the general literature on discretion as a "zone of
possibilities."3 7 This "zone of possibilities" represents the alternative
outcomes in the decisionmaking process that would be acceptable to
knowledgeable lawyers or jurists comprising the relevant professional or
381. Professor Tobias' analysis points out that there will continue to be confusion regarding the
definition of threshold liability and the standards to be used to determine the need for, and nature
of, appropriate sanctions. See Tobias, 1993 Revision, supra note 3, at 208-14.
382. See supra notes 120-26 and accompanying text (discussing as a general jurisprudential
issue the challenge posed by the "hard" or "close" case).

383. See Brilmayer, supra note 26, at 365 (distinguishing between "wobble," an acceptable
"discrepancy between a decision and the relevant decisionmaking inputs," and legal error). A finding
of error is premised on the assumption that the actual result should have conformed to a particular
result. Id. at 363. Professor Brilmayer points out that "wobble" or decisional variability can be a
function of many factors not traditionally associated with legal error. See id. at 366-69. But cf
Thompson, supra note 26, at 424 ("[D]ecisional inconsistency, while neither abstract error nor
necessarily wrong, is also not necessarily always right."). Professor Thompson argues that the goal
of the adversary system is "to minimize the extent of avoidable unacceptable inconsistency of

decisions," id. at 425, but that defining unacceptable variability is difficult to do. Id. at 426-27.
384. See supra notes 120-26 and accompanying text (discussing the jurisprudential concept of
the "close" case).
385. See Yablon, supra note 18, at 261.
386. See Yablon, supra note 18, at 265 ("ET]he only way to critique a particular instance of a
practice is to use one's own knowledge of what constitutes a skillful exercise of the practice. ..2).

387. See BARAK, supra note 16, at 9 ("[D]iscretion assumes a zone of possibilities rather than
just one point. It is founded on the existence of a number of options that are open to judge.").
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legal community."' This formulation closely parallels the formulation
of acceptable discretion under the "skill" paradigm.389 The use of the
"close" case as a rough rule of thumb to define the limits of tolerable
variability within the paradigm of discretion as "skill" also reflects the
intuitive and subjective nature of the courts' sanctions practice. Asking
how a skilled practitioner would view the decision is another way of
formulating the question of whether the legal community would agree
with the result.3"
Commentators who advocate a more restrictive application of Rule
11 argue that the "close" case defines the point at which the trial court
should exercise restraint and not order sanctions. 91 In highly subjective
fact sensitive decisions such as these, the decisionmaker's ability to argue
persuasively that similarly situated skillful practitioners would reach an
opposite result should cause her to pause. Using the "close" case to
define the limits of the courts' discretion to sanction is certainly not a
bright line, but it appears to have some utility--hence its use by the
courts and commentators.
Incorporating the rough rule of thumb of the "close" case or
"decisional opposite" as an element of the courts' sanctions practice does
not pose undue burdens. It simply asks a court about to order sanctions
to pose to itself the decisional opposite as a way to test the skillfulness
of its decision."l By asking whether other jurists would agree with the
decision, a judge also avoids an unduly idiosyncratic or highly personalized approach to the sanctions question. This approach asks the judge to
think about the acceptability of her decision within the larger legal
community, a perspective that is consistent with the restructuring of the

388. Id. at 11 (citing Fiss, supranote 47; Greenawalt, supra note 25, at 386).
389. See Yablon, supra note 18, at 261-68.
390. This point is made by Judge Barak:
The legal community is the professional outlook of the collectivity of lawyers in a
particular state. An option is lawful if the legal community views it as such and if the
legal community's reaction to the choice of this option is not one of shock and mistrust.
An option is unlawful if the legal community sees it as unlawful and considers it
impossible that a knowledgeable lawyer would choose this option.
BARAK, supra note 16, at 11 (footnote omitted).
391. See sources cited supra note 191 (discussing the need for judicial restraint in Rule 11
decisions).
392. The technique or method of posing the opposite decision as a way to test or evaluate the
courts' decisionmaking has been suggested in other contexts. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic,
Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Serious Moral Error?,69 TEx. L. REv. 1929, 1952-60
(1991) (discussing how to avoid the error of false objectivity by developing a critical perspective);
Martinez, supranote 20, at 559 (suggesting that courts should look at the opposite result to test their

own decisions for bias).
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Rule to emphasize its exclusionary function. This approach is particularly
apt when the rule is viewed as an attempt to institutionalize acceptable
norms of practice.393 Viewed from this perspective the court should ask
itself the key question: Will there be consensus within the relevant
practice community3 94 regarding the exclusion of this type of case or
conduct for all similarly situated attorneys and litigants? If not, why not?
And if so, how would the courts avoid the overinclusive application of
the decision?
A brief comment about the use of the "close" case at the appellate
level is needed. Appellate courts reviewing decisions generated under the
paradigm of discretion as "skill" use the "close" case differently. Here
the "close" case is used to denote a difference in opinion between two
sitting jurists and defines the case that the appellate court likely would
have decided differently than the court below based on the record before
it.395 When the appellate court makes the statement that a case is a
"close" case it is implicitly acknowledging that the lower court has
exercised "skill." A "close' case is just that; it is not one in which the
lower court is viewed as having abused its discretion warranting reversal
on appeal.396 The appellate court's statement poses a conundrum: What
should be done when two skillful practitioners reach opposite or
conflicting results? This is a problem particularly in the Rule 11 arena
where the issue in the "close" case will increasingly be whether or not
the appellate court should uphold the sanction ordered by the trial court.
However, the case law indicates that appellate courts who raise the
question of the "close" case, also routinely defer to the lower court.3 97
This deference is grounded in the appellate court's assumption that the
trial court is in a better position to observe and address factual nuances
of the case that cannot be captured on appeal.39 While the appellate
court might decide differently on the record, it typically assumes that the

393. See supra notes 3, 49 (discussing the regulation of attorneys and the adequacy of the
dictates of Rule 11 in controlling and shaping their conduct).
394. Vhile the United States Supreme Court has talked about the trial courts' superior

knowledge of local legal practices, see Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384,404 (1990),
the relevant interpretive community is more broadly defined under the rule than just the local bar.
To define it so narrowly would simply exacerbate the concerns regarding the lack of coherence in
the case law and the problem of consistency and predictability in the courts' decisions.
395. See, e.g., Jennings v. Joshua Indep. Sch. Dist., 869 F.2d 870, 879 (5th Cir.), amended and
superseded by 877 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 935 (1990).
396. See supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
397. See cases cited supra notes 120-25 (indicating deference to trial courts and holding
sanctions warranted in only the most extreme and obvious cases).
398. See Cooter,496 U.S. at 403-04.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1996

81

Hofstra
LawLAW
Review,
Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [1996],[Vol.
Art. 24:677
3
HOFSTRA
REVIEW

record cannot reflect the factual richness underlying the sanction
decision. The appellate courts are also willing to defer to the trial courts'
expertise regarding local litigation practices and the problem of
regulating attorneys' conduct during litigation.399 As a result in these
"close" cases the trial courts are given the benefit of the doubt.
As discussed in more detail in the next section, this policy of
institutional deference becomes problematic when the appellate courts'
deference is automatic. However, the paradigm of discretion as "skill"
does not require automatic deference. The appellate courts, particularly
in the "close" case, are appropriately asked to evaluate the sanctions
decision to determine if it has all of the indicia of a "skillful" decision.
This is especially true for decisions regarding threshold liability, that is
when the courts' must determine whether a claim is legally or factually
frivolous. Yet this call for enhanced review under the "abuse of
discretion" standard still contemplates limited appellate intrusion.
One final point needs to be made regarding appellate review of Rule
11 decisions. To the extent a decision regarding threshold liability bears
all the hallmarks of a traditional doctrinal analysis going to the merits of
a claim, the appellate courts should approach that decision as they would
any other exercise of decisionmaking authority under the "legal"
paradigm.4t ° In Cooter, the Supreme Court adopted the abuse of
discretion standard for all appeals under Rule 11.4 1 The Court opined
that for it to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court would have
no effect beyond that of substituting one fact sensitive, subjective
judgment for another. 2 Since this process was not likely to reduce
variability in the case law or develop a regulatory bright line, the
Supreme Court saw no point in investing institutional resources in this
process. 40 3 However, this policy of deference is grounded in an empirical assumption regarding the nature of the courts' decisionmaking and
the underlying nature of their sanctions practice. If this assumption
proves to be wrong, the appellate courts should rethink their approach.
The final decisional element of the paradigm of discretion as "skill"
involves the subjective and intuitive judgments that underlie the practice.

399. Id. at 404.
400. These decisions can vary in nature and scope, requiring different levels of appellate review.
See Christie, supra note 169, at 18; Louis, supra note 23, at 738-39, 760-61.
401. Cooter, 496 U.S. at 405.
402. See id. at 403-04; supra notes 261-336 and accompanying text (discussing in detail the
Court's decision in Cooter).
403. Cooter, 496 U.S. at 404-05.
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Although the courts' sanctions practice remains grounded in their
"individualized judgments, specifically tailored to the facts of the
case," 4" the practice is evolving. One important dimension of that
evolution is the movement away from the use of the paradigm of
"discretion as skill" as a purely personal or internal reference. The
internal logic of the paradigm of discretion as "skill" assumes that there
is something called a "skillful sanction decision." To define that element
of "skill" reductively to include virtually any and all decisions reflecting
the courts' highly subjective, intuitive response to the sanctions case,
flips the paradigm on its head. This approach would allow the courts to
define, through their sanctions practice, the acceptable limits of that
practice. Yet that is largely how the trial and appellate courts currently
approach their Rule 11 sanctions practice. The courts need to make these
normative judgments explicit as part of their "skills" analysis to give
some paradigmatic coherence to the Rule 11 jurisprudence and provide
greater legitimacy for these discretionary determinations.
This Article proposes limited but critical oversight of the district
courts' sanctions practice. While the courts' sanctions decisions may vary
when lined up next to each other and when viewed from the "inside-out,"
from the perspective of the decisionmaker, the intent to render the most
skillful decision possible should be clear.4" 5 The more difficult question
is whether it should also be evident that the courts share the normative
assumption that there is a single right or best answer to the sanctions
question in each individual case.40 6 This is the decisional norm that has
proven the most problematic in the Rule 11 arena yet there is clearly
movement in this direction. This trend is consistent with the Supreme
Court's analysis in Cooter and the 1993 amendments to construe Rule 11
as contemplating a single best or right answer as a norm toward which
the courts should strive. This is not an argument that the courts must
change their fundamental sanctions practice. Rather, adopting this
decisional norm as an element of the paradigm of discretion as "skill"
simply requires the courts to begin consciously narrowing the acceptable
range of variability in their decisionmaking.
In his study of the paradigm of discretion as "skill," Professor
Yablon observed that in certain contexts and for certain types of

404. See Yablon, supra note 18, at 262.
405. Id. at 267-68.
406. See BARAK, supra note 16, at 11; Yablon, supra note 18, at 260-61, 263-64.
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decisions the courts shared this normative assumption. °7 The question
is whether this assumption is different in the Rule 11 context? The
internal logic of the paradigm cannot resolve the question regarding the
acceptable limits of variability in decisionmaking under the rule. Clearly,
wide variability is anticipated in the actual case law: However, how does
the court define this norm for itself and apply it as a guide for its
decisionmaking? Cooter treats this normative dimension of the paradigm
as defined by the institutional commitment to produce a decision based
on law. It must be recognized, however, that when the paradigm of
discretion as "skill" is substituted in place of the "legal" paradigm as the
decisionmaking model, the question becomes whether the normative
assumptions that narrowly define the acceptable scope of variability
persist.40 8 Invoking the normative assumption of a single right or best
answer as a restraint upon the courts' exercise of discretion is one way
to address the problems of consistency and predictability in the case law.
Unfortunately, this normative assumption is not addressed in Rule 11
itself, the Advisory Committee's Note, or the case law.4' The only
intimation of an overt institutional concern regarding variability as a Rule
11 norm is the "close" case law.410
The Advisory Committee need not acquiesce to critics who
challenge the trial courts' sanctions practice head on, since the Rule has
established a place for itself in the procedural lexicon of the courts. The
Advisory Committee should not ignore the underlying concerns of the
critics regarding pragmatic decisionmaking in the Rule 11 context. These
concerns can be addressed, at least in part, if the courts approach their
sanctions practice as calling for a structured analysis that lays out the
pragmatically appropriate reasons justifying the sanctions decision.4 '
Expediency, efficiency, or the efficacy of the sanction decision in
deterring future similar conduct are not sufficient in and of themselves
to define a good or acceptable decision. These practice goals do not

407. See Yablon, supra note 18, at 264-267 (discussing the acceptance and application of this
assumption in cases involving criminal sentencing).
408. See supra notes 245-59 and accompanying text.
409. See cases cited supra notes 124, 358-60 (discussing a variety of Rule I I cases).
410. Courts using this rough rule of thumb reject the notion of alternative, conflicting decisions
as being equally right, that is, falling within the acceptable scope of variability. See supranotes 12026 and accompanying text (discussing the jurisprudential approach to the "close" case). See generally
Brilmayer, supra note 26 (discussing the growing indeterminacy of legal decisions and the
accompanying erosion of any meaningfil criteria for or definition of "legal error").
411. See Wells, supra note 61, at 1745-46 (arguing that context-based judgments must have a
structural framework that is pragmatically appropriate).
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adequately address the question of whether the court has rendered a
skillful sanction decision as defined by the internal criteria of the
paradigm or the relevant contextual norms. In this same vein, a highly
doctrinal approach may also prove problematic. There is no guarantee
that efforts to force the decision into the narrower "legal" paradigm give
adequate weight to other dimensions of the case.4 12

IV. THE 1993

AMENDMENTS-IMPROVING THE PRACTICE

The 1993 amendments, properly interpreted and applied within the
paradigm of judicial discretion as "skill," should significantly improve
the courts' sanctions practice. The Advisory Committee was unwilling to
abandon their pragmatic strategy and the rule therefore continues to rely
upon a broad express delegation of discretion to the courts.41 3 The
Advisory Committee addressed these criticisms in other ways. One was
simply to act to improve the courts' sanctions practice. More importantly,
the 1993 amendments emphasize the exclusionary function of Rule 11,
and by doing so, the increased importance of developing a cleaner
definition of the limits of tolerable advocacy.
A.

Defining the Limits of Tolerable Variability in the
Courts' Sanctions Practice

In the Call for Comment, 4 14 the Advisory Committee devoted a
substantial portion of its discussion of the need for reform to those
criticisms that questioned the Rule's indeterminacy,4 1 5 and the problems

412. Professor Tobias's "call for context" and the richly detailed analysis it generates argues
against attempting to force the courts' Rule 11 practice into the "legal" paradigm. See, e.g., Tobias,
Public Law Litigation, supranote 3, at 345 (urging a "contextual analysis" of the relevant variables
pertaining to various rules, including Rule 11, as they are applied to public law litigants). The
suggestions outlined above require the courts to acknowledge and address this challenge to the
discretionary nature of their sanctions practice on a case by case basis. The appellate courts already
engage in a highly deferential review of these opinions.
413. "Whether a violation has occurred and what sanctions, if any, to impose for a violation are
matters committed to the discretion of the trial court; accordingly, as under current law, the standard
for appellate review of these decisions will be for abuse of discretion." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory
committee's note (1993) (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990)).
414. See CALL FOR COMMENT, supranote 66, at 6-7; infra notes 537-38 and accompanying text
(discussing the Advisory Committee's Call for Comment on the 1993 amendment to Rule 11).
415. The Committee, unlike its critics, did not view the indeterminacy in the rule as fatal. See
Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy,77 CAL. L. REv. 283, 283 (1989) (arguing that "indeterminacy is
a much less serious defect in the law than it is often thought to be[, and] moderate indeterminacy
does not undermine the law's legitimacy"); Ken Kress, A Preface to EpistemologicalIndeterminacy,
85 NW. U. L. REv. 134, 138-39 (1990) (exploring the proposition that "radical indeterminacy"
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of variability and predictability in its application.4 16 The Advisory
Committee recognized these as factors relevant to judging the efficacy of
the courts' sanctions practice,417 yet having raised these issues in the
Call for Comment, the Advisory Committee did not explicitly follow-up
on them in the Advisory Committee Note41 8 after the Rule was redrafted. The Note only makes a general reference to the Committee's effort
to restructure the Rule, and with it, the courts' discretion.4 19 Viewed in
a larger context, the Committee responded in the only way it could.42
The critics' primary concerns were the potential overinclusive application
of the rule and the resulting "chill" these sanctions decisions would
generate. 42 1
The Committee's direct response to these criticisms was to seek data
to determine whether or not the courts' sanctions practice was having the
adverse effect claimed. 4z It is not surprising that the Committee's
initial response to these criticisms was to request data,4' as the task of
descriptively or analytically defining and responding to the problems as

jeopardizes the legitimacy of the legal enterprise). But see note 166 (discussing the critique of radical
indeterminacy and its accompanying rejection of discretionary approaches to decisionmaking).
416. See CALL FOR COMMENT, supra note 66, at 4-6.
417. See id. at 4-7. Yet indeterminacy, like judicial discretion, is seen by the Advisory
Committee as an inevitable element in the rule structure. Cf Thomas Ross, Modelingand Formalism
in Takings Jurisprudence,61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 372, 375 (1986) (positing that the courts'
decisionmaking model includes both express principles and a "carefully staked out.., element of
indeterminacy"); Rachel F. Moran, Reflections on the Enigma of Indeterminacy in Child-Advocacy
Cases, 74 CAL. L. REV. 603 (1986) (book review) (discussing judicial strategies in child advocacy
settings to deal with indeterminacy); Smith, supra note 166, at 439 (noting that "[t]o the more
pragmatic lawyer or scholar ... a certain degree of indeterminacy does not necessarily threaten the
basic legitimacy of the legal system; indeed, it may provide desirable flexibility within which a factresponsive equity has room to operate").
418. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993).
419. The Advisory Committee's Note states that the new rule "expands the responsibilities of
litigants to the court, while providing greater constraints and flexibility in dealing with infractions
of the rule." Id.
420. See CALL FOR COMMENT, supra note 66, at 6 ("The Civil Rules have generally favored
judicial discretion as a means to secure just results and have avoided procedural rigidity."); Burbank,
supra note 80, at 1937 (noting that the shift in structure of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
following the reforms of the 1980s increasingly relied upon "the discretion of judges, guided by
general directions that usually are not informed by empirical study, to deliver on the promise of
equal justice"). The play given jurists' normative preferences in this process, however, raises
concerns about the efficacy of such a strategy. See CALL FOR COMMENT, supra note 66, at 6.
421. See CALL FOR COMMENT, supra note 66, at 5.
422. See sources cited infra note 426-27 (including some of the empirical data sources that the
Advisory Committee ultimately relied on in arriving at the 1993 amendments).
423. CALL FOR COMMENT, supra note 66, at 1-2.
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posed otherwise was insurmountable.42 4 The empirical response12 to
Rule 11 has been unprecedented.426
The statistical data reassured the Committee that variable and
inconsistent application of the rule was not perceived as wide spread, or
at least was not unduly chilling the filing of meritorious claims.4 27
Whatever comfort the data provided, it could not answer the more
difficult normative question: "[H]ave the benefits of amended Rule 11
been worth the costs? While the data reported here provide important
information, they do not answer the ultimate normative question about
the value of the Rule."4'28 Critics claimed there were problems, but the
data indicated that they were not substantial.42 9 Yet how widespread
did the problems have to be to warrant a fundamental change in the
courts' sanctions practice? This question was never answered. In light of
the Committee's evaluation of the other options available to it, it is not

424. See Kritzer et al., supra note 85, at 272 ("[Ain examination of the experiences
of... federal litigators in three circuits strongly suggests that much of the portrayal of the effects
of Rule 11 has been unduly influenced by selected anecdotes that tend to emphasize big cases that
are not representative of federal litigation."); Lawrence C. Marshall et al., Public Policy: The Use
and Impact of Rule 11, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 943, 944 (1992).
425. The Advisory Committee's empiricism does not address the heuristic bias in the law. While
anecdotal or personal experiences and isolated judicial opinions may not be an accurate systemic
picture of how Rule I1 is being used throughout the courts, it is more often than not the basis for
lawyers and judge's judgments, at least within the immediate surrounding practice community. See
generally JOHN A. PAULOS, INNUMERACY: MATHEMATICAL ILLITERACY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
107-118 (1988) (discussing two basic types of statistical errors, Type I and Type II errors, and the
inherent flaws in any supposedly representative sampling or study).
426. See BURBANK, supra note 285 (outlining research compiled by Third Circuit Task Force
formed to determine the implications of Rule 11 in anticipation of the 1993 amendments); RESEARCH
DIVISION, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, RULE 11: SURVEY OF FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT JUDGES;
STUDY OF RULE 11 CASES IN FIVE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS; REVIEW OF PUBLISHED DISTRICT
AND APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS (1991); THOMAS E. WILLOING, THE RULE 11 SANCTIONING

PROCESS (1988) (discussing the results of a recent study on judicial administration undertaken by
the Federal Judicial Center); Marshall et al., supra note 424, at 743, 748.
427. But see WILLOINO, supra note 426, at 9 ("[The threat of sanctions has caused [lawyers]
to raise their threshold for handling close cases: They now demand a higher probability of success,
limiting access to the courts for more marginal claims.'); Kritzer et al., supra note 85, at 269-70
(asserting that the American Judicature Society's study of Rule 11 attempted to document, through
self reporting behaviors associated with Rule 11 including personal assessments, whether or not the
subjects had modified their behavior in response to Rule 11). The survey lacked baseline data and
attempted to measure a "change" in behavior due to Rule II by asking attorneys to report the
"impact, if any, of the sanctioning provisions of Rule 11 on your practice?" Id. at 271 (quoting from
the survey used to generate the results in BURBANK, supra note 285).
428. Marshall et al., supra note 424, at 986.
429. Id. at 985-86.
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surprising the decision was made to forge ahead and amend the rule.43
The 1993 amendments did not alter the fundamental strategy of the
Rule--the delegation of discretion to the courts to implement Rule 11.
For the Advisory Committee to proceed as it did, it had to be confident
that the trial courts would produce decisions that fell within a tolerable
range of variability.431 This was certainly the case with Rule 11. The
Committee viewed the problems of indeterminacy, variability, inconsistency, and lack of predictability in the rule as essentially unsolvable from
a draffing perspective.4 32 They were not willing to impose strict
doctrinal limitations on the practice by, for example, reintroducing the
element of "bad faith," because the data did not seem to warrant such an
extreme move.433 Nor was there a more specific rule in the offing that
would address all of the problems that had been raised.434 If the
Committee's only other choices were to continue with the Rule or
completely abandon it, it is not surprising that the Committee did what
it did: amend the rule and delegate the problem of filling any interpretive
gaps to the courts on a case by case basis.435
B. Improving the Practice and Defining the Tolerable
Limits of Variability
The Advisory Committee's restructuring of the Rule has the
potential to significantly improve the courts' sanctions practice by
ensuring a fit between the practice and the paradigm of discretion as
"skill." More importantly, the restructuring emphasizes the importance of
the courts' sanctions decisions in defining the limits of tolerable

430. The Advisory Committee's response to the criticism that indeterminacy in the Rule created
undue judicial discretion is not unprecedented. See supra note 415.
431. See supranote 417 (discussing the different norms of variability that apply to the paradigm
of discretion as "skill" in different institutional contexts).
432. See CALL FOR COMMENT, supra note 66, at 6-7.
Can the indeterminacy of the rule be diminished? The Committee would welcome
suggestions to make the sanctions rules more explicit in order to enable the judges to be
more predictable and even handed in their application if this can be done without causing
other perhaps more arbitrary results. At the same time, the Committee is aware of its own
inherent limitations; efforts to be more explicit than the subject of the rule will admit are
likely to be counterproductive.
Id.
433. See Keeling, supra note 95, at 1095-1102 (commenting on the high threshold sanctions
model and its inherent problems).
434. See, e.g., Nelken, Chancellor's Foot, supra note 3, at 405-08 (discussing Professor
Nelken's proposed draft of Rule 11).
435. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993).
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advocacy.43 6 This section examines briefly how the 1993 amendments
to the Rule can address the decisional elements of the "skill" paradigm:
the need for fact development and preparation of a record; the need for
an opinion or order from the court explaining its decision to sanction; the
need to develop the doctrinal limits of the Rule, at least in the threshold
analysis of "frivolousness"; the need to emphasize an appropriate subject
for regulation under the paradigm of discretion as "skill"; and the need
to emphasize the exclusionary function of the Rule and the goal of
developing a decisional bright line. The amendments should improve the
fit between the paradigm and the courts' practice on each of these points.
In an effort to better define the doctrinal limits of the practice, the
Committee undertook to clarify the definition of frivolous litigation. The
prefiling investigation requirement was not redrafted, but it was given
primacy of place in the new format.437 The Committee did redraft the
threshold requirements defining the legal and factual merits of the
case. 438 Unlike the 1983 rule, the 1993 amendments clearly distinguish
between the legal and factual merits of the claim, they delete any
implication of a "good faith" defense, and for the first time the term
"frivolous" is used in the drafting of the Rule.439 These amendments
address the factual dimensions of the claim more explicitly than before,
tying evaluation of the factual merits of the claim to formal evidentiary
standards and summary judgment procedures. 440 The new standard
defining the acceptable legal content of a claim is described in the

436. The Advisory Committee's Note admonishes litigants not to use Rule 11 motions for
"minor, inconsequential violations" of the rule or otherwise abuse the sanction process. FED. R. Civ.
P. I1 advisory committee's note (1993). The Note outlines a number of unacceptable practices
including use of the Rule as a discovery device, a threat to extort settlement, a device to test the
legal sufficiency of allegations, to increase the cost of litigation, to intimidate, to create a conflict
of interest, or as a means to pierce the attomey-client privilege. Id. One way to achieve this goal is
to defer the sanctions ruling to the end of the litigation.
437. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b).

438. Id. ll(b)(l)-(4).
439. Id.
440. See id. I l(b)(3), (4); FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993).
That summary judgment is rendered against a party does not necessarily mean, for

purposes of this certification, that it had no evidentiary support for its position. On the
other hand, if a party has evidence with respect to a contention that would suffice to
defeat a motion for summary judgment based thereon, it would have sufficient 'evidentiary support' for purposes of Rule II.
...A party should not deny an allegation it knows to be true; but it is not
required, simply because it lacks contradictory evidence, to admit an allegation that it
believes is not true.
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Advisory Committee Note as an "objective standard, intended to
eliminate any 'empty-head pure-heart' justification for patently frivolous
arguments." 441 However, the Note also acknowledges the need to avoid

chilling imaginative advocacy, recommending that "arguments for
a
' 2
change of law... be viewed with greater tolerance under the rule.
These amendments accomplish two things. They limit the courts'
decision whether or not a claim is legally or factually frivolous by
imposing more specific doctrinal guides. Second, the amendments
accomplish this goal by bringing into the Rule 11 arena legal standards
and case law with which trial courts are already very familiar." These
amendments also emphasize the evidentiary dimensions of the case, an
arena of acknowledged judicial expertise. While these amendments
cannot be said to guarantee less variability and greater predictability in

the courts' sanctions practice, they do provide a basis for a more
structured analysis of the threshold issue of liability than we have seen
in the past.
The restructuring of the Rule focuses the sanctions decision on the
conduct of the litigation, as opposed to its content. 4' Rule 11 was
amended in 1983 to remove the "bad faith" requirement from the
Rule." 5 The goal was to impose a greater obligation upon attorneys to
engage in a legal and factual investigation prior to filing their lawsuits." 6 Having done away with the "bad faith" requirement, the
drafters went on to make sanctions mandatory upon finding a violation
of the threshold requirements of the Rule." 7 Early commentary ana-

441. FED R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993).
442. Id.
443. See Stempel, supra note 12, at 280-81 (discussing the need to harmonize Rule I1 and other
pretrial interception procedures and the benefits of such a presumption against sanctions created by
such harmonization).
444. See Schwarzer, supranote 84, at 1021-23 (noting the shift from the merits to the adequacy
of the prefiling inquiry made by the attorney or pro se litigant). "Courts are beginning to shift their
focus from assessing the merits to assessing the adequacy of the prefiling inquiry." Id. at 1021.
445. See Burbank, supranote 90, at 1003. See generallyDonna E. Ostroff, Note, 59 TEMP. L.Q.
107 (1986) (discussing the removal of the bad faith standard as explicated in Eastway Construction
Corp. v. City of N.Y., 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985)).
446. See infra Appendix (outlining the provisions of the 1983 amendments).
447. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983) ("Irapleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation
of this rule, the court... shall impose... an appropriate sanction"); infra Appendix A (outlining
the provisions of the 1983 amendments). The Notes to the 1983 amendments, however, did delegate
some measure of discretion as far as the sanctions themselves:
And the words "shall impose"... focus the court's attention on the need to impose
sanctions for pleading and motion abuses. The court, however, retains the necessary
flexibility to deal appropriately with violations of the rule. It has discretion to tailor
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lyzed the impact of the rule as its regulatory orientation shifted from the
conduct of the litigation to a more detailed analysis of its legal content.448 At the time of the 1993 amendments, efforts had coalesced to
shift the Rule away from the analysis of legal content toward a conductoriented inquiry." 9 "[A]fter a six-year period that has witnessed some
sharp turns by courts and commentators alike (which have brought more
of them together), there is a conflict between or among circuits on
practically every important question of interpretation and policy under the
Rule .... ,45 At the time, these conflicting outcomes were thought to
undermine the procedural goal of uniformity and reflect federal judges'
personal normative preferences rather than those of the Rule. 45' According to Professor Burbank, one of the early commentators, these
normative conflicts were a direct result of the courts "giving primacy to
legal products and to a compensatory goal in the interpretation and
implementation of amended Rule 11."42 He argued that the determination whether a paper is "legally frivolous... will be as determinate, and
hence as uniform, as the notion of frivolousness itself."4 53
With the 1993 amendments to Rule 11 the Supreme Court has
returned to a tripartite structure similar to the earlier versions of the
Rule.4' As with other versions of the Rule, under the 1993 amendments the court must first determine if those facing sanctions have met
the basic requirements regarding the prefiling investigation and the
minimal requirements governing the legal and factual merits of the
claim.455 With the 1993 amendments the attorney's certification

sanctions to the particular facts of the case, with which it should be well acquainted.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983).
448. See supra notes 3, 12.
449. In an early article, Judge Schwarzer pointed out that "[s]hifting the focus of rule 11
enforcement from merits to process will not solve all problems." Schwarzer, supra note 84, at 1024.
He noted, however, that it
should materially reduce subjectivity and inconsistency. Lawyers and judges may not

invariably agree on what constitutes a reasonable inquiry under the circumstances, but it
is reasonable to expect a greater consensus on that question than on whether a claim or
defense is frivolous. The former involves an assessment of prevailing professional
practice; the latter a prognostication of how courts might in the future evaluate a claim
or defense.

Id. at 1024-25.
450. Burbank, supra note 80, at 1930 (footnotes omitted).
451. Id. at 1932-33.
452. Id. at 1932.

453. Id. at 1933.
454. See infra Appendix (illustrating some of the earlier manifestations of Rule 11).
455. See infra Appendix (discussing the 1993 amendments to Rule 11).
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regarding the factual and legal sufficiency of the claim does not stand
alone. The drafters have attempted to make the prefiling investigation the

predicate to a sanctions analysis in an effort to emphasize conduct as a
threshold element.4' If the investigatory requirement is applied in this
fashion, a claim that is problematic from a legal or evidentiary perspective would not be deemed frivolous so long as the investigation passed
muster. 7
The ultimate utility of the distinction between content and conduct
in the sanctions arena lies in the creation of a buffer zone that demarcates
the sanctions decision and the decision on the merits. The Rule prior to
the 1983 amendments required only honesty in fact in the filing of
pleadings and bad faith for sanctions.458 The sanctions analysis was
bifurcated.459 Even if there was a determination that the claim was

factually or legally frivolous, sanctions were not authorized absent a
finding that the claim was brought in "bad faith."46 This "bad faith"
requirement focused the courts' attention on the context, conduct, and
character of the litigation, not its legal content. In so doing, it created a
decisional buffer zone between a merits-based analysis and the courts'
exercise of their sanctions powers. 46 ' The restructuring of the Rule
reintroduced that decisional buffer zone.
Nevertheless, the conduct-content dichotomy does not address one
of the fundamental problems of the Rule: How is the court to evaluate

456. See FED. R. Civ. P. ll(b); FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993) ("The
revision in part expands the responsibilities of litigants to the court, while providing greater
constraints and flexibility in dealing with infractions of the rule."). The Rule also imposes a duty to
"stop and think" with respect to allegations made in the court papers and "emphasizes the duty of
candor." Id
457. See Tobias, 1993 Revision, supra note 3, at 205 (arguing that these two predicate elements
in effect must be construed together, the latter element evaluated primarily in light of the former).
458. See Risinger, supra note 66, at 4-14 (discussing the facial requirements of early Rule 11;
that is the version before the 1983 amendments). Risinger cautions against the use of Rule 11 to
sanction "improper espousal of a legal position," id. at 58, or imposing too strict a factual threshold
which unduly restricts access to the courts. Id. at 55-56. Risinger finds that the subjective standard
of the old rule, the bad faith requirement, was not itself a problem: "The problem arises when the
finder of fact is not willing to indulge in the normal process of circumstantial inference concerning
the intentional or wilful nature of an act." Id. at 60. Risinger questions the use of objective standards
on the ground that they "take us from the realm of ethical consideration to the realm of negligence."
Id.
459. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1938).
460. See Risinger, supra note 66, at 3-4 (discussing the bad faith element in the original rule
and the enforcement difficulties associated with inquiring into the subjective beliefs of attorneys).
461. Cf. Nelken, Chilling, supra note 3, at 1338-39 (discussing the potential overinclusive
application of Rule 11 and the potentially adverse impact on zealous advocacy through an overly
limited definition of acceptable advocacy).
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the legal judgments involved in moving from a prefiling investigation
into litigation?462 An objectively adequate investigation does not
guarantee that the analysis of the products of that investigation will be
properly handled.4 63 Nor is it clear why the professional judgments
involved in developing and directing the prefiling investigation should be
more amenable to sanctions than those involved in ultimately putting the
case together for filing. The same is true of the professional judgments
involved in predicting whether evidentiary support will be forthcoming
through discovery and the judgments involved in evaluating the factual
merits of the claim.4" Defining "legal" judgments as conduct is a
difficult aspect of the current rule. Despite the drafters' efforts to
emphasize "conduct" in the sanctions inquiry, nothing in the Advisory
Committee's Note or Rule itself prohibits courts from treating as a

predicate to sanctions the factual or legal merits of a claim standing
alone.4 65 At least the 1993 amendments, unlike those of 1983, do not
authorize sanctions automatically upon a finding that the threshold
requirements have not been met.466 If the threshold requirements have
not been met, the court must then decide if sanctions are warranted by

462. Practice norms cannot be evaluated without reference to the institutional role of the
attorney-here the roles of the attorney as a zealous advocate and an officer of the court. See JAMES
E. MOLITERNO & JOHN M. LEVY, ETHICS OF THE LAWYER'S WORK 254-55 (1993). Traditional
conceptions of the role of attorneys have come under attack. See RUDOLPH J. GERBER, LAWYERS,
COURTS, AND PROFESSIONALISM: THE AGENDA FOR REFORM 75-102 (1989) (critiquing traditional
models of adversarialism and the combatant approach to litigation). Despite the growing emphasis
upon the attorney's obligation to others than simply her client, these duties are not always easy to
reconcile. See Lincoln Caplan, Unequal Loyalty, A.B.A. J., July 1995, at 54 (looking at the
competing interests of clients and judiciary in the adversarial process).
463. Analyzing the legal and factual merits of a claim-considered a core skill of the legal
profession-is not always a simple matter. "Legal theory," has been defind as a "view of the facts
and law-intertwined together--that can justify a decision in the client's favor." RICHARD K.
NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING: STRUCTURE, STRATEGY AND STYLE 247
(1990). To argue that a legal theory is frivolous inevitably involves an act of creative judgment
which attempts to evaluate strategic and persuasive dimensions of the theory, as well as the existence
of, or argument from, precedent. See generally SHELDON MARGULIES & KENNETH LASSON,
LEARNING LAW: THE MASTERY OF LEGAL LOGIC (1993) (explaining the basic legal principles that
are involved in virtually all species of legal disputes).
464. See Tobias, 1993 Revision, supranote 3, at 195 (discussing the difficulty of predicting the
likelihood of securing evidentiary support for a claim despite having a reasonable belief the claim
is correct).
465. A reasonable prefiling investigation standing alone does not discharge the threshold
obligations of the Rule. Professor Tobias attempts to resolve this interpretive dilemma by treating
the threshold elements as inextricably intertwined. He argues that the lack of legal or factual merit
should be measured by reference solely to the prefiling investigation and not as an independent
element. See id. at 195-96.
466. See FED. R. Civ. P. Il(c).
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looking explicitly at the conduct of the litigation and the impact of the
frivolous claim on the court.467 The Advisory Committee's Note to the
1993 amendments states that "[t]he rule does not attempt to enumerate
the factors a court should consider in deciding whether to impose a
sanction or what sanctions would be appropriate in the circumstances."468 Having said this, the Committee then lists a series of suggested
factors to be considered. Many of the factors suggested in the Note are
similar to the factors typically used to determine if a litigant has acted in
bad faith under the courts' inherent power doctrine.469 For example, the
Advisory Committee's Note directs the courts to look at factors that
reflect on litigants' intent in bringing the challenged litigation:
Whether the improper conduct was wilful, or negligent; whether it was
part of a pattern of activity, or an isolated event; ... whether the
person has engaged in similar conduct in other litigation; whether it
was intended to injure; ... whether the responsible person is trained in
the law; what mount... is needed to deter that person from repetition
in the same case; [and] what amount is needed to deter similar activity
by other litigants .... 470
The Note also directs the courts to look at the impact the frivolous claim
has had on the course of the litigation and the court: "[W]hether it
infected the entire pleading, or only one particular count or defense;
effect it had on the litigation process in time or ex[and] what,1471
pense ....
The courts' experiential skills and institutional competence in
dealing with attorney conduct is assumed. This conduct-based approach
to sanctions is more compatible with the paradigm of discretion as "skill"
than a content-oriented approach. This shift in emphasis within the Rule
should address some of these concerns by focusing the courts' discretion
as "skill" in areas where it is least problematic. Yet the utility of the

467. See FED. R. Civ. P. I1 advisory committee's note (1993).
468. Id.
469. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing the inherent powers doctrine as a

source of the courts' sanctioning power and touching upon Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32
(1991), a recent inherent doctrines' decision addressing the imposition of attorney's fees as
sanctions).
470. See FED. I Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993).
471. Id. This shift in the structure of the Rule refocuses the Rule on an element of culpability,
rather than wasting time addressing mere mistakes and random acts of inadvertence or negligence
which do not seriously threaten the operation of the courts. See id. ("[S]anctions should not be more
severe than reasonably necessary to deter repetition of the conduct by the offending person or
comparable conduct by similarly situated persons.").
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dichotomy between an analysis of the content and conduct of a piece of
litigation collapses when professional judgments are at issue. In these
circumstances, the conduct orientation of the Rule quickly fades into an72
analysis of the professional and legal judgments that led to its filing.
It is inevitable that many of the problems that have plagued the Rule's
application of the paradigm of discretion as "skill" to these essentially
"legal" judgments will surface again in these cases.
The other problem is that the content-conduct dichotomy fails to
address different dimensions of conduct and how they are to be weighed.
It can be difficult drawing the line between conduct that is abusive of the
litigation process and undermines the legitimate adjudicative function of
the court, and conduct deemed tolerable and within the acceptable scope
of the mandate to provide zealous advocacy.473 There is little doubt that
the goals of managerial reform, increasing the efficiency of the courts
and reducing attorneys' abuse of the procedural process, also focus on
abusive conduct and conduct deemed unnecessary, inefficient,
duplicative, or designed to delay the litigation. But the conduct at issue
in Rule 11 cases routinely strays beyond these confines.
While the Advisory Committee's Note attempts to make this point
by referring to conduct that is not merely inefficient or questionable, but
conduct that is egregious and adversely impacts the court, the Rule itself
does not. Given this lack of clarity how are the courts to define the
decisional context and weigh the competing institutional norms?4 74
Attempting to objectively evaluate the conduct of litigation standing
alone without any reference to context will prove problematic. Context
shapes the paradigm of discretion as "skill" and needs to be addressed
explicitly in the courts' sanction analysis.
The Advisory Committee's virtual withdrawal of compensatory fee
shifts from the courts' sanctions arsenal and its edict to consider
deterrence the primary goal in the sanctioning process, reflects the Rule's
narrower, but significant, exclusionary function.475 In ordering sanctions
the courts are encouraged to consider a sliding scale, ordering only those
sanctions necessary to achieve deterrence, thereby protecting the courts

472.

See supra notes 462-63 and accompanying text (discussing the complex legal judgments

involved in preparing a case for trial).
473.
frivolous
sanctions
474.

See Tobias, 1993 Revision, supra note 3, at 197-200 (discussing the fine line between
and non-fivolous arguments and claims as contributing to the difficulty of the Rule I1
decision); Vairo, Prologue,supra note 3, at 41-42, 83-87.
See supra notes 355-412 (outlining how the "skill" paradigm can accomplish this).

475. See FED. R. Civ. P. ll(c)(2).
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with the least adverse possible consequence for the litigants.476 This
shift emphasizing deterrence falls squarely within the pragmatic paradigm
of discretion as "skill." Who else but the trial courts are in a position to
know what the local practices are like and what it will take to deter other
lawyers or litigants similarly situated.477
The amendment to the Rule that has received the most comment is
decision to delete the mandatory "shall" in defining the
Committee's
the
courts' duty to sanction. In its stead, the Committee substituted the
'1 71 The substitution of "may" for "shall" gives the
permissive "may.
courts virtually unlimited discretion to withhold sanctions. The 1993
amendments to Rule 11 provide that upon making the determination that
there has been a violation of subsection b, the court "may, subject to the
conditions stated below [regarding the nature of the sanction to be
imposed], impose an appropriate sanction."479 There are no guidelines
in the Rule or the Advisory Committee's Note that restrict the courts'
discretion not to sanction. The Rule provides for no review of this
decision, rendering it an act of almost pure judicial prerogative and
ensuring wide variability.4 0 At first blush it is therefore difficult to see
how this amendment is designed to improve the courts' sanctions
practice.
It helps to look at the opposite result to see the virtues of the new
rule. If the court decides to sanction, there are procedural and substantive
guidelines with which it must comply.4 81 For example, if the court
decides to impose sanctions it must prepare a written order "describ[ing]
the conduct determined to constitute a violation of this rule and
explain[ing] the basis for the sanction imposed.' 482 There is no
476. While the scale is not formally set out in the Rule, the Advisory Committee's Note and
the language of Rule 11 itself are clear on this point. See FED. R.Civ. P. 11 (c)(2); FED. R. CIV. P.
11 advisory committee's note (1993).
477. See Jeffrey A. Parness, DisciplinaryReferrals UnderNew FederalCivil Rule 11, 61 TENN.
L. REv. 37, 60-61 (1993); Parness, supra note 112, at 904-05; Marc P. Goodman, Note, A Uniform

Methodologyfor Assessing Rule 11 Sanctions:A Means to Serve the End of ConservingPublic and
Private Legal Resources, 63 S.CAL. L. REv. 1855, 1865-73 (1990) (discussing the variation in the
federal circuits' implementation of Rule 11 sanctions); see also Paul Kaufman, Note, A Prospective
Cap on Rule 11 Sanctions, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 1275, 1281-82 (1991) (illustrating, through survey
of judges, the uncertain and inconsistent application of Rule 11 before the 1993 amendments).
478. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c) ("If... the court determines that subdivision (b) has been
violated, the court may... impose an appropriate sanction ... "(emphasis added)).

479. Id.
480. For sources discussing this variability of judicial decisions within the context of the
normative structure of the law, see supra note 25.

481. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c).
482. Id. 11(c)(3).
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comparable requirement for a decision not to sanction: no order is
necessary and, by implication, there is no record for appellate review.
This is a significant about-face in the structuring of the Rule. Under the
1983 amendments' mandate to sanction, decisions finding no violation
or an insufficient violation to warrant sanctions were scrupulously
reviewed and often reversed and remanded4 83on appeal for further
development to justify the denial of sanctions.
How should the courts' discretion not to sanction be construed?4"
Professor Waltz, a commentator who has looked at the issue of broad
delegations of discretion, makes the telling point that in attempting to
define the scope of judicial discretion "we should pay attention to
context." 485 He observes further that "[tlhe phrase 'judicial discretion'
is used but almost never defined in statutes and rule codifications," and
as a result it has become a term used by courts to "shore up verdictsalvaging opinions, but they rarely formulate a definition, a setting of
metes and bounds.,4 8 6 Discretion such as this is "inhedged by any
formal constraints or guidelines."487 The court need not fear appeal or
reversal when making these types of decisions.
The reinsertion of the permissive "may" parallels the case law which
has construed the courts' discretion to sanction under the 1983 rule as
authorizing de minimis sanctions for de minimis violations. 4 8 The 1993
amendments allow the courts to make a similar decision. A strict
interpretation of the threshold requirements might indicate Rule 11 has
been violated, but the imposition of sanctions remains within the
discretion of the court.48 9 Some may bemoan the loss of the mandatory
"shall," arguing that courts will return to their earlier bad habits-

483. See, e.g., Knight v. Sharif, 875 F.2d 516, 519 (5th Cir. 1989); Corpus Christi Taxpayer's
Ass'n v. City of Corpus Christi, 858 F.2d 973, 977 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. dismissed, 490 U.S. 1032,
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1065 (1989). See also Armour, supra note 220, at 105 (discussing Fifth
Circuit decisions reversing and remanding trial court orders denying sanctions for more development
and justification).
484. See Jon R. Waltz, Judicial Discretion in the Admission of Evidence Under the Federal
Rules ofEvidence, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1097, 1099 (1984-1985) (discussing the concept of "guided
and unguided" discretion, the latter rising to the level of judicial prerogative).
485. Id. at 1099.
486. Id. at 1101.
487. Id. at 1103.
488. See Armour, supra note 220, at 111-14.
489. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (c); FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993) (asserting
that the goal of Rule 11 is deterrence such that the severity of the sanctions imposed should be
proportional to the seriousness of the violation); supra notes 444-74 and accompanying text
(discussing the emphasis within the Rule on a separate conduct-oriented sanctions analysis under
section 1 (c)).
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tolerating the intolerable-despite the lack of any evidence that federal
trial courts will refuse to exercise the sanctions powers delegated to them
under Rule 11. From this perspective, the mandatory "shall" of the 1983
amendments codified the managerial activism characteristic of the early
amendments to Rule 11. But the Advisory Committee did not simply
substitute "may" for "shall" in restructuring the Rule.
This amendment was accompanied by a change in the language of
Rule 11 reintroducing consideration of the conduct of the litigation, as
distinct from the prefiling investigation, as an essential element in the
sanctions analysis.4" In this context, the substitution of the permissive
"may" for the mandatory "shall" in defining the courts' discretion should
be interpreted as a safety valve. This provision allows the courts to
explicitly consider whether the challenged advocacy, be it the conduct or
content of the litigation, falls outside the scope of the reasonable or
tolerable limits of zealous representation. If the court determines that the
challenged action should be sanctioned, the procedural restraints
incorporated into the Rule, if properly applied, require a structured
sanctions decision. This approach to Rule 11 sanctions focuses on
drawing bright lines to exclude intolerable behavior and assumes that all
other conduct of the litigation falls within the bounds of acceptable
advocacy. The Rule defers to the courts on this inclusive definition of
zealous advocacy and avoids requiring them to invest significant
resources defending their decisions not to sanction.4 9'
The Rule requires that "[i]f the court imposes a sanction, it must,
unless waived, indicate its reasons in a written order or on the record; the
court should not ordinarily have to explain its denial of a motion for
sanctions."492 This amendment encourages the courts to focus on the
conduct that should be expressly excluded from litigants' and lawyers'
repertoire. The courts' sanctions practice no longer involves affirmatively
approving of litigation practices. This restructuring emphasizes both the
exclusionary function of the Rule and the normative assumption that the
skillful exercise of its discretion by the court will generate sanction

490. See supra notes 444-74.
491. Cf Armour, supra note 220, at 103-05 (discussing numerous appellate court decisions

before the 1993 amendments reversing and remanding lower courts' "no-sanction" decisions for
further explication and justification on the record).
492. FED. R. Civ. P. I1 advisory committee's note (1993). Rule 11 requires a separate motion

and a "reasonable opportunity to respond." FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c). The motion must describe the
"specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b)." Id. I l(c)(1)(A). The Rule further mandates that

"[w]hen imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct determined to constitute a violation
of this rule and explain the basis for the sanction imposed." Id. 1l(c)(3).
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decisions that fall within a narrower range of variability than before.
Thus, despite the premium placed upon discretion, this amendment
should not be construed to contemplate a myriad of conflicting sanction
decisions. Making it clear that courts are authorized to impose sanctions
as needed to achieve the purposes of the Rule acknowledges the
importance of the assumption shared by trial and appellate courts alike
that in delegating this matter to the courts' discretion, there is an
expectation that the trial court will "demonstrate that the decision was
'
If these
made skillfully, carefully, and with attention to all the facts."493
legal decisions can in fact be made494correctly, the assumption is that the
trial courts' will attempt to do SO.
Finally, the Advisory Committee incorporated procedures into the
Rule which require the sanctioning court to explain itself. In early Rule
11 cases the Rule was invoked and at times resolved prior to the final
adjudication on the merits without reference to any formal procedures.495 The explanations and justifications for the courts' lack of
procedures mirrored the early managerial rationales offered for the rule.
The decisions had to be made quickly if the Rule was to effectively
control and manage the litigation process. Other rules regulating this
conduct did not contemplate formal procedures.4" In addition, the fact
sensitive nature of the decision, coupled with the courts' personal
perspective in the application of the Rule, did not lend itself to appellate
review warranting an extensive evidentiary record.497 The new procedural requirements of the Rule clearly convey to the courts the expectation that they will be expected to generate a logical, rational application
of the Rule. The express incorporation of the procedural safeguards
traditionally associated with the courts' formal adjudicative
decisionmaking into the Rule is significant. It represents the Advisory
Committee's most explicit response to the critique of indeterminacy and
critics' desire to restrain the courts' exercise of discretion under Rule 11.
This renewed emphasis on procedural restraints and the potential
for appellate review raises questions regarding the appellate courts'
continued reliance on the "abuse of discretion" standard. The promise of

493. Yablon, supra note 18, at 268.
494. See Yablon, supra note 18, at 267; cf supra notes 65-148 and accompanying text
(discussing the difference between the courts managerialism and its pragmatic adjudication).
495. See Armour, supra note 220, at 109-10.
496. Cf supra notes 65-148 and accompanying text (discussing the managerial revolution of
the 1980s).
497. See Armour, supra note 220, at 101.
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enhanced accountability is illusory unless the appellate courts revisit the
issue of appellate review of Rule 11 decisions. 498 Courts should be able
to justify their sanctions decisions by reference to the elements of the
practice outlined above. 4 99 This process of "justification" is essential if
the courts' sanctions decisions are to be treated as legitimate exercises of
judicial power. Without substituting its judgment for that of the trial
court, the appellate courts can develop a process of review that examines
the individual sanctions decision to see if the applicable elements of the
paradigm of discretion as "skill" are all present; that is, does the practice
fit the paradigm? 5"
C. Problems That Remain
The courts' evolving sanctions practice has moved beyond the
point where highly variable outcomes, or idiosyncratic, subjective
decisionmaking, are tolerable. The amendments to the Rule, when
interpreted within the larger context of the debate that led to their
restructuring, reflect the need to develop a sanctions practice that
addresses these concerns. The 1993 amendments do this in part by
focusing the courts' sanctions practice on the exclusionary function of the
Rule and by emphasizing the importance of explication and explanation
in the courts' decisionmaking. There is even an intimation in the
reformulation of the doctrinal guidelines defining the element of
"nonfrivolous" litigation that the courts, when necessary, should emphasize the "legal" paradigm over the "skill" paradigm at the threshold level
in a "product" based analysis."'
The amendments cannot fully lay to rest the two major concerns of
critics challenging the discretionary nature of the courts' sanctions
practice. The first is the potential for bias disguised as the personal,
experiential basis of the courts' subjective, intuitive judgments under the
paradigm of discretion as "skill." The second is the problem of defining
acceptable variability in the application of the Rule in a way that guides

498. See supra notes 138-48 and accompanying text (discussing need for more appellate
oversight to impose the necessary judicial restraint and accountability upon trial courts' sanctions

decisions).
499. See supra notes 355-412 and accompanying text (discussing the "fit" between the "skill"
paradigm and practice and the justification fimction it serves).
500. See supra notes 337-51 and accompanying text (discussing the elements of the paradigm
of discretion as "skill").

501. Cf Stempel, supra note 12, at 268 (discussing the need to harmonize Rule I1with other
"interception devices" that reflect the courts' exercise of their adjudicative discretion).
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or limits the courts' decisionmaking. These are inevitable by-products of
discretionary decisionmaking, 0 z particularly when the courts treat the
delegation of discretion to them as constrained solely by the paradigm of
"discretion" as skill. These problems can only be addressed if the courts
approach sanctions decisions with the normative assumption in mind that
they are looking for the right answer to the question: Should the limits
of tolerable advocacy be drawn at this case? Courts should be willing to
critique their exercise of discretion from the perspective of the practice
community: Would a skillful jurist or lawyer agree with their decision?
More importantly, how will the practice community interpret this
decision?
Additionally, concerns about bias or undue subjectivity can only be
redressed if the court makes the context of its sanctions analysis explicit.
What assumptions regarding the litigation, the litigants, or the claim are
being brought to bear? And how does the court view this litigation in the
larger institutional context of an open, accessible court system within a
democratic society? In its turn, how does the court view this litigation as
a breach of the duty of zealous representation? The Rule and Advisory
Committee's Note does not address the elements of context and the
situatedness of the decisionmaker explicitly, and yet the perspective the
decisionmaker brings to bear on the question of sanctions certainly can
be outcome determinative.
These suggestions both build on the courts' role as conscious
decisionmaker, and ask the courts to acknowledge and address on a case
by case basis the discretionary nature of their sanctions practice. The
courts need to approach their sanctions practice from the perspective that
they must produce structured, skillful decisions for which they will be
held accountable.
VI.

RESTRUCTURING THE COURTS' SANCTIONS PRACTICE

Had the trial and appellate court adopted this approach in Jennings
v. Joshua Independent School District,"3 the result-sanctions imposed
against an American Civil Liberties Union ("A.C.L.U.") volunteer
attorney and his client-might have been quite different. This case
involved a challenge by the A.C.L.U. of a local school district's use of
sniffer dogs. In undertaking this challenge the A.C.L.U and its volunteer
attorney, Mr. Don Gladden, were aware that the precedent in the Fifth

502. See supra notes 337-51 and accompanying text.
503. 877 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 935 (1990).
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Circuit was against them on this point."' In affirming the award of
sanctions ordered by the trial court, the Fifth Circuit pointed to the
controlling precedent of Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School
District5 and the lack of any "Supreme Court or later authority... to
suggest that Horton's principles of law might be overturned."5°6 The
circuit court found that there were no facts distinguishing Jennings from
Horton, and that Jennings could only be construed as directly contrary
to existing law 07-- which is exactly what it was! 8 In affirming sanctions, the Fifth Circuit pointed out that all of the material facts "were
essentially known to Jennings and Gladden at the time the complaint was
filed. ' '519 And yet that would be the case with a direct challenge to
existing precedent: Plaintiff is in effect arguing that the court should
rethink its interpretation and application of the rule of law to the given
fact paradigm. In their Petition to the United States Supreme Court
Plaintiffs continued to pursue their legal arguments on this point.510
In many ways this is not a typical sanctions case, but it is a good
case to illustrate the point of this Article. It was not a case involving
large sums of money or other facts raising a question about the plaintiff's
financial motive in bringing suit. Yet "motive" figured large in the
courts' analysis and "reading" of the litigants. This case involved an irate
father's challenge to the school district's right to search his daughter's
locker and car for drugs."' In its opinion, the Fifth Circuit focused on
Mr. Jennings's "strong disapproval of the.., sniffer-dog search
program... prior to the events at issue in this case."5' 12 At the time of

504. Id. at 321.
505. Id. (citingHorton, 690 F.2d 470,477 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,463 U.S. 1207 (1983)).
506. Id.
507. Id.

508. See Petition, A Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit at 11, 13, 18, Jennings v.Joshua Indep. Sch. Dist.,
869 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.) (No.88-1089),
amended andsupersededby 877 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1989),cert.denied,496 U.S.935 (1990) [hereinafter Jennings Cert. Petition]; Appellant's Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas, Petition for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, at 10, 13 No. 88-1089,
Jennings v. Joshua Indep. Sch. Dist., 869 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.) (No. 88-1089), amended and
supersededby 877 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,496 U.S. 935 (1990) [hereinafter Jennings
Appellate Brief]. In both briefs Appellants challenged Horton directly by raising complicated issues
of probable cause regarding "dog sniffs," the scope of Horton, the question of public school
authorities delegation to private security companies the function of security, and the impact of
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
509. Jennings, 877 F.2d at 321.
510. See Jennings Cert. Petition, supra note 508.
511. Jennings, 877 F.2d at 315.
512. Id.at 321.
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the search, the court pointed out that Jennings threatened to sue everyone
involved and did so despite testimony at trial that "he did not think that
his or his daughter's constitutional rights had been violated by any of the
discrete actions of the school officials."'1' There is nothing in the
record regarding the "subjective" good faith of Mr. Jennings' counsel,
Mr. Gladden. 14
What is striking about the case is the way the court handled the
involvement of the A.C.L.U. In its opinion the circuit court noted that
Mr. Gladden's representation of Mr. Jennings and his daughter was
without compensation. 5 The Fifth Circuit recognized that the
A.C.L.U. took the case for the precise purpose of challenging the "alert"
of a sniffer-dog as a sufficient basis for probable cause and a search
16
absent evidence of a particularized suspicion of current contraband.
The A.C.L.U. makes the point numerous times in their briefs that sniffer
dogs are "over-alert," responding to numerous substances that are not
illegal. What is of interest is that both courts, trial and appellate, seem
to treat Jennings' attitude and the A.C.L.U.'s involvement as evidence
that this was not a legitimate dispute or use of judicial resources. There
is no willingness to address this litigation in a larger context or pose the
"opposite" argument. This is not to argue that the A.C.L.U. or other
advocacy groups are immune from Rule 11, but there do seem to be
relevant contextual factors that were not addressed.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the award of sanctions, initially holding
that "this is a close case with respect to sanctions, and if we had been
sitting as district judges we might have arrived at a different conclusion." 7 But they were not willing to substitute their opinion for that
of the trial court. If the trial and appellate court on the initial appeal had
adopted the approach to sanctions outlined above, the result would likely
have been different.5 1 Take for example the element of "subjectivity"
and the need to properly define the context of the dispute. The trial
court's response to the A.C.L.U. could be characterized as idiosyncratic

513. Id.
514. Mr. Gladden was interviewed as part of the research for this Article. The case involved a
challenge to Horton and, in his mind, raised new legal theories. Interview with Don Gladden, Esq.
(on file with author).
515. Jennings, 877 F.2d at 321.
516. Id.; see also Jennings Cert. Petition, supra note 508, at 6.
517. Jennings v. Joshua Indep. Sch. Dist., 869 F.2d 870, 879 (5th Cir. 1989), amended and
supersededby 877 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 935 (1990).
518. See supra notes 355-412 and accompanying text (describing the application of the
discretion as "skill" paradigm to sanction decisions).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1996

103

HOFSTRA
Hofstra
LawLAW
Review,
Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [1996],[V/ol.
Art.24:677
3
REVIEW

and as not reflecting a larger institutional perspective. 9 While such a
response might fairly reflect the trial judge's personal view of how his
limited court resources would be best utilized, what happens if this case
is viewed as part of a larger body of jurisprudence defining the limits of
tolerable advocacy and the exclusionary function of the Rule? The trial
judge should be required to address these factual elements in greater
detail.
The appellate judge on the initial review also went to great lengths
to make the point that the Fifth Circuit precedent was clear. 20 Yet in
both its brief to the Fifth Circuit and to the United States Supreme Court,
Plaintiff consistently pointed out the nature of his challenge to the
existing precedent.52' Even adopting the strictest definition of candor,
this case does not seem ripe for sanction on those grounds. There was at
least a cognizable argument to be made on behalf of counsel that this
was a legitimate challenge aimed at changing the law.
In addition, this element of the case seems to fall outside of the
paradigm of discretion as "skill." 5' Nothing indicates why the circuit
court did not feel comfortable exercising their adjudicative skills to
evaluate the "objective" reasonableness of the challenge to their law. To
argue that the trial court looked at the frivolousness of the claim as a
"fact intensive" issue because of the Plaintiff's trial testimony ignores
substantial Rule 11 precedent which holds that there can be no improper
motive in bringing a suit if the underlying claim has merit.523 Mr.
Jennings's temper aside, the real issue was whether Mr. Gladden and the
A.C.L.U. had properly pursued their challenge to Horton. The fact that
there was no intervening Supreme Court precedent or other authority
offered 524 should not be dispositive of the issue. Someone has to be the
first one to make the challenge. Once more, using the "posed opposite"
would have been helpful: Could the court make an argument that a
reasonable, zealous advocate, would have pursued this case?
The Fifth Circuit pointed out that it would have ruled differently on

519. See Tobias, 1993 Revision, supra note 3, at 27-28, 40, 56 (discussing need for courts to
be sensitive to the role played by civil rights litigation and advocacy groups in the larger political
context).
520. Jennings, 869 F.2d at 877-88.
521. See supra note 507-08 and accompanying text.
522. See supra notes 201-60 and accompanying text (discussing focus of "legal" paradigm on
doctrinal analysis, elaboration, and development).
523. See Armour, supra note 220, at 106-09, 124-25.

524. Jennings v. Joshua Indep. Sch. Dist., 877 F.2d 313, 321 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496
U.S. 935 (1990).
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the question of sanctions but deferred to the trial court. The reasons for
its appellate deference were grounded in its view that the trial court was
simply in a better position to address these issues.'2 From the perspective of the paradigm of discretion as "skill" this automatic deference is
troubling. If the circuit does not agree with the ruling, that is some
evidence that reasonably competent jurists might question whether the
decision is a "skillful" one. In such a situation the appellate court should
review the lower court opinion for the elements of skill discussed above,
not merely defer to a highly subjective, albeit "hands on" approach.
This Article is not recommending that a court of appeals merely
substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. However, the policy of
deferring to the trial court's skills should adhere to the logic of the skill
paradigm. Accordingly, the court of appeals should scrutinize the trial
court's decisions to sanction for the elements of skill discussed
above.5 26 Were the facts developed? Does the court's selection of a
context reflect the underlying normative and legal issues involved in the
sanctions? Has the court adequately outlined applicable doctrine and any
other factors on which it relied? And has the court defined the specialized skill and institutional perspective brought to bear? Courts should no
longer rely on a peculiarly personal or self-referring definition of their
discretion; nor should they hide behind a highly fact specific analysis.
Having to explain the decision is one way to make the trial courts
accountable and ensure that the rule is properly interpreted and applied.
Having something more than a perfunctory appellate review of the
sanction decision is another way. The appellate court should determine
if the decision is one with which other skilled practitioners would agree.
In addition, the appellate court should determine if the trial court has
constructed an opinion that adequately addresses the important legal
question: Do the practices at issue in the particular case exceed the
bounds of acceptable advocacy?52 7
525. See Jennings v. Joshua Indep. Sch. Dist., 869 F.2d 870, 879 (5th Cir. 1989), amended and
superseded by 877 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,496 U.S. 935 (1990). Yet on rehearing en

bane, the Fifth Circuit spent more time analyzing the law. The court did not disclose why, but it may
have been because of the attention given the case. See Jennings v. Joshua Indep. Sch. Dist., 877 F.2d
313, 320-22 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 935 (1990).
526. See supra notes 355-412 (discussing the "skill" paradigm as applied to discretionary

decisionmaking).
527. I realize that this example is subject to criticism as one of the cosmic anecdotes that has

fueled the movement to reform the rule, but even a cosmic anecdote helps define the law. See Kritzer
et al, supra note 85, at 272 ('A]n examination of the experiences of randomly selected federal
litigators in three circuits strongly suggests that much of the portrayal of the effects of Rule II has
been unduly influenced by selected anecdotes that tend to emphasize big cases that are not
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VII.

CONCLUSION

The paradigm of discretion as "skill" applied to the courts' sanctions
practice is not a static paradigm. The courts' sanctions practice has
evolved and changed. It will continue to do so as the courts gain
experience with the Rule. Over ten years have passed since the original
amendment in 1983 and the courts have gained expertise. By now they
should be able to predict the impact their decisions will have on the
courts' public adjudicative function and the role of attorneys as zealous
advocates. Judicial decisionmakers faced with this type of decision
should not hide behind their discretion. They should act as self-conscious
decisionmakers and clearly address the contextual and subjective
elements of their sanction decisions. 2 The courts' sanctions practice
is evolving in ways that will hopefully ensure more accountability and
consistency if the courts are to be held to a minimal duty of "justifying"
the exercise of their discretion as "skill." This is one way to ensure the
fit between the "practice" and the "paradigm."

representative of federal litigation.").
528. See Wells, supra note 61, at 1745-46 (discussing the need for judicial decisionmakers to
become aware of their "situatedness"). Wells argues further that "[i]f our judgment is inevitably
limited by our perspective, then consideration of the character of that perspective is the beginning
of rational inquiry" Id. at 1746. By specifically addressing the types of reasons and structured
analyses that are "pragmatically appropriate to a particular decision" the court can ensure that a
highly contextual approach generates a fair normative decision. Id.; cf Minow & Spelman, supra
note 183, at 1629 (arguing that legal decisionmaking involves a "[p]rincipled [c]hoice of
[c]ontexts"---selecting the context that best reflects the normative contours of the underlying legal

debate).
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APPENDIX
Original Rule 11 provided as follows:
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be
signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose
address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney
shall sign his pleading and state his address. Except when otherwise
specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified
or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of
an answer under oath must be overcome by the testim6ny of two
witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances
is abolished. The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by
him that he has read the pleadings; that to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief there is a good ground to support it; and that it
is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not signed or is signed with
intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken as sham and
false and the action may proceed as though the pleading had not been
served. For a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected
to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken if
scandalous or indecent material is inserted.529
In June of 1981 proposed amendments to the original Rule 11 were
published:
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by
at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address
shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign
his pleading and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically
provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer
under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of
one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The
signature of an attorney orparty constitutes a certificate by him that he
has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information,
and belief thcrc is geed gr..d to supprt it; and it is net int.s.
fer- delay formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact
and is warranted by existing law or a goodfaith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; and that it is not
interposedprimarilyfor any improperpurpose, such as to harass, to
cause delay, or to increase the cost of litigation. If a pleading is not
signed, it shall not be acceptedfor filing. or is signed with intot to

529. FED. R. Crv. P. 11 (1937).
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defcat the pufpese ef this ruke, ft mafy be stiken as sham and faNc an
the ai.n may pr..d as thcugh th pleading had n been
at scr'd. Fer

a MWr1 ialafien ef~. rhic~ a attcmey may be subjated te apprepfimez diseipliaary aefien. Simfar aefien may be taken if seandaicun er
indeeent mattr- is iase...d. If a pleading is signed in violation of this
rule, the court, upon motion or upon it own initiative, shall impose
upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an
appropriatesanction, which may include an order to pay to the other
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred
of the filing of the pleading, including a reasonableattorney's
because
530
fee.
The proposed amendments were adopted after a few minor changes. The
Advisory Committee's Note to the 1983 amendments states that the "new
language is intended to reduce the reluctance of courts to impose
sanctions., 5 31 The Note further states that the amended rule expands the
courts' powers to award attorneys fees "to a litigant whose opponent acts
5 32
in bad faith in instituting or conducting litigation.
Commentary at the time questioned this effort to expand the courts'
sanctioning powers under the umbrella of the Rules Enabling Act. 3
Drafted and adopted pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1966), the 1983 amendments proposed to remove the
requirement of a "wilful" violation as a predicate to sanctions, effectively
destroying any "good faith" defense. 34 In addition to removing the
requirement of bad faith, the 1983 amendments made sanctions
mandatory if the court found the threshold requirements of the Rule had
not been met. 535 As stated in the Advisory Committee's Note the new
"standard is more stringent than the original good-faith formula and thus
it is expected that a greater range of circumstances will trigger its
violation."53 6 The 1983 amendments caused a flurry of commentary and
less than ten years after their enactment a general Call for Comments was
issued prefatory to amendment.13 ' The 1993 amendments were quite

530. See 1981 PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 65, at 6-7.
531. FED. R. Civ. P. ll advisory committee's note (1983).
532. Id.
533. See Burbank, supra note 90, at 998-1000.
534. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983) ("The reference in the former text
to willfulness as a prerequisite to disciplinary action has been deleted.").
535. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1983) ("Ifa pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of
this rule, the court... shall impose ...an appropriate sanction ... .
536. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983).
537. CALL FOR COMMENT, supra note 66.
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extensive, but one in particular caused comment: the substitution of the
permissive "may" for the mandatory "shall" in the sanctions provisions. 38 At the time of the submission of the packet of rule reforms to
Congress, Justices Scalia and Thomas objected to the amendments.
Specifically, they disagreed with deleting the mandatory "shall" from the
Rule and limiting the availability of compensatory fee awards as
sanctions, stating that "the sanctions proposal will eliminate a significant
and necessary deterrent to frivolous litigation."' 39 In their dissent from
the Supreme Court's approval of the rules, Justices Scalia and Thomas
opined that "there appears to be general agreement ...that Rule 11, as
written, basically works.""54 They did not note or address commentary
to the contrary.
The 1993 amendments became effective on Dec. 1, 1993. However,
Congress's response was not overwhelmingly favorable and action was
taken to negate much of the drafters' work. This included proposing a
provision in the "Attorney Accountability Act of 1995" (H.R. 988) that
would restore the mandatory sanction provision and compensatory fee
awards to Rule 11.541 Similar language attempting to reinstate the
mandatory sanction language of the 1983 rule was included in the
"Lawsuit Reform Act of 1995" (S.300).542
Ultimately, the Rule was extensively amended. The 1993 amendments to Rule 11 provide as follows:
Rule 11: Signing of Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers; Representations to Court; Sanctions

(a)

SIGNATURE.

Every pleading, written motion, and other paper

shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's
individual name, or, if the party is not represented by an attorney, shall
be signed by the party. Each paper shall state the signer's address and
telephone number, if any. Except when otherwise specifically provided
by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by
affidavit. An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of the
signature is corrected promptly after being called to the attention of the
attorney or party.
(b) REPRESENTATIONS TO COURT. By presenting to the court

538. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c) ("If... the court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated,
").
the court may... impose an appropriate sanction ....
539. Supreme Court of the United States, Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
146 F.R.D. 507, 507 (1993) (dissenting statement).
540. Id. at 509 (dissenting statement).
Sess. (1995).
541. H.R. 988, 104th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1995).
542. S.300, 104th Cong., Ist
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(whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading,
written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is
certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and
belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such
as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in
the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein
are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the
establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have
evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to
have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the
evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on
a lack of information or belief.
(c) SANCTIONS. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to
respond, the court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the
court may, subject to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated
subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation.
(1) How Initiated.
(A) By Motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule
shall be made separately from other motions or requests and
shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but shall
not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21
days after service of the motion (or such other period as the
court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense,
contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court may award to the
party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and
attorney's fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion.
Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm shall be held
jointly responsible for violations committed by its partners,
associates, and employees.
(B) On Court' Initiative. On its own initiative, the
court may enter an order describing the specific conduct that
appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing an attorney,
law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated
subdivision (b) with respect thereto.
(2) Nature of Sanction; Limitations. A sanction imposed for
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violation of this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter
repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others
similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs (A)
and (B), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a
nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if
imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an
order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the
reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred as a direct
result of the violation.
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a
represented party for a violation of subdivision (b)(2).
(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the
court's initiative unless the court issues its order to show
cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the
claims made by or against the party which is, or whose
attorneys are, to be sanctioned.
(3) Order When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe
the conduct determined to constitute a violation of this rule and
explain the basis for the sanction imposed.
(d) INAPPLICABILITY TO DISCOVERY. Subdivisions (a) through (c)
of this rule do not apply to disclosures and discovery requests,
responses, objections, and motions that are subject to the provisions of
Rules 26 through 37.543

543. FED. R. Civ. P. II.
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